Disposition of surplus war property : by Steinmeyer, George William,
STEINMEYER, George William, 1918- 
DISPOSrriON o f  s u r p lu s  w a r  p r o p e r ty :  a n  
ADMINISTRATIVE fflSTORY, 1944- 49.
The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1969 
History, modem
University Microfilms, Inc.. Ann Arbor, Michigan
1
This dissertation has been |
microfilmed exactly as received 70-2338 |
THE UNIVERSITY OP OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE
DISPOSITION OF SURPLUS WAR PROPERTY: AN
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 1944-%9.
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 




GEORGE WILLIAM STEINMEYER 
Norman, Oklahoma 
1969






The abrupt ending of World War II caught both 
military and civilian planners by surprise. Without 
knowledge of the capability of the atomic bomb everyone 
had expected a longer war. Accordingly, those people 
responsible for reconversion to a peacetime economy 
found themselves short of time for planning and 
organization. In no area was this more evident than In 
the field of surplus war property.
The amount of surplus property was known to be 
enormous; estimates ran as high as $100,000,000,000,
Items were also tremendously varied: from small personal
objects, through jeeps and trucks, and to giant factories. 
Nevertheless, this huge variety could be divided Into 
five major categories: consumer's goods, maritime
equipment, war materiel and unsaleable aircraft, 
producer's goods, and real property. The last classifi­
cation Included surplus Industrial facilities which are 
the primary concern of this study.
It Is, however, difficult to treat Industrial 
facilities as a separate entity completely divorced from 
the entire surplus disposal Issue, since It was never so
111
considered by reconversion leaders. The Chief Executive, 
legislators, and administrators, in spite of the disparate 
factors involved, always considered the surplus as one 
big problem. Thus the administrative history of the 
entire surplus policy and disposal function must be an 
important part of this paper.
Prom the beginning there was divergence in thought 
about the proper role of the surplus in a peacetime 
economy. The poles of opinion ranged from those who felt 
that the social welfare of the greatest number was the 
primary objective, to those who were convinced that 
rapid sales at the top dollar, if consistent with the 
maintenance of a stable market, was the answer.
This disagreement was particularly evident in the 
disposition of industrial facilities because of their 
ratio to existing plant. It was conservatively 
estimated that government-owned surplus warplants would 
add 25 per cent to prewar productive capacity. Obviously, 
this huge investment, calculated to be about 
$15,000,000,000, would play an important role in the 
determination of the character of the postwar economy. 
Zealous social planners advocated government 
retention to assure full employment, to act as a bulwark 
against poverty, and to lessen the power of the business 
community. At the other end of the spectrum, extreme 
champions of private enterprise supported complete
iv
freedom of acquisition on the basis that what was best 
for American capitalism was best for the country.
This study, then, will center on attempts to 
define national goals and efforts to solve administrative 
problems. In the course of this investigation, close 
attention will be paid to the creation of a policy making 
establishment, to the passage of controlling legislation, 
to the combination of policy and disposal, and to the 
erection of a permanent policy and disposal structure. 
Hopefully, weaknesses will be pinpointed, strengths will 
be praised, and results will be tabulated.
Without unlimited assistance from many people, 
obstacles to the completion of this study would have 
been insurmountable. Librarians and archivists have been 
unfailingly kind and courteous in response to my unreasonable 
requests. Dr. Donald J. Berthrong, Chairman of the History 
Department at the University of Oklahoma, took time from 
his manifold duties to read the unfinished manuscript, to 
smooth numerous passages, and to correct awkward style.
To the other members of my committee, Dr. Arrell M. 
Gibson, Dr. William H. Maehl, and Dr. Jim E. Reese, I 
apologize for subjecting them to far too many pages of 
tedious reading. My colleagues on the History faculty of 
Texas A 5 I University have not only read drafts and 
corrected proofs, but have listened to my daily progress 
reports with forbearance and great good humor.
V
Dr. Gilbert C, Fite, George Lynn Cross Research 
Professor of History at the University of Oklahoma, gave 
aid and comfort far beyond the mere call of duty. He not 
only provided the finest professional assistance, but also 
the friendship and understanding which changes an arduous 
task into a joy.
Kathryn, my wife and co-worker, has labored 
unceasingly from the first research to the typing of the 
final draft. Without her I would not have started, let 
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In his farewell address delivered to a television 
audience on January 17, 1961, the usually cautious President 
Dwight D, Eisenhower warned of a serious threat to American 
democracy :
In the councils of government we must guard 
against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, 
whether sought or unsought, by the military- 
industrial complex. The potential for disastrous 
rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.^
This disturbing situation in time of peace was 
something comparatively new to American experience. 
Continuing world crises after the end of World War II 
created a condition by which the military could retain an 
inordinate amount of power. Even though there were no 
shooting wars. Sputnik and growing fear of "Red agression" 
enabled military leaders, in concert with their supplierr , 
to continue in the dominant role they had held during
^Ralph E, Lapp, The Weapons Culture (New York:
W. W, Norton & Company,”19bB), ll.
wartime. Such had not been the case after other wars.
Past generals had not failed to try, for to Justify 
generals there must be those to lead. After World War I
the Army General Staff pushed legislation which would have 
authorized a large standing army and universal military 
training; Congress, with no Immediate foreign threat, 
would have none of It,^
In the 1920s and 1930s the military assumed Its 
traditional peacetime role. With Its numbers and 
expenditures drastically cut by a niggardly Congress the 
military Influence on national affairs was negligible. Its 
officers were not consulted on matters of policy.
Diplomatic positions were assumed without regard to 
military preparedness, or lack of it. Military spending 
was the concern of a few specialized suppliers; Its 
contribution to gross national product was of no great 
Importance. ̂
The hard years of the Great Depression have yet a 
deep emotional Impact on remembering Americans, Those 
who evaluate New Deal policies fall to find real economic 
recovery until the beginning of military spending after
%red J. Cook, "Juggernaut: The Warfare State,"
The Nation. CXCIII (October 28, 1961), 284.
^Walter MiIlls, with Harvey C. Mansfield, and 
Harold Stein, Arms and the State: Clvll-Mllltary Elements
In National Policy (dew York: the twentieth Ùenturv Fund.
i95w r ^ - h . — ^
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September 1,, 1939. The Increasing war budgets of the 
Allied powers and defense spending by the United States 
government finally brought about recovery and full
temployment. This lesson was not forgotten after World War
II. Businessmen learn quickly when the company ledger 
sheet is involved. As the end of World War II approached, 
many recalled that since 1939 prosperity had been 
associated with generous military spending and depression 
with laissez faire and comparatively ineffective civilian 
pump priming.5 This realization created pressures —  
pressures increased by a willing military —  which 
influenced postwar reconversion. Reconversion policies 
were a giant step forward on the road to increased 
military and big business control of the national economy.
The alliance between those segments had begun soon 
after national leaders began to plan for United States 
defense against the threat of the European War. By mid-1940 
the Array-Navy Munitions Board and the National Defense 
Advisory Council had been established. ANMB's role was 
simply to coordinate military requirements and procurement,^
^Gilbert 0, Fite and Jim E. Reese, An Economic 
History of the United States (Boston; Houghton Mifflin 
Company, b27.
^Cook, "Juggernaut: The Warfare State," 285.
^Millis, Arms and the State. 54.
7but NDAC was empowered to begin economic mobilization.
Gross national product In 1940 had risen to $97*000,000,000, 
breaking the 1929 record, but there were still 9,000,000
Dunemployed.° Clearly there was plenty of opportunity for 
expansion Into war production.
At that time, however, big business was not eager 
to expend the necessary monies to build specialized 
munitions plants since they had been plagued with excess 
manufacturing capacity for the past ten years.^ Quite 
often small businesses received those early orders since 
they were more willing to convert and could frequently 
give the best d e l i v e r y . T h e  business community 
remembered World War I when Its experience with government 
contracts had not been happy. Contracts had been 
terminated abruptly; war Inventories had been allowed to 
languish on contractor's premises; no provision had been 
made for loans with which to reconvert; and claims had 
been paid slowly or even denied. With that experience
?Ibld., 55.
®A. D. H, Kaplan, The Liquidation of War Production.
A Research Study of the Committee For Economic Development 
(ïïew fork: McGraw.klll hook dompany, 1944), 3.
^"One-Plfth of a Nation Government-Owned." Business 
Week (June 19, 1943), 53.
Elberton Smith, The Army and Economic 
Mobilization. Part 5, The War Department of* Vol. IV; The 
United states Army In #orld War lï (WasElngton: U. S.
Government ï>rintlng ofTlce- 19^9), 413.
5
still in mind few large manufacturerers Jumped at the chance 
to expend huge sums when they saw little chance for 
profit.H
Through the summer of 1940 several attempts were 
made before a solution, albeit expensive, was found.
First tax concessions were used as an Incentive; one-fifth 
of the expense of plant expansion could be charged off 
against profits each year for five years. But this implied 
taxable profits and. In light of previous experience, who 
could be assured of profits?^ It soon became evident 
that the federal government would have to put up the 
money to encourage construction of additional plants.
NDAC came up with a plan which It called an Emergency 
Plant Facilities (EPF) contract. In this scheme the 
government agreed to pay the company for plant expansion 
In sixty equal Installments. With this contract as 
collateral the manufacturer borrowed the necessary 
expansion money from his bank. This was not advantageous 
to the government since It had to repay the loan out of 
money which had been authorized by Congress which meant 
that It was paying Interest on already appropriated funds; 
the operators did not like It at all. Even with an Iron­
clad government contract, bankers were Inclined to consider
lllbld.. 674.
^^"One-Flfth of a Nation Government-Owned,"
Business Week. 53.
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over-all Indebtedness; the Increase In which would limit the 
manufacturer's regular line of operating credit. It became 
increasingly clear that funds would have to be advanced 
openly, directly, and completely if a defense industry was 
to be built.
It remained for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 
headed by Jesse Jones, to come up with the answer. Within 
that organization the Defense Plant Corporation was formed 
on August 22, 1940. DPC built and paid for plant expansion; 
it then leased the facilities to the operating company 
for the duration of the emergency. In this way the lessee 
escaped capital expenditure, and rental payments were guar­
anteed by cost-plus contracts. Often DPC also Included 
a clause In the agreement which gave a company an option 
to buy the plant at the end of hostilities. Big business 
went for this plan in a big way.^3
Thus an acceptable arrangement was slow in being 
developed but that it would favor the industrialists was 
manifest from the beginning; it was conceived by big 
business; the midwife at its birth was the military.
Matthew Josephson, in Washington on an extended assignment 
for the New Yorker, saw the arrival of the money men;
During the summer, while London was being bombed, 
Washington fairly boiled with excitement. I haunted 
the headquarters of the NDAC in the new marble 
palace of the Federal Reserve Board on Constitution
13lbid.. 54.
Avenue and saw with my own eyes how the power 
elite was changed. As in I917 and again in 1933» 
under the Blue Eagle, a horde of dollar-a-year men 
converged on the capital to serve as deputies or 
assistants to the Defense Commissioners. The 
regular New Dealers, often seedy-looking professors 
or lawyers in baggy trousers, were quite outnumbered 
by the dollar-a-year men who stemmed from Wall 
Street, Chicago, or Detroit, and were usually 
spruce chaps in $200 suits. They came ostensibly 
to donate their services for the emergency as 
civilian patriots, but it was evident that they 
meant to keep a sharp eye out for their private 
business interests as well, since huge government 
contracts worth billions of dollars were being hand­
ed out day by day.
They moved in from General Motors, General 
Electric, U. S. Steel, Standard Oil, Wright 
Aeronautical, and United Aircraft; in short from 
the fifty giant corporations that controlled a 
third of America's industrial wealth. . . .
"After all," remarked one of the dollar-a-year 
men, "if you want quantities of powder and shell 
casings you^can't go to some New Deal professor to 
get them."^
The War Production Board was created on January 13, 
1942, with Donald Nelson, former head of Sears Roebuck and 
Company as chairman, to promote civilian control of the war 
economy. The military services, however, continued to 
control procurement functional^ and thus dominate 
allocation of plant construction. Close at the elbow of 
the military were the ubiquitous "malefactors of great
l^Matthew Josephson, Infidel in the Temple : A 
Memoir of the Nineteen-Thirties (New Ifork: Alfred A.
Knopf , -----------
l^Millis, Arms and the State. 82,
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wealth." Serving as the advisory staff to Brehon B. 
Somervell, Chief of Army Ordnance, were Bernard Baruch, 
Lewis Brown of Johns Manville, and Benjamin Pairless of
Ü. S. Steel.
The ever-vigilant Matthew Josephson noted that it 
was the generals and admirals who "specified and awarded"
75 per cent of the first $10,000,000,000 in contracts to 
the fifty largest corporations. Together, according to 
Josephson, they "laid the foundations for that 'military- 
industrial complex of whose all-pervasive power Dwight 
Eisenhower . . . would warn the country,"1?
The relinquishment of government ownership of the 
$15,000,000,000 in warplant construction, for the wildest
New Deal dreamer never seriously thought control could be 
retained, was in many ways more difficult and more complex 
than was the acquisition. The hopes, dreams, personal 
ambitions, and prejudices of rich men, poor men, beggar 
men, thieves; doctors, lawyers, merchants, chiefs— and 
before all else, veterans because of established priority- 
had to be considered before even the smallest shop or plant 
could be marketed.
If social considerations were difficult, organiza­
tional problems seemed almost insurmountable. The United
^^Cook, "Juggernaut: The Warfare State," 284.
17'Josephson, Infidel in the Temple. 505.
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States, In all Its manifest wisdom, chose to view the 
disposal of all surplus property as a single problem. 
Exactly the same organizational machinery was used to 
sell a five-cent pair of shoe laces as to dispose of a 
$100,000,000 steel mill.
Before examining actual warplant disposal, 
therefore, it is necessary to investigate general war 
surplus problems, including the attempt to find an 
efficient agency to direct the settling of an estate 
estimated as high as $100,000,000,000. Background of 
this quest stems from World War I experience.
Armistice Day for "the war to end wars" came too 
abruptly for the planners to think much about 
reconversion and surplus. As late as October 29, 1918 
the War Industries Board had appealed for vastly Increased 
production. In that same month numerous contracts had 
been let which anticipated a much larger army than the
1 o3 1/2 million men then in uniform.
In contrast to the war of the 1940s the end of 
World War I found the peak of production still to be 
reached.19 The Army, totally engrossed by a wln-the-war
William Hoyt Moore, "Termination of Contracts 
and Disposal pf Surpluses After the First World War,"
% e  American Economic Review* XXXIII (March, 1943),
1^8.
19peak Production in WW II was reached in November,
1943.
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psychology, had made no plans whatsoever for the flood of 
surplus which would soon engulf them. Not until twenty
days after November 11, 1918 were the first 150 men
onassigned to surplus property planning,
Bernard Baruch and some members of Congress, in 
August of 1918, had evinced interest in converting the 
War Industries Board into a Peace Industries Board when 
hostilities ended.21 The majority of Congressmen, 
however, listening to the demands of special industrial 
and commercial interests, sought only to relax the rigid
ppwartime controls as rapidly as possible.^ As a result 
Baruch resigned from the chairmanship of WIB which then 
went out of existence on January 1, 1919.^^ Not that the 
Chief Executive and the national legislature did not make 
numerous attempts to smooth the transition to private 
control. In 1944 when Congress was again discussing surplus 
property legislation it required three pages in the 
Congressional Record to reprint the legislative acts and 
Executive orders of 1919 and 1920 pertaining to that
^®Helen Puller, "Our Surplus Billions," The New 
Republic, CXIII (August 27, 1945), 252.
^^Kaplan, The Liquidation of War Production. 31.
ppJames Allen Cook, Marketing of Surplus W ^
Property (Washington: The Public Affairs Press, 1^47), 61.
^^Kaplan, The Liquidation of War Production. 31.
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s u b j e c t . I n  spite of this verbiage there was no 
centralized agency, no clean line of authority to guide the 
departments that owned the surplus. Since by far the 
largest portion of the excess materiel belonged to the 
Army, that organization had most of the headaches. To 
find a partial solution the War Department created a 
central selling control group known as the Office of 
Director of Sales. This office was to coordinate the 
efforts of the nine to fourteen selling agencies maintained 
by the Army. But even then chaos was the order of the 
day.25
It was difficult to find the most efficient selling
method. Sealed bids were tried, then fixed prices. When
these failed to produce desired results. Army salesmen
turned to direct negotiation and auction sales. Mail order
techniques had their day, with parcel post deliveries going
direct to consumers. When that proved to be unworkable
the Army Quartermaster opened seventy-seven retail locations
In scattered areas. Finally that genius of American
retailing, the "Army and Navy Store" operator, buying his
goods from the government, merchandized the bulk of the
26services’ surplus consumer goods.
p liU. S., Congressional Record. 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 
January 15, 1944, 6958-ëO.
25cook, Marketing of Surplus War Property. 61,
2^Moore, "Termination of Contracts," 148.
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Recommendations by government officials and Industry 
spokesmen varied widely regarding a preferred volume of 
sales. As a result selling was restricted for five months 
after the war's end to allow normal channels of trade to 
be re-established. For a short time thereafter, disposals 
were vigorously pushed only to be cut back again In 1920,
By 1921 officials became apprehensive of the large Inven­
tories still on hand and forced selling with a low recovery 
ratio was begun.
It was almost Impossible to determine how much surplus 
the United States actually owned. In 1945, writing from 
the vantage point of historical perspective, one authority 
gave the 1918 figure as $3,333,000,000 worth,^7 another 
raised It to $3,750,000,000,^® and a third upped the amount 
to between $6 and $7,000,000,000.^9 Whatever the final 
tabulation, the total Included over 250,000 different 
Items: on the list was 100,000,000 pounds of copper,
860,000 tons of nitrate, two years supply of wool, and about 
$200,000,000 worth of machine tools; to compound the problem 
If any of these were dumped It would break the regular 
domestic market.30
27ibld,. 144,
2®Puller, "Our Surplus Billions," 252,
29phll Kelly and Bake Young, "Shoes and Ships and 
Sealing Wax," Collier's CXVI (October 20, 1945), 28.
SOwoore, "Termination of Contracts," 144,
13
Another difficult question to answer was how much 
property should be retained and how much should be declared 
surplus. The permanent size of the postwar army had not 
been decided. Canned food, for Instance, could be retained 
If It was known how many were to be fed and how 
long canned goods could be kept. It was Impossible to 
get accurate figures on the amount of surplus that could 
be absorbed by other federal agencies. There was no 
central clearing house to evaluate the needs of state 
and local governments. The adaptability of an Item to 
peacetime use had a great deal to do with saleability 
and therefore with price. Harness, trucks, food and such 
Items were obviously useable, but what about machine guns? 
These eventually sold for twelve cents each on the scrap 
market,31
A large portion of the leftover property was still 
overseas. Many felt that It should be left where It was.
If It were, ships could be used to bring men home. Instead 
of materiel; adverse effect on the domestic market would be 
diminished and handling and maintenance costs could be 
reduced. Nevertheless property worth about $672,000,000 
was brought back after World War 1,32 More than half of the
S^Ibld.. 145.
3^Arthur Robert Burns, "Surplus Government Property 
and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs; An American 
Quarterly Review. XXIII (April, 19^5),
lit
surplus property that remained abroad was in Prance, The 
French government purchased most of this on credit which 
only added to the troublesome postwar debt; no credit sales 
of surplus, however, were made to the English, Time sales 
were made to the governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Roumanla, Russia, and 
Serbia, Foreign sales to Individuals amounted to about 
$228,000,000, Goods were also transferred, without cost, 
to the American Relief Administration and to the American 
Red Cross, Aggregate foreign sales, then, amounted to 
about $823,000,000 which was about 60 per cent of cost,^^
If the money had all been collected this would have been a 
far better performance than on the domestic scene.
Given the volume of domestic surplus and the lack 
of effective organization, scandal and mismanagement were 
sure to follow. Speculators grew rich, goods bought for 
pennies were sold for dollars, and canned goods, supposedly
ohspoiled, reappeared on grocer's shelves,^ The scandals 
In the office of the Allen Property Custodian and the 
Veteran's Bureau became well known but In other cases
50,000 bales of cotton were allowed to rot, over 11,000 
army cars were permitted to deteriorate Into junk, and 
bonfires were built with surplus warplanes. Furthermore
33lbld.. 486,
^^Background piece for World War II Surplus Problem, 
New York Times. December 3, 1944, lOE,
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scandals were unearthed that barkened back to the original 
purchase orders; the best iexample of which was the 900,000 
saddles purchased for the 85,000 cavalry horses I
The surplus problem would continue as much as officials 
might wish that it would go away. In 1920 the Secretary of 
War avowed that there had never "been a commercial problem 
comparable in extent and intricacy," and in 1921 he referred 
to the surplus as one of the "war h a n g - o v e r s B u t  the 
hang-over had not run its course even in 1921. As late 
as 1944 the Chairman of the Surplus Property Board announced 
that not only were there surpluses in government warehouses 
left over from World War I but that Spanlsh-American War 
surpluses were still on hand.3?
Most of the increased Industrial facilities for 
World War I were built by private Industry but the problem 
of disposal of the government's share was nonetheless 
bothersome. The United States had invested approximately 
$600,000,000 in seventy-two separate installations. Sixty- 
seven of these, costing $467,000,000, were turned over to 
private industry with a 4 per cent return to the government. 
Five DuPont munitions Plants costing $115,000,000 brought
^^Moore, "Termination of Contracts," 144. 
37,
Cook, Marketing of Surplus War Property. 62.
Ibid.. 63.
^®Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization. 235.
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$6,800,000.39 In the case of the $5,000,000 received for
a $65,000,000 plant in West Virginia the Justice department
felt that it would have been better to have given it away
since litigation costs attendent to the sale ran higher
than the selling price. Lack of planning and willingness
to sell at any price just to "get rid of it" led to this 
40dismal result. The only happy result, and this was due 
to a long vigorous fight by a group of willful men, was the 
retention of Muscle Shoals to form the nucleus of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority.
There were lessons to be learned from the World War I 
ordeal but circumstances were so different during and after 
the Second World War that the analogy cannot be carried 
far. The organization waging the Second War was a great 
deal larger and more sophisticated than for the first. War 
production had passed its peak in 1943 and there was some 
reconversion by 1 9 4 5 in 1918 the United States was striv­
ing for still more production. Nonetheless, World War I 
surplus experience did influence World War II thinking even 
if that influence was largely negative. Congressmen who 
remembered World War I when shaping the Surplus Property 
Act of 1944 attempted to avoid the mistakes that had been
39(
^Ibid.. 64.
xook. Marketing of Surplus War Property. 63. 
40,
^^Kaplan, The Liquidation of War Production. 68.
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iipmade. To avoid one of the pitfalls, planning started much 
earlier and was much more effective in World War 11,^3 
Disposal speed was emphasized in the Second War to cut down 
on the huge maintenance costs in comparison with the 
f i r s t , E v e r y  effort was made to consolidate agencies. 
Speculators were kept under better control; a system of 
government priorities kept the sharp operators from buying 
from one Ü, S, agency and selling to another. However, 
problems such as the retention of competent personnel were 
characteristic of both postwar periods. People were 
reluctant to remain on a Job that was obviously temporary 
when work was opening up in peacetime industry,
In the end. World War II planners did not learn 
much from the lessons of the World War I fiasco. Prom the 
beginning of production for the second war it should have 
been realized that the surplus problem would be many times 
greater than in the first. But planning was still too 
slow; there was still too much decentralization in selling 
agencies; Congressional guidelines were still fuzzy. And to 
top it off social considerations remaining from New Deal 
philosophy complicated the situation even further,
hoCook, Marketing of Surplus War Property. 60, 
^^Kaplan, The Liquidation of War Production. 25. 
^^Cook, Marketing of Surplus War Property, 65, 
^^ibid,. 68,
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Bernard Baruch, who was chairman of the War Industries 
Board In 1917-18, well remembered those years. He had 
offered to use his wartime know-how to help solve postwar 
problems but had been rebuffed. Roosevelt, however, used 
Bainich*8 talents to begin the planning for reconversion In 
World War II. But by 1944 circumstances were a great deal 
different, more complex, than In the first war. As shall 
be seen the recommendations of the Baruch-Hancock Report. 
while useful, were not the Infallible pronouncements that 
many Americans had come to expect from the most famous 
elder statesman of his era.
CHAPTER II
EARLY PLANNING AND THE BARUCH-HANCOCK REPORT
The culmination of pre-legislative planning for 
World War II surpluses came with the issuance of the 
Baruch-Hancock Report on February 15, 1944, Between 
World War I and the latter date, however, some efforts had 
been made, first to build an operational disposal 
organization and then, after the beginning of World War 
II, to start planning for reconversion to a peacetime 
economy. Operations In disposal for World War I were
handled by the owning agencies, primarily the Army and 
Navy. The job was nearly completed by 1926,^ although 
nuisance items continued to turn up. In an 
attempt to end the embarassment attendant to government 
disposal on one hand and government purchase of duplicate 
items on the other, the Director of the Budget, on July 
27, 1923, created the Federal Coordinating Service in the
^James Allen Cook, Marketing of Surplus War Property 
(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1&4Y),6%,
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Bureau of the Budget.  ̂ its task was to coordinate the 
purchases and to transfer supplies between agencies and to 
dispose of surplus property. This service remained active 
until June 10, 1933 when President Roosevelt by Executive 
Order 6166, replaced it with the Procurement Division of 
the Treasury Department.
Although the authority of the Procurement Division 
was always rather nebulous, since Executive Order 6166 
was not completely clear, this Division functioned as 
both a policy and operating agency for a number of years. 
During that time, 1933 through 19*1, disposal of civilian 
property was not a big problem. Returns to the government 
in those years came to a total of about $200,000, Items 
sold included fixtures, broken motor parts, old furniture, 
a stuffed horse from the Smithsonian Institution and two 
stone eagles, weighing thirty tons each, originally 
designated as guardians for a government building. With 
World War II, however, it soon became evident that some 
provision had to be made to strengthen the policy function. 
The Procurement Division preferred to keep surplus 
property disposal as one of its functions but higher 
echelons ruled otherwise. Executive Order 9235, issued
^U. S. Federal Register, United States Government 
Organizational Manual, 1964-65 (Washington D. 6.,




October 16, 1942, transferred the policy-making power from 
the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department to the 
Bureau of the Budget. Since the policy function had thus 
been specifically assigned. Treasury on that same day in 
1942 moved to strengthen surplus operations; the Federal 
Property Utilization Branch was created within the 
Procurement Division to separate surplus disposal from 
acquisition,^
By the end of 1942 a number of planning groups in 
the United States had become interested in the postwar 
world, since Americans never seemed to doubt that they 
would win the war. At that time George B, Galloway 
conducted a survey for the Twentieth Century Fund which 
named 112 agencies, both public and private, that had 
begun to think about the direction society should take.
It is true that few of these were primarily concerned 
with surplus property, but in the end the effect of 
surpluses on the government's stake in the postwar economy 
would be difficult to ignore. The interested agencies 
were as divergent as the American Peace Society and the 
Corps of Army Engineers, or the National Association of
War Assets Administration, Office of Plans and 
Policies, Reports Division, Historical Branch, "Administra­
tive History of War Assets Administration and Predecessor 
Agencies," Compiled between March 1, 19^7 and October 1, 
1948 (Unpublished Typescript in Federal Records Center, 
Springfield, Virginia), no consecutive page numbers.
Cited hereafter as "WAA History,"
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Manufacturers and the International Labour Office.^
In 1942, and through most of 1943, one of the most 
progressive of the planning bodies was the National 
Resources Planning Board.^ It was not long-lived. Having 
been created by Executive Order on July 1, 1939, It died by 
legislative flat on January 1, 1944,^ The NRPB became a 
center of controversy when one of Its reports. Issued 
early In 1943, advocated extensive governmental control 
over the postwar economy. Although a great majority of 
Americans thought otherwise, the report contained the 
uncommon Idea that a postwar depression was not necessary.
If, with continued governmental action, such as retention 
of control of war plants, national Income could be kept 
at about $120 billion annually there would be no
O
unemployment. Roosevelt did not push the report, 
according to J. Raymond Walsh, because of a conservative 
Congress and a popular "misunderstanding of the alms of 
such agencies." Walsh, a former Harvard Economics professor 
and official In the C.I.O., felt that Roosevelt was
^George B. Galloway, Postwar Planning In the United 
States (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1942), VII-IX,
^Bureau of the Budget, The United States at War: 
Development and Administration of the War program fey the 
federal Government (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1946), m ':-------
^Organizational Manual. 655-56.
oJ. Raymond Walsh, "Action For Postwar Planning,"
The Antioch Review. Ill (June, 1943), 154.
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"undoubtedly waiting for public opinion to catch up with 
the Ideas of this enlightened d o c u m e n t . I n  Its report 
NRPB made two specific proposals for the disposal of war 
plants: first that plants, especially those producing
basic metals and materials, should be divided among 
producers, large and small, to ensure competition; and 
second that some partnerships of business and government 
should be established to make certain that the plants 
be used for the greatest common good.^® The program was 
never adopted. Few Congresses had been more conservative 
than the Seventy-Seventh,^^ and legislation passed In 
August 1943 specifically abolished NRPB.^^ Walsh was 
fearful of the result If some positive program were not 
adopted. During the war, he Insisted, "big business was 
getting bigger and small business smaller"; thirty 
thousand concerns had gone under In Chicago alone In 1942 
and the first part of 1943. "Many of these small 
entrepreneurs are bitter," he said, and It was "such a 
group of disgruntled middle-class business men who turned 
to Hitler as their s a v i o r . I n  Walsh’s opinion only
9lbld.. 153.
l^Lewls Corey, "Problems of Peace: I, War Plants,
The Antioch Review. Ill (September, 1943), 446.
l^Walsh, "Action for Postwar Planning," 153.
^^Organizational Manual. 656.
^^Walsh, "Action for Postwar Planning," 157.
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Immediate planning, popularization of the ideas of the NRPB 
report, and prompt action could save the n a t i o n . B u t ,  
eventually, it would be continued military spending instead 
of the healthy civilian economy envisioned by Walsh that 
would bring full employment.
It was at this same time that Congress began to 
turn its attention to the surplus property problem. Its 
approach, however, was narrow; Congressional leaders, as 
yet were too interested in winning the war to find time to 
develop a postwar blueprint. The first tentative wartime 
surplus property legislation introduced in 1942, H, R.
2795, only incidentally dealt with war production surpluses; 
specifically it was designed to handle the accumulation 
of such defunct agencies as the Works Progress Administra­
tion and the National Youth Administrâtion. Representative 
Robert Hale, of Maine, was of the opinion that this bill 
was well drafted and would have lessened the need for haste 
when the Surplus Property Act of 1944 was d e b a t e d . W o r k  
on H, R. 2795 had actually begun in the Senate Committee 
on Appropriations in July 1942; it was introduced in 
the House of Representatives that fall and passed 
unanimously on the following June 9, 1943,^^ It was
l*Ibid.. 159.
S.. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 
March 16, 1944J 6 9 ^ ---- --------
l^Ibid.. 2216.
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Introduced In the Senate early In 1943 but was never
considered. Thus the first Congressional attempt to deal
with surplus property came to nothing. Hale was disappointed
in the lack of action since, with passage of legislation,
control of surplus property would have remained in
Congressional hands instead of in the executive department
where the Baruch-Hancock Report and Executive Order 9425
eventually put it.^?
In the meantime the Defense Plant Corporation
which had built the bulk of the government-owned
manufacturing facilities began to realize that to get rid of
its plants would be, in some ways, a larger job than
building them. When it began to figure out what it owned,
DPC found that inventory alone was no small task. By June
1943 it was in the midst of totalling, first, its holdings
in machine tools and, second, factories themselves. The
job was of such magnitude that the inventory had to be
1Aput on punch cards,
DPC was not the only agency building installations 
that would become surplus at the end of the war. The 
Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission had also authorized 
construction. The total, for all agencies, had reached
l?Ibid.. 6994,
lG"one-Pifth o 
Week (June 19, 1943), 56,
1A O f a Nation Government-Owned, "Business
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about $33,000,000,000 of which between $15,500,000,000^^ 
and $16,900,000,000^0 were In industrial facilities.
Almost 100 per cent of these facilities had been built with 
public funds; private money was largely used to finance 
small, integrated projects. This was clearly indicated 
by the fact that the average cost of each private financed 
addition, from the beginning of the emergency to October 
of 1942, was $270,000, while the average cost of each 
government financed addition was $6,700,000.^1 Percentage 
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As a percentage of total industrial investment, the 
government’s share was most impressive: at least one-
^A. D. H. Kaplan, The Liquidation of War Production. 
A Research Study of the Committee f̂ or Economic Development 
(liew Ÿork: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1944), 14.
^^Glenn E. McLaughlin, "Industrial Adjustment at 
the End of the War: Wartime Expansion in Industrial





Kaplan, Liquidation of War Production. 101.
27
fifth of the nation's total. In the war Industries, some 
of them basic to the whole economy, the percentage was 
even greater: 10 per cent of steel Investment, 50 per cent 
of the capacity to produce machine tools, 70 per cent of 
aluminum plants, 90 per cent of aircraft factories, and 
96 per cent of magnesium facilities.^3
The figure of one-fifth of total production was for 
wartime and could not be projected precisely Into the 
postwar economy. In the first place the one-fifth figure 
was computed by using pre-war prices for existing plants and 
wartime prices for additionsj wartime prices were much 
higher. Also the wartime plants would not all be useable 
In the postwar economy. A, D. H. Kaplan, therefore, 
figured the probable percentage of government-owned 
postwar facilities at about 15 per cent of the nation's
total.24
That so much of the postwar industrial plant would 
be owned by the government was frightening to spokesmen 
for the business community. Business Week declared:
Without anyone's intending it, almost without 
anyone's noticing It, large sectors of American 
Industry have been socialized during the last 
three years. The old bugaboo of government 
ownership of industry has become an accomplished 
fact as a mere Incident to the drive to create a 
munitions industry in a peaceful country.
23corey, "Problems of Peace," 439.
p hKaplan, Liquidation of War Production. 89.
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In other times, decades of controversy would 
have resulted from a proposal that the government 
assume physical ownership of about a fifth of the 
Industrial capacity of the country. Yet, since 
19^0, the government has done exactly that, has 
done It with hardly any controversy, has done It 
under the auspices of Industry Itself and of the 
most conservative elements In the administration.
And no one has cared much. ^
The figure was Just as frightening, but for a 
different reason, to those somewhat further to the left, 
Lewis Corey, writing at about the same time, in The 
Antioch Review, warned:
Monopoly corporate Interests have already swung 
Into action to absorb, on their own terms, the 
most profitable of the government plants and to 
scrap the "unprofitable surplus" facilities. The 
monopoly oligarchy, which has killed free 
enterprise In the many areas It dominates, calls 
upon government In the name of "free enterprise" 
to give the oligarchs a vast new Industrial empire 1 
. . . But why give to private monopoly corporations 
a new Industrial empire created by public 
Initiative, public Investment, public enterprise?
For most observers the very existence of the vast 
amount of government-owned facilities raised questions.
Would the government retain any of Its Industrial plant? 
Would It be a threat to private enterprise? Would It add 
to the power and concentration of big business? Would 
outlying communities Insist on keeping their war industries? 
Would the additional plant be subsidized to create employ-
25"0ne-Flfth of a Nation Government-Owned," Business 
Week. 53.
^^Corey, "Problems of Peace," 44l.
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ment? Would It mean keeping the government in business? 
Should the plants be dismantled or shipped abroad to reduce 
domestic surpluses? Would the government try for a quick 
sale or temporarily lease the facilities until ultimate 
demand could be gauged?^? Whatever others might think, the 
prevalent mood In Congress as expressed by Walter P. George 
of Georgia, Indicated that "all of those [facilities] that 
the domestic economy can absorb should be sold to private 
Industry at the earliest possible moment."^8
This was really a foregone conclusion that must be 
accepted before serious consideration can be given to 
other aspects of plant disposition. The country was not 
moving toward socialism; for the time being, at least, 
capitalism and private ownership were to remain the basis 
of the American economy.
Other than the assurance that the government-built 
facilities would finally go to private owners, perhaps the 
most pressing consideration for the man-ln- 
the-street was that no one be allowed to steal the 
plants. Almost everyone had heard, at one time or 
another, how speculators had enriched themselves off 
government surplus In World War I. Already there had been 
a few scandals about consumer goods In World War II. Because
^^Kaplan, Liquidation of War Production, 87-88,
28Ü, S., Congressional Record. 78th Cong.. 2d Sess,, 
February 9, 19#',TIW.—  ---------
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of the newness of the plants and the need for them It 
would, no doubt, appear to most that practically all of 
$15 billion Investment could be recovered. But even 
before the war's end It was obvious that there were many 
factors that would preclude such a result. Quality of 
construction was generally quite high but such factors 
as convertibility to peacetime Industry, the huge size of 
some Individual Installations, and location with respect 
to market, sources of power, available labor, and raw 
material often entered Into the picture. In wartime, 
production costs are not the ultimate criteria In choosing 
a plant location, but In peacetime competition costs are 
all Important; the above factors all bear heavily on costs.
In many Instances It would be difficult to fit a particular 
plant, however capable of wartime production, into a peacetime 
Industrial blueprint,Therefore the price to be received 
from peacetime operators would perhaps be considerably less 
than anticipated.
Individual plants were not of great consequence In 
the overall picture. With few exceptions any plant In the 
country could be written off as salvage or scrap with 
little effect on WAA's total performance. But to the 
community In which that plant was located. Its fate was 
of the greatest gravity. Workers, civic leaders, area
^^Kaplan, Liquidation of War Production. 99-100,
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bankers, wholesalers, and even bartenders would have a 
stake in the effort to keep local plants operating. Again 
nearness to markets and raw materials, supplies of labor 
and power would be of prime importance. But there would 
be other factors as well. Transportation facilities 
could not be ignored, Perhaps the most serious drawback 
to many localities was their distance from traditional 
centers of industry. The Geneva Steel Plant, in Provo,
Utah, was far away from Pittsburgh and the home offices of 
its wartime operator. United States Steel, Cities on the 
prairies and plains such as Wichita, Dallas, Oklahoma City, 
Omaha and Kansas City had become wartime aircraft production 
centers; but the peacetime aircraft industry had operated 
entirely on the c o a s t s , W o u l d  it be possible for Douglas, 
Boeing, Martin, Consolidated, and North American to keep their 
interior plants in peacetime production far from headquarters 
and centralized supply. Many doubted that it would.
It was elementary economics, taught even by the 
era’s most popular parlor game, that monopoly and the 
absence of competition raised prices. Most people were 
concerned. They truly feared the increased control of 
big business since the big businessman was little trusted 
by the depression generation. They listened when the New 
Deal trust-buster Thurman Arnold warned that New Jersey
^^McLaughlin, "Industrial Adjustment at the End of 
War," 111,
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Standard was getting control of the synthetic rubber 
Industry.31 They worried when they read that Dow Chemical, 
who had controlled 100 per cent of prewar magnesium 
production, had substantial control of government-financed 
wartime facilities.3̂  Thus one of the foremost Interests 
to be protected was that of the small businessman. In the 
minds of most people he was the touchstone In the American 
way of life. Pew could aspire to the presidency of General 
Motors but all could hope to become the boss of his own 
small business. It was only self Interest to make certain 
that the big fellows be kept from getting all of the war 
plants.
Despite the worries and fears of John Q. Public 
about the surplus industrial facilities there were 
possible methods to dispose of them. The trouble would 
come In choosing the method to best satisfy the greatest 
number. Some planners advocated quick sale to get the 
plants In civilian production as soon as possible; others 
suggested decelerated sale until the optimum ultimate 
public good could be ascertained. Some said that the plants 
should be leased so that a measure of governmental control 
could be maintained. Some advocated that the plants be 
turned over to the wartime operators by the purchase options 
that had been written Into many DPC contracts; others said
3^Quoted In Corey, "Problems of Peace," 442.
3^Ibld.. 443.
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these should be cancelled since they were too favorable 
to business interests. Some proposed that the big plants 
be kept intact for greater industrial efficiency; others 
supported multiple-tenancy leases to give smaller business 
a chance. Some counselled government subsidy to ensure 
that plants remain in wartime locations; others rebelled 
at axiy government intervention above quick disposal. Some 
said that above all national defense should be considered 
and the plants, like battleships, should be mothballed; 
others adopted the attitude that world prosperity should 
be the foremost goal, so to cut down on domestic surplus 
and promote underdeveloped countries, the plants should 
be dismantled and sent abroad.
That something was to be done, whatever it might be, 
was evident by November of 1943, In that month General W.
P. Tompkins, Director of the Special Planning Division of 
the War Department's General Staff, recommended to the 
Under Secretary of War that the army study proposals for a 
central agency to handle postwar surplus.Also in 
November of 1943 the Senate established the Special Committee
^^These various methods of distribution may be 
found in all of the wartime writers on postwar problems.
Cook, Kaplan, McLaughlin, Walsh, Corey, and in publications 
such as Business Week. Nation's Business, and others.
9/1Memo W. P. Tompkins to Robert Patterson, November 
8, 1943, in War Department Piles, World War II Records 
Division, National Archives, Alexandria, Virginia, Pile 
WDSPD 400.73.
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on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning with Walter George 
of Georgia as chairman* In the same month the Truman 
Committee In the Senate turned Its attention to postwar 
problems. Before the latter committee Donald Nelson, 
Chairman of the War Production Board, testified that his 
agency had begun studying postwar production problems.
The most momentous move In a memorable month was made,
however, by James Byrnes of the Office of War Mobilization 
when he announced the appointment of elder statesman Bernard 
Baruch to head a unit In his agency to study reconversion.35 
It was the Baruch-Hancock Report, brought out by OWM, which 
would be the cornerstone upon which all reconversion plans. 
Including the disposal of surplus property, were based.
The Baruch-Hancock Report was made public on 
February 15, 1944.3^ Its authors were Bernard M. Baruch 
and John M. Hancock. The Issuing agency was the Advisory 
Unit for Post-War Adjustment Policies In the Office of War 
Mobilization.
Bernard M. Baruch was the original "barefoot boy 
from Wall Street," having been born In the rural 
community of Camden, South Carolina, In I87O. His family 
moved to New York In I88I. After graduating from City
35fiureau of Budget, United States at War. 464.
oc
^ Bernard Baruch and John Hancock. Report on War 
and Post War Policies (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1$44).
35
College he became associated with "the street" and his 
rapid rise to fame and fortune Is well known. By World War 
I he was wealthy enough that he could devote as much time to 
public affairs as he wished. He was the successful head of 
the War Industries Board from which position Hlndenburg 
reportedly said he,"won the war for the Allies." Even 
though a Democrat he served as advisor to Republican 
Presidents during the period of "Republican Ascendency."
When Franklin Roosevelt was elected It was widely surmised 
that Baruch would get a cabinet post, but word never came 
from on high and the two men drew apart.
With the advent of World War II, Baruch served the 
government In advisory posts and at one time was asked to 
head the War Production Board but Roosevelt changed his 
mind before the appointment was made p u b l i c . H i s  
connection with the reconversion problem came through James 
P. Byrnes, head of the Office of War Mobilization, with 
whom Baruch had worked on the synthetic rubber program. In 
reconversion he was to have a free hand to pick his own 
staff, and announce his own conclusions.^®
John M. Hancock started life as a North Dakota farm 
boy but he got as far away from the Great Plains as
®?Margaret L. Colt, Mr. Baruch (Boston; Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1957), Passim.
®®Bernard M. Baruch, The Public Years (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, i960),
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possible by serving a sixteen year pre-World War I hitch In 
the Navy where, as a supply officer, he was associated with 
Assistant Secretary Franklin Roosevelt. He went directly 
from the Navy to Wall Street and was the first non-Lehman 
to be given a partnership In Lehman Brothers, Investment 
bankers. Unlike Baruch he was a Republican and also unlike 
Baruch had never taken part In public affairs. His one 
gesture to Washington was when Hugh Johnson asked him to 
help with NRA, but Hancock took one look, said It would not 
work, and went back to New York. He had been associated 
with Baruch In private financial matters and had worked 
with him In the synthetic rubber program so when Baruch 
was asked to make the reconversion study, he asked Hancock
ogto go along.
The Report Itself was divided Into three parts: 
first, the letter of transmittal which summarized the 
major suggestions; second, the report Itself; and third, 
additions giving more extensive treatment of contract 
termination, surplus property, and the tightening of the 
Industrial war m a c h i n e T h e  three major steps that the 
letter of transmittal recommended were: one, to Increase
Industrial effort so that the War could be finished quickly; 
two, to return to peacetime enterprise; three, to get the
39"John Hancock— A Man Who Means Business,"
Business Week (January 15, 1944), 5.
iinBaruch and Hancock, Report. 1.
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government out of business by rapid termination of contracts, 
quick removal of government inventory from contractors* 
property, and insuring ready and orderly markets for all 
types of surplu s e s , T h e  Report criticized the scattered, 
part-time attention that had been given to postwar problems. 
It noted the half-hearted attention of the many executive 
agencies and the plethora of Congressional committees.
Hence it recommended that all executive effort "be brought 
together under a single, unforgetful mind." In Congress 
there should be, at the least, a single committee in 
each branch and at best a joint committee of Senate and 
House members to deal solely with the problem of war 
surplus. "The unified Executive and Congressional groups 
should then work together on a combined program of 
legislation and operations that will carry out the 
objectives that all of us share.
Delegation of authority to a single administrator 
was the first specific proposal for disposition of surplus 
property. There was no equivocation; there should be 
a "Surplus Property Administrator . . . with full 
responsibility and adequate authority for dealing with 
all aspects of surplus disposal." The Report continued 




of the Surplus Property Board, It was Implicit In Its 
membership that this board would be advisory In function.
Its members would Include representatives from "these 
agencies: War, Navy, Treasury, Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, Maritime Commission, War Production Board, 
Bureau of the Budget, Pood Administrator, Attorney 
General, Federal Works Agency, State Department, Foreign 
Economic Administration."^^ The Surplus Property 
Administrator would work In the Office of War Mobilization
illand would be appointed by the head of that agency.
It was clear that Baruch and Hancock Intended that 
the Administrator would only establish policy. They 
recommended that, "the work of actual disposal to be 
assigned to four major outlets; each operating In a clearly 
defined field with no overlapping, and following policies 
laid down by the Surplus Administrator." The disposal of 
consumer goods would be. the responsibility of the 
Procurement Division of the Treasury. Capital producer 
goods. Including warplants were to be handled by a single 
corporation within the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 
The Maritime Commission was to dispose of ships and maritime 
properties. Surplus food would be handled by the Food
^^Though referred to here as the Surplus Property 
Board, It Is later called the Surplus Property Policy 
Board, which title accurately reflected Its advisory 
capacity.
iiitBaruch and Hancock, Report. 13.
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Administration•
Perhaps the most widely quoted part of the Report 
was the admonition that "the business of all the disposal 
agencies should be conducted in a goldfish bowl,"^^ To 
supplement this policy of open public Inspection of all 
sales, each agency would be required to submit reports to 
the Administrator and to Congress.
The authors of the Report recommended that their 
findings be Implemented by Executive Order because of the 
"urgency for quick handling of Immediate surpluses." It 
was also their contention that experience gained under 
an Executive Order could be used In framing comprehensive 
legislation. To be certain that the Administrator's 
experience would be made available to Congress It was 
suggested that he be required to submit, as soon as 
possible, recommendations for needed legislation. The 
Report firmly denied that the authors* proposals should 
preclude further centralization If such a step was found 
to be desirable,
Both rugged Individualists, Baruch and Hancock 
next turned their attention to the choice of an 





come from New Deal or professorial ranks; he would not 
be a theorist or idealist:
We now emphasize the importance of the choice of 
a man for the post of Surplus Property Administrator,
He should be a man of proven executive capacity and 
business sagacity to deal with the multitude of 
problems that will arise in the sale of an endless 
variety of products and In meeting changing mar­
keting conditions. He should be a man of character, 
unquestioned Integrity and great courage to fight 
off the selfish interests that will be seeking to 
exploit these surpluses.
In the disposal of industrial facilities the writers
preferred outright sale to lease. But they agreed that
loans and credit sales could be arranged In order that
smaller enterprises might avail themselves of opportunities
otherwise denied them. Leases, they said, must be
carefully used: "This red flag of warning is raised:
Leasing must not become a hidden device for the Government
to compete with private plants; it must not become a hidden
48device for subsidies . , . In this same vein the two
pundits argued that local ownership should be encouraged 
but not to the point that the national interest would be 
Jeopardized. Fair selling prices and fair rentals should 
be the watchword. "In all surplus disposal, the national 
interest must govern. Local or particular trade interests, 





"The particular problems of small business have
been constantly on our minds," avowed Baruch and Hancock,
By small business, they said, "we think of the broad
background of enterprises, scattered throughout the
country, which rely largely on the Initiative and
resourcefulness of their Individual proprietors," To
protect the Interests of this class the authors suggested
that representatives of small businesses be Included on
the Industry Advisory Committees, Also a representative
of the Smaller War Plants Corporation would sit on the
Surplus Property Policy B o a r d , T o  protect small
business from the Inroads of monopoly It was recommended
that the Attorney General also be a member of the latter 
■51board,^ The possibility of breaking down the largest 
plants Into smaller units available to the little fellow 
received attention. The Report pointed out that few of 
the large plants could return fair value to the 
government anyway, since they were dlsadvantageously 
located and would be unprofitable to big business; high 
wartime costs would also make them unacceptable to the large
COcorporations,^ Were the problems of small business really 





Since the Baruch-Hancock Report was concerned with 
all of the problems of reconversion, of which surplus 
property was only a part, the surplus recommendations did 
not receive wide editorial attention. Such criticism as 
there was came largely from the left, although even that 
great and good friend of big business, Henry Luce's 
Fortune magazine, took a couple of sly digs at the Report.
In defending the value of the speculator in surplus sales. 
Fortune suggested that in the attack on speculators 
"pragmatism is mixed with puritanism" and noted that Mr.
Baruch who would "not be frightened if he met a speculator 
after dark," has urged "that all such entrepreneurs be 
avoided."53 Fortune further noted that in 1944 little 
information could be obtained on surpluses and that Mr. 
Baruch’s goldfish bowl was "filled with very muddy water."5^
Congressional criticism, voiced by Representative 
James J. Davis of Pennsylvania, centered on the recommendation 
of Executive action, Davis contended that the Constitution 
vested control over United States property in Congress.
He further argued that the Executive Order, resulting from 
the Baruch-Hancock Report, was not necessary in that 
"legislation designed to deal with this problem is already
53lbid.. 68,
5^"The War Inventory," Fortune. XXX (September, 1944),
250.
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far advanced In the legislative p r o c e s s . ”^5
William Green, president of the American Federation 
of Labor, speaking to the Economic Club of Detroit on 
January 28, 1944, was disappointed that there were no 
representatives of labor. Industry or agriculture on the 
proposed Surplus Property Board. He further doubted the 
ability of a single administrator, "who Is Influenced by 
a governmental administration psychology," to deal with 
postwar policy. His recommendation was that a 
Reconstruction Commission "upon which labor and management 
would be represented" be given the "responsibility of 
formulating the general policies to be followed by the 
administrator." The president of the A. P. of L. anticipated 
that "subtle bureaucrats" would criticize his suggestion.
They would say It was government by "pressure groups;" 
which term he Identified as "part of the new terminology 
of some government officials whose Ideas on America are 
bounded by the ten square miles of Washington."5^
Real hard line leftist criticism came from Donald J. 
Kingsley. He wrote that, "Baruch and Hancock, steeped In 
the wisdom of Wall Street," had glamorized the planning 
process so despised In the New Deal when planning was done
S., Congressional Record. 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 
March 3, 1944, 2?ïïï7
5^Wllllam Green, "Green Slams Beruch-Hancock Report," 
The American Pederatlonlst, LI (March, 1944), 9,
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by "bolsheviks" and "long-haired professors. But he 
continued that the Report had given planning the "high 
polish of reputability and a status unquestionably 
American. Mr. Alfred Sloan plans, why don't you?"5? 
Kingsley summarized his criticisms In one paragraph:
The report Is, on any grounds, an amazing 
document. It represents, more than anything else, 
the Imposition of a set of pious hopes upon a hard 
core of reactionary realities. It Is Victorian 
both In Its economics and Its optimism— and In Its 
genteel refusal to call a problem a problem. Its 
authors speak glowingly of the "traditional 
American spirit of private Initiative and 
resourcefulness" which, they hope, will make of 
the future "an adventure In prosperity." The 
picture Is an appealing one, painted In the best 
pre-Raphaellte manner and with as little regard to 
the more angular realities of life. It 
completely overlooks the somewhat relevant fact 
that the American spirit has been more constant 
throughout the years than have our adventures 
in prosperity, and the spirit itself was somewhat 
dampened by the long years of economic 
depression before the war. But this Is a pretty 
picture, nonetheless. In Its luminous red, white 
and blue, and many people will enjoy looking 
at It.2°
One of the reasons that there was no great body of 
criticism of the Report Itself was that only four days 
ensued between the Issuance of the document and the 
announcement of President Roosevelt's Executive Order 9425 
which followed the report to the letter. Evidently James 
Byrnes, who had followed the Report closely, had prepared
5?Donald J, Kingsley, "Serious Blunder on the 
Right," The Antioch Review. IV (March, 1944), 127.
S^Ibld.. 128.
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the Executive Order for the President since it was issued 
so quickly. Thereafter the Surplus War Property 
Administrator, Will Clayton, received the brickbats that 
might have gone to Baruch and Hancock. The Executive 
Order which created the SWPA followed the Report but, as 
will be seen, the legislation which Baruch and Hancock 
urged be passed, veered sharply away from recommended 
paths.
CHAPTER III 
THE SURPLUS WAR PROPERTY ADMINISTRATION
When, by Executive Order 9425, President Franklin 
Roosevelt, on February 19, 1944, created the Surplus War 
Property Administration, he followed almost exactly the 
dictates of the Baruch-Hancock Report. He did not Include 
all of the recommendations of the Report since the Executive 
Order was a short and simple document. In its first 
section, E. 0, 9425 established the SWPA In the Office of 
War Mobilization; It further stated that the surplus 
Administrator was to be named by and serve under the 
Director of OWM.^
The first paragraph of part two of E. 0. 9425 dealt 
with the Surplus War Property Policy Board. Although Its 
duties were not spelled out. Its membership was specified; 
the Board would consist of representatives of State, 
Treasury, War, Navy and Justice Departments, the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Smaller War Plants
^Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Executive Order 9425: 
Establishing the Surplus War Property Administration, 
February 19, 1945." Code of Federal Regulations. Title 3. 
The President. 1943-48 Compilation (Washington: 
government Printing Office, 155?), 303.
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Agency, the Maritime Commission, the War Production Board,
the Bureau of the Budget, the War Food Administration, the
Federal Works Agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and
2the Foreign Economic Administration, The President did 
not indicate how often the Board should meet, nor from 
what echelon agency representatives should be chosen.
Perhaps the greatest oversight was that guide lines to 
establish the authority of the Board were omitted.
The Surplus War Property Administration, which was 
to consist of the Administrator "with the assistance of" 
the Board, was empowered "to have general supervision and 
direction of surplus war property," Roosevelt also gave 
the Administration control of all surplus property transfers 
between government agencies. When section two of E, 0.
9425 assigned surplus disposal operations to other 
government agencies it relegated SWPA to a policy making 
role. Named as actual disposal agencies were; the 
Procurement Division of the Treasury Department for con­
sumers' goods, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for 
capital and producers' goods, the Maritime Commission for 
ships and maritime property, the Pood Administration for 
surplus food, and the Foreign Economic Administration for 
surpluses outside of the United States,^ Section three of 




Vover surplus property would thereafter reside In SWPA. The 
assignment of disposal duties gave the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation control of disposition of Industrial facilities.
It must be kept In mind that until the establishment of 
the War Assets Administration, anyone who wished to purchase 
a warplant had to go to RPC. The Surplus War Property 
Administration, the Surplus Property Board, and the Surplus 
Property Administration were only policy making organizations.
Section four of the Order empowered the 
Administrator to "prescribe regulations and Issue directions 
necessary to effectuate the purposes of this order," and no 
government agency can act "In contravention thereof."
Each agency was also required to give title to, and 
transfer property to the SWPA when It was declared surplus. 
Section five authorized the Administrator to use the 
services of other agencies and within the bounds of 
appropriated funds to set up such staff as he would require.
In section six "Surplus War Property" was defined as all 
property that any government agency no longer needed.*
On February 21, two days after E. 0 . 9425 was Issued, 
former Supreme Court Justice James P. Byrnes, the director 
of the Office of War Mobilization, named Texas businessman 
William Lockhart Clayton to the post of Surplus War Property
*Ibld. This definition would later prove to be 
Inadequate! As eventually used this type property would 
be "excess" to the owning agency and would become "surplus" 
when the disposal agency determined It was not needed by 
any agency of the government.
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Administrator,^ Will Clayton was born, the son of a poor 
cotton farmer, near Tupelo, Mississippi in 1880. When he 
was six years old his father lost the heavily mortgaged 
farm and the family moved to Jackson, Mississippi. Will 
taught himself shorthand and typing, became secretary to a 
cotton merchant, and moved to New York with his boss to 
work for the American Cotton Company. After rising to a 
responsible position there, he and his brother-in-law 
started their own company in Oklahoma City in 1904. That 
was just in time to take over the facilities of the 
American Cotton Company which went broke the month after 
Clayton left. The Clayton family and the business moved 
to Houston, Texas in 1915 where both continued to prosper.
In 1936 the firm survived Senate charges of manipulating the 
cotton market and emerged from the investigation stronger 
than ever.
During the growth of Anderson, Clayton and Company, 
Will Clayton became interested in the South American 
market so in August of 1940 he went to Washington as deputy 
to Nelson Rockefeller who was Co-ordinator of Inter American 
Affairs. In October of the same year he moved over to the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Clayton continued in 
various jobs in fellow Texan Jesse Jones's Department of
T̂he New York Times. February 22, 1944, 19. In 
this account and elsewhere he is always named "Will"
Clayton.
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Commerce until he became Surplus War Property Administra­
tor.^ His was the American success story; he was a shining 
light of the business community. Fortune magazine called 
him "one of the half-dozen ablest businessmen of his 
generation."7 Congressman John Cochran of Missouri agreed 
with the evaluation describing him as "one of the best
Qadministrators In Washington." The New Republic, however, 
was not so laudatory. While accepting his ability as a 
businessman, Helen Fuller accused him of helping Jesse 
Jones turn war production over to big business. The article 
also noted that the Mêlions and the Rockefellers had 
monopolized wartime production of synthetic rubber with the 
blessing of Jones and Clayton of RFC, so doubted the wisdom 
of giving Will Clayton "that tremendous power" over surplus 
property.^
Not only did Roosevelt follow the Baruch-Hancock 
Report In the Executive Order establishing SWPA, but Clayton 
also followed It In setting up the organization. The basic 
rules from the Report were adopted: sell as much as
^Ellen Clayton Garwood, Will Clayton: A Short
Biography (Austin. University of Texas press.Chrohblogy 192-40:
^"The War Inventory." Fortune. XXX (September, 1944),
109.
Q
U. S.. Congressional Record. 78th Cong.. 2d Sess.. 
September 18, --------
^Helen Fuller, "Surplus Property: Plunder or Plan?"
The New Republic, CXXX (September 4, 1944), 269.
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possible as early as possible without disrupting normal 
trade; listen to pressure groups but act In the public 
Interest; make no sales or leases to speculators or 
promoters; get fair market value and apply all monies to 
reduction of the national debt;^® sell In a goldfish bowl; 
use regular channels of trade; no government competition 
with private enterprise; no aid to monopolies; no state 
or sectional favoritism; reduce to scrap when necessary 
but destroy no useful material; do not sell anything that 
might aid In the drive for continuing high wages and living 
standards.This was no program for a social planner. It 
would be hard to Imagine ten rules better designed to 
preserve the status quo. Obviously, the vast business 
Interests of the country were safe In the hands of Clayton, 
Even the plan to reduce the national debt had been Included 
In the original Report as a program that "will aid all
business,
In view of Its purely policy function the 
Administration was able to keep Its staff small. In fact
l°As will be seen In Chapter IV, Treasury did not 
agree to direct application to debt reduction and It was 
never done,
lly, s.. Surplus War Property Administration, Report 
to the Director of War Mobilisation as to Activities Ùnaer 
Executive Order 9425.(October' $1. 2, cited
hereafter as SWPA ReporTI
1 PBernard Baruch and John Hancock, Report on War and 
Post War Policies (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1&44), 64, italics theirs.
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It was almost unbelievable that In those days of burgeoning 
bureaucracy the peak employment figure for SWPA was "fifty- 
five officers and employees. Including all stenographic 
and clerical p e r s o n n e l . T h e  staff was divided Into 
three groups. First there was a small central Administra­
tor, his deputy, an Executive Assistant and the General 
Counsel; It also Included the Secretary of the Policy Board 
and the Information Chief. The second group consisted of 
those whose primary function was to deal with the owning and 
disposal agencies. The third group contained experts In 
various fields of Industry who were therefore experts In 
those disposal categories.
In his report to Byrnes, Clayton referred to his 
people as of "consistently high caliber," but complained 
of the difficulty of attracting and keeping them. Clayton 
blamed this on the fact that surplus disposal would not end 
with the war— as he put It: "on the obvious post-war
continuation and accentuation of the surplus problem." On 
first thought one Is Inclined to think Clayton's statement 
erroneous. Difficult to keep competent people on a well- 
paying, long term job? Ridiculous I But, then It Is 
remembered that Clayton's men were not ordinary government 
employees. They were. If not dollar-a-year men, at least
ISsWPA Report. 5. 
l*Ibld.
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members of the business establishment only doing their 
wartime stint In Washington. They wanted out of government 
service and back In regular careers as quickly as possible. 
So, If businessmen were not readily available, how about 
their natural allies, the military? Clayton acknowledged 
that "except for the cooperation of the Armed Services in 
assigning personnel," staff shortages would have been 
"even more serious." As it was, no Assistant Administrator 
to deal with Procurement was ever appointed, and there were 
other gaps as well.^^
The Idea of SWPA as a policy making body operating 
with a small staff was discussed at the first meeting of 
the Surplus War Property Policy Board on March 1, 1944. 
Major General Lucius Clay, speaking from experience as an 
Army Service Forces officer, was in complete agreement 
with the Idea of a small staff and "policy only" function, 
since he had seen the paper work attendant to disposal of 
materiel In a few contract terminations. He was convinced 
that a centralized operation large enough to handle surplus
policy and actual disposal would be impossible to gather 
within a reasonable time. Harold Smith, Chief of the 
Bureau of the Budget, naturally was pleased with the 
economy of a small organization, but warned that the lack
15ibid.. 6.
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of personnel might reduce efficiency.
On overall view, the Surplus War Property Board
seems to have been rather ineffective. To be sure, its
first meeting was attended by such top officials as the
Attorney General and the Chief of the Bureau of the Budget,
and it appeared that it might assume considerable stature.
At that meeting, however, it became obvious that the
Policy Board would have little power. Attorney General
Biddle inquired as to the nature of the Board's authority.
Would it be advisory to the Administrator or would a
majority vote of the Board set definite Administration
policy? Executive Order 9425 had been far from clear on
this point. Clayton was abundantly positive in his stand.
While he would give careful attention to recommendations
of the Board, since he had the final responsibility he
would be the final authority. Thereafter the top men
1 Ain the agencies no longer attended Board m e e t i n g s . I n  
fact, meetings became less frequent. Clayton reported to 
Byrnes: "For a considerable period it met weekly, and
^^"Minutes of the First Meeting of the Surplus War 
Policy Board." Cited hereafter as "Minutes SWPPB." Cited 
in U. S., War Assets Administration, "Administrative 
History of War Assets Administration and Predecessor 
Agencies." (Unpublished typescript in Federal Records 
Center, Springfield, Virginia, Box 62-A-982 #7). Cited 
hereafter as "WAA History."
l?Ibid.
1A"The War Inventory," Fortune. 109.
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thereafter bi-weekly with occasional postponements.”^^
In his report, Clayton tried to magnify the Board's 
importance since it had been created by the President's 
Executive Order, ”The Board”, he insisted, "was a genuine 
working Board, whose discussions and advice had great 
influence on shaping the policies of the Administration." 
But later he was forced to admit that no formal votes were 
taken and "it was sometimes a practical necessity to take 
action first then report to the Board later.
Specific problems having to do with warplant 
disposal were brought up as early as the first meeting of 
the Policy Board. Admiral Emory Land, of the Maritime 
Commission, questioned the Board concerning disposal of 
a shipyard in Texas. The Attorney General felt that the 
whole question of the sale of real property needed more 
study and a policy level subcommittee was formed of 
representatives of Justice, War, Navy, and the Budget 
Bureau.
The shipyard referred to by Admiral Land was the 
San Jacinto yard near Houston, Texas; it was the first 
warplant disposal made by any surplus property agency. 
Business Week reported that contractors were studying
l^SWPA Report. 6.
2°Ibid.
21"Minutes SWPPB” cited in "Administrative History."
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the disposition in an effort to find clues on future policy.
Pew, however, were found since the sale was quite simple.
The shipyard had been built by the Defense Plant Corporation
for the Maritime Commission and had been leased to San
Jacinto Shipbuilders for making concrete barges. The
Maritime Commission concluded the contract for barges on
December 31, 19^3, and declared the facility surplus. After
the SWPA was formed Clayton cleared the shipyard for sale
and after that the only problem was to find a buyer. It
was not a large deal since all of the equipment had been
removed, leaving some buildings and forty acres of ground.
An independent appraiser set fair value at $188,750, The
property was advertised and DuPont was the high bidder at
$200,000, SWPA quickly approved and RPC closed the deal.
There were no social questions, no veterans involved, and
no question of monopoly, DuPont only wanting the land as
part of an BOO acre piece it was putting together for a
PPpetrochemical complex. Although this was, seemingly, a 
great start for SWPA since the price received was above 
appraised value, the government actually did not make out 
that well. It had put about $2,000,000 in the whole project 
and even with the remaining equipment it would lose a 
considerable sum.^S
^^"Plant Disposal,” Business Week (March, 18, 1944),16,
23lbid,. 17,
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The second disposal approved by SWPA created interest 
because it was one in which the government-owned plant was 
a part of, or attached to, a privately owned shop. This 
made it a "scrambled facility" and to add to the interest it 
was under option. This brought the value of such options to 
the attention of government contractors and to Business 
Week as well. DPC had built a $22 million addition to a 
Bethlehem Steel plant. Since it was a scrambled facility 
and it fit Bethlehem*s postwar plans, the company simply 
exercised the option and took the plant over at cost.
Business Week pointed out, however, that even though many 
DPC plants had such option clauses, contractors were not 
apt to take them up with alacrity because "in most cases the 
options [were] no bargains." Even if high wartime costs were 
discounted the depreciation allowance was no gift. In most 
DPC contracts depreciation was limited to 5 per cent annually 
on buildings, 12 per cent on standard tools, and 25 per 
cent on hand tools; this was not nearly enough to compensate 
for high original costs and multiple shift use. Also DPC 
options were generally "all or nothing" contracts; attrac­
tive portions could not be singled out and bought sepa­
rately.^^
Admiral George P. Hussey, Chief of the Navy Bureau 
of Ordnance, however, held a different view of options, at 
least relative to the machine tools in industrial plants.
Z^Ibid.
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Speaking to a meeting of the National Association of 
Manufacturers, he anticipated that most contractors would 
take up their options and stated that there would not "be a 
very large quantity of machine tools in the Ordnance field 
to be disposed of through the Property Disposal Organization 
currently set up under Mr, Will Clayton,Furthermore, 
if the Admiral had his way, few Ordnance plants would be 
disposed of; they would, instead, be kept in standby.
Whether they would be operated or, as he put it, laid up 
"in grease" would depend on the size of the postwar Navy.
His greatest wish was that, in any case, adequate funds 
would be provided by Congress for a good research and 
development program. He concluded his speech to the NAM:
"I hope that you gentlemen will be found earnestly
26supporting such a program," In light of continuing 
cooperation between the manufacturers and the military, 
his wish was not an idle one.
Even as SWPA, the first surplus property agency, was 
supposedly swinging into high gear, there was a great deal 
of sentiment in favor of change, William Green's suggestion 
that the Surplus War Property Administration be replaced by 
a National Reconversion Board was considered but that was as
25"Retain DPC Plants as Insurance, Admiral Hussey 
will Recommend;* The Iron Age, CLIII (May 11, 194%), 11%,
Z^Ibid,
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far as It got.^f Fortune opined that the disposal job
would prove to be too big for a civilian agency and that
eventually the Army might have to take over the job.^®
Representative Ralph Davis did not think that the SWPA
was necessary at all; Procurement, the Department of
Commerce, and the Civil Aeronautics Authority would. In
his opinion, all be able to handle the job without help
2Qfrom an additional agency. ^
Due to disagreement over Impending legislation. Will 
Clayton tendered his resignation as Surplus War Property 
Administrator before his first report to OWN Director,
James Byrnes, was made public on October 31, 1944. Never­
theless, this report was a survey of his entire term as 
Administrator, and was not optimistic In tone. Clayton 
seemed to be of the opinion that, under different 
circumstances, more might have been accomplished, and he 
naturally acknowledged that the big job lay ahead.
Clayton frankly admitted that It was difficult to get 
an accurate picture of just what the government did own In 
surplus Industrial facilities. He counted 1,146 government- 
owned, privately operated warplants but he numbered scrambled 
facilities in the general term of "several hundred." He
^^New York Times « May 26, 1944, 25.
28"The War Inventory," Fortune. 109.
S., Congressional Record. 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 
March 3, 1944, 22177
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admitted; "It*8 this latter category that makes It difficult 
to get an exact figure of government plants o w n e d , A s  
accomplishment he listed twelve plants sold under option, 
twenty-two additional plants which had been declared surplus, 
of which five had been reclaimed by the owning agency and 
seventeen were still for sale.^^
He cited the need for prompt and intelligent planning 
and indicated several areas where such plans were under 
consideration. The Armed Services, Clayton said, were 
determining their postwar needs as to stand-by plants, war 
reserves, and machine tools to modernize arsenals. He 
commended DPC for gathering complete information, which 
included suggestions for prospective peacetime use, on the 
plants under its c o n t r o l . H e  said that this survey was 
95 per cent complete. Clayton also described a 
"Briefalogue," prepared by DPC, through which a prospective 
buyer could tell at a glance what the agency would have 
for sale at the war's end. And, he reported, DPC was then 
surveying its option holding contractors to find whether or 
not they intended to exercise those options.
When Clayton discussed the Surplus War Property 
Administration itself, he mentioned studies made regarding 





said that England had succeeded with such a plan where 
"transportation was good and the plants were adjacent to 
large consumer markets,"33 But he concluded laconically: 
"Most government-owned plants are not so located,"3^
Pricing policy was, naturally, of utmost concern. 
Realistic prices would have to be quoted if plants were 
to be sold at all and if the government was to get a decent 
return on the sale. The actual cost of the plant was readily 
available, but deducted from this figure was the high 
cost of wartime construction, depreciation, and cost of 
converting to peacetime use; that which was left was the 
basic price,35
The initial performance of SWPA was not very 
impressive. Will Clayton, "one of the half-dozen most 
capable businessmen of his generation,36 and "one of the 
best administrators in Washington,"3? did not enhance his 
reputation by dealing with surplus government property.
But Clayton was not alone in this; he was only the first 
of eight otherwise capable men who ultimately found the 




3^See above footnote 7. 
3?8ee above footnote 8,
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During Clayton’s time as Administrator he received
comparatively little criticism from his contemporaries. In
fact, the leadership of the House of Representatives
patterned its version of the Surplus Property Act on his
recommendations. It was not until people began to realize
that policy decisions and vital organizational steps had
been ignored or postponed that the critics began to be
heard. Official designation of operational disposal
agencies were three months in coming and after the agencies
had been designated, SWPA did not issue operating procedure
to them during its entire seven and one-half months of
existence. No clear and definite information was
distributed to potential purchasers of either consumers*
or producers' g o o d s . T h e  Senate found it difficult to
get information on surplus property and on June 15, 1944,
petitioned President Roosevelt to ask that it be informed
oqof the situation within three months.
Clayton was criticized for his attempts to heed the 
demands of pressure groups. This, it was said, led to 
compromise and decisions that were not "in the general 
public I n t e r e s t . T h e  ever-pungent New Republic claimed
^®James Allen Cook, Marketing of Surplus War 
Property (Washington: Public Affairs &ress, 194?), 69.
S., Congressional Record. 78th Cong. 2d Sess,, 
June 15, 1944, 5533T
^Ojohn D. Sumner, "The Disposition of Surplus War 
Property," The American Economic Review. XXXIV 
(September 1944), 461,
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that, when the Surplus Property Act of 19^4 was passed. 
Congress substituted a three-man board for a single 
administrator, "primarily as a way of getting rid of Will 
Clayton,
In the final analysis, the Administrator’s reputation
rested on his success in disposing of surplus property, and
Clayton did not dispose of much. By September 9, 1944,
SWPA held $451,000,000 in property declared surplus to it
ii?and had sold only $38,000,000 worth. At the end of the
short, happy life of the Surplus War Property Administration
it had sold only $83,000,000 worth of the $552,000,000
43that had been turned over to it.
Failure of SWPA can be, at least partially explained 
by the fact that from the beginning the agency knew that
it would be superceded as soon as Congress passed the
necessary legislation. Moreover, it was handicapped in 
its initial search for competent personnel, and it had to 
deal with newly created organizations on the operational 
level. Its authority was not clear-cut, and a great deal
of the time its top leadership was taken up in testimony
before Congressional committees, and even in drafting
^^Helen Puller, "Our Surplus Billions," The New 
Republic. CXIII (August 27, 1945), 252.
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^^New York Times. September 10, 48,
’Cook, Marketing of Surplus War Property. 70,
61}
versions of the proposed surplus property legislation,^^ 
Clayton hoped that, through his efforts, forthcoming 
surplus property legislation would reflect his attitudes 
on the Surplus property problem. As will be seen, he was 
able to sway the House, but the Senate would not listen 
to the Surplus War Property Administrator,
**Ibld,
CHAPTER IV 
THE SURPLUS PROPERTY ACT OP 1944
Given the magnitude of the surplus property problem 
and the certainty that sooner or later the nation would 
have to find a permanent solution, it is, in retrospect, 
difficult to understand why disposal legislation was not 
quickly enacted. It must be remembered, however, that the 
United States was still in the middle of a war, and that 
Congressional effort was constantly directed to that end 
until late 1943 when, at last, an adequate war machine had 
been fashioned. It was not until November of 1943 that the 
peak of war production was reached, and in that same month 
the first Congressional hearings were held to seriously 
consider postwar problems.
The Senate Committee on Post-War Economic Policy 
and Planning was formed by Senate Resolution 102 in March of 
1943, but it was not until fall that it began to meet.^ One 
of its first witnesses was James P. Byrnes, Director of the
^U, S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee on 
Post-War Economic Policy and Planning, Hearings. 78th 




Office of War Mobilization, who emphasized the importance 
of legislation on the subjects of contract termination and 
surplus property disposal. He said that we had to solve
pthese problems and "if we do not we are sunk,"
Lest it be forgotten that the war was far from over 
it should be remembered that on the day that Byrnes was 
testifying the Marines were landing on Bouganville and 
still had Tarawa, Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Peleliu, Saipan, 
Tinian, Guam, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa to capture. In western 
Europe the Germans still held their line in central Italy 
and the Allies would not establish a second front for 
another seven months. In eastern Europe the Russians 
would turn the tide against the Germans in the recapture of 
Kiev on November 7, 1943.
In the November committee hearings, nonetheless, 
the focus was on postwar problems. Senator Claude Pepper, 
the fiery Florida liberal, advocated intelligent postwar 
planning. He favored leaving productive capacity in private 
hands but wanted some government intervention and stimula­
tion. He said that the government could influence the post­
war economy by "giving a little bit over here and maybe
holding back a little bit over t h e r e . T h e  government- 
owned surplus was ready made for "giving and holding."
^Ibid.. November 5, 1943, 405.
Sibid.. 415.
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Under Secretary of War Patterson, however, testified 
that not all of the plants would be available for disposi­
tion. In particular, he forecast holding in reserve those 
plants which manufactured material which the Armed Forces 
were likely to find in short supply at the beginning of any 
national emergency. In any legislation acceptable to the War 
Department, plants which could be used for long range weapons
research and development would also be held in strategic 
4reserve.
The strategic reserve, however, would be a small 
percentage of the total surplus. Most of it would have 
to be made available to private ownership and legislation 
was necessary to do this. Before deciding on the issues, 
legislative committees listened to witnesses with almost 
every shade of political and economic opinion. Among the 
most conservative was the National Association of 
Manufacturers who lobbied for an eight point program for 
surplus disposal which included: prompt declaration of
any plants to be used for strategic reserve; establishment 
of a surplus property board which would be independent of 
any existing agency; an immediate and accurate inventory 
of all surplus property; industry committees to work with 
the board to protect private business from destruction 
or unfair competition; disposal of some surplus in other 
countries; no government ownership or competition with
*Ibid,, 428,
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private concerns; maintenance of government arsenals and 
navy yards, but utilization of private manufacture for 
actual production; and to foster existing private enter­
prise, to stimulate employment in private enterprise, and 
to protect the interests of taxpayers.
The Congress of Industrial Organizations was at the 
other end of the political spectrum, but in some ways its 
recommendations were similar to those of the NAM. It 
advocated full employment, overseas disposal, and no mass 
disposal which might break the back of the domestic market. 
The C.I.O. spokesman, J. Raymond Walsh, was, nonetheless, 
insistent that the economic stranglehold of big business 
be broken and that labor have meaningful representation 
at the policy level of any surplus property disposal 
organization.5
Matthew Woll, Chairman of the American Federation 
of Labor's Committee on Post-War Planning had specific 
recommendations for labor's participation in disposal 
functions. He suggested that two Administrators be named to 
handle the two primary problems, contract termination and 
surplus property disposal. To set policy for each 
Administrator there would be a civilian board on which would 
sit representatives of labor, management and agriculture. 
These boards would be instructed to guard against unemploy-
^Ibid.. 532,
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ment, monopoly, and ruinous marketing procedures,^
The Senate Special Committee on Post-War Economic 
Policy and Planning, however, was not a committee with 
legislative responsibility; its function was to Investigate 
and recommend. Thus it had no legislation assigned to it 
by Senate leadership nor did it report any bills to the 
Senate floor. This was the responsibility of the Senate 
Military Affairs Committee.
As an indication of the complexity of the surplus 
property legislative task, a report published by the War 
Contracts Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military 
Affairs is illuminating. It recounts the legislative 
proposals dealing with postwar reconversion prior to 
April of 1944. One proposal would have allowed the 
Secretary of Agriculture to requisition surplus equipment 
for soil conservation.? Another would have authorized 
the Smithsonian Institute to acquire and dispose of certain 
surpluses.® The Senate passed a bill (S. 1156) which
®Ibid.. 633.
?U, S., Congress, Senate, War Contracts Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Mobili­
zation and Demobilization Problems. 78th Ôong., 2d Èess., 
Àu^st 7, 1^44, 79Y-98. Cited hereafter as Military 
Subcommittee Hearings. The Senate and the House Bills were: 
S. 1745, March 3, 1544; H. R. 4l80, February 14, 1944.
®Ibid.. S. 7127, February 21, 1944.
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authorized the Secretary of War to dispose of property 
which has accumulated because of the relocation of roads, 
railroads, and utility lines, but the bill did not pass 
the House, Senator Gerald Nye introduced a bill with the 
unusual provision that nothing could be disposed of at 
less than its acquisition cost.9 There were many bills 
to insure prior owners reacquisition of farm lands,
A number of bills to set priorities were also 
introduced. One would give state and local governments 
first chance at surplus lend-lease g o o d s , A n o t h e r  
would establish the following priorities on surplus goods; 
farmers, tax supported institutions, the domestic market,
1 Pforeign governments, and foreign markets,Furthermore, 
lawmakers gave attention to disposition of special types 
of surplus including housing,^3 agricultural products,
^Ibid,. S. 1680, February 1, 194%.
lOlbid,. S. 1775. March 14. 1944; S. 1794. March 
20, 1944; ■"RT"R, 2112, March 8, 1943; H, R, 2377, April 2, 
1943; H, R, 2487, April 13, 1943; H, R, 4457, March 22, 
1944; H, R, 4462, March 23, 1944,
lllbid,. 8, 1815, March 23, 1944,
l^Ibid,. H, R, 3025, June 22, 1943.
l^Ibid.. 8, 1607, December 18, 1943.
^^Ibid,. H. R, 4259. February 23. 1944; H, R, 4275. 
February 5TTT944; H, R. 4281, February 29, 1944.
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machine tools,strategic materials,movable surplus, 
exclusive of ships,surplus aircraft^® and merchant
vessels.
Surplus property provisions were also included in 
bills dealing with other subjects, such as one providing 
benefits for returning servicemen,^® and another which 
strengthened the Smaller War Plants Corporation.^^
Several bills were framed as general surplus property laws 
but were not widely supported.
The Baruch-Hancock Report and the subsequent creation 
of the Surplus War Property Administration by Executive 
Order convinced many Congressmen that the executive branch 
had preempted their legislative prerogative. Thus pressure 
for Congressional action toward permanent peacetime 
reconversion legislation increased.
In response, the House Committee on Banking and
l^Ibid.. 8. 1609, December 21, 1943.
l^Ibid.. H.R. 3856, December 16, 1943.
l?Ibid.. H.R. 4420, March 16, 1944.
iGlbid.. H.R. 2959, June 15, 1943.
l^Ibid.. S. 1814, March 28, 1944.
pn Ibid.. 8. 1604, December 17, 1943.
^^Ibid.. S. 1913, May 12, 1944.
^^Ibid.. 8. 1478, October 28, 1943; S. 1729,
February 5. 1944; H.R. 2795, June 9, 1943; H.R. 3873, 
December 18, 1943; S. 1730, February 22, 1944.
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Currency held hearings, early In 19%4, on H. R. 4420.
Among the many witnesses they heard were Will Clayton,
John Hancock, Jesse Jones, Estes Kefauver, and Wright 
Patman, In fact It was Batman's bill that was before the 
Committee, H. R, 4420 was a short bill which would 
simply assign the responsibility for surplus disposal to 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation with a board of 
government agency heads to advise It. The objectives of 
thé bill Included speed without dumping, selling abroad, 
use of regular channels of trade and discouragement of 
speculation. Other objectives were encouragement of 
Individual enterprise by veterans, fair return to the 
government, and a complicated provision that would avoid 
monopolization of surplus by not allowing any company to 
buy In one year more surplus of any particular Item then 
It had purchased of that Item In the regular run of 
business for the year prior to December 7» 1941. No 
mention was made. In Patman*s proposal, of Industrial 
f a c i l i t i e s . I n  testimony, John Hancock did not favor 
Batman's bill; In fact, at that time, he did not favor any 
surplus property legislation. He believed that It would be 
needed eventually, but that, for the time being, SWBA 
was doing an adequate job. It was Hancock's contention
S., Congress, House, Committee on Banking and 
Currency. Hearings on H.R. 4420. 78th Cong.. 2d Sess..
March 20, 1944, IBÏ-W3.--------
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that more experience under the Executive Order was
oùnecessary to write an adequate surplus property law.
The majority of the Committee evidently agreed since 
H, R, 4420 was not reported out.
There was some opinion in the Congress that new 
legislation was totally unnecessary, James Davis of 
Pennsylvania was even convinced that no new agency was 
needed to handle surplus property. He said that the 
Department of Commerce, the Procurement Division of the 
Treasury, or the Civil Aeronautics Authority, could 
handle the surplus situation,
Before Congress could seriously work on the surplus 
property problem, the question of contract terminations 
had to be answered. The problem was simply how to end 
the war contracts when the emergency had passed. In order 
that the transition from wartime to peacetime be smooth, 
a way had to be provided to pay contractors quickly, 
to clear their plants of government inventory, and to 
satisfy their sub-contractors. Since this would face 
the nation before large amounts of surplus became 
available, it took precedence. The Contract Settlement 
Act of 1944 which settled the problems was signed and
^^Ibid.. 207-08,
^^Congressional Record. 78th Cong., 2d Sess,,
March 3, 1544, 2217.
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became law on July 1, 1944,^^
As has been noted, however, before the passage of
the Contract Settlements Act, Congressional committees
had begun to work on surplus property. Hardly had Will
Clayton taken office as Surplus War Property Administrator
than he was asked to testify before legislative
committees. In his testimony Clayton followed Hancock's
train of thought. He said that the Executive Order was
sufficient and pleaded for more time. Since there was
not much surplus to sell during the War, he maintained
that this period should be used to gain the necessary
27experience to write permanent legislation.
On May 5, 1944, however, James Murray, Chairman 
of the War Contracts Subcommittee of the Senate Committee 
on Military Affairs forced Clayton to develop some of his 
Ideas on surplus property legislation. While not yet 
ready to frame a specific bill, he suggested eight areas 
In which legislation would be needed: first, to create
a single, responsible, and authoritative agency with Its 
composition, function, and power clearly defined; second, 
the selling agencies should be specifically empowered to
Z^New York Times. July 2, 1944, 15.
27U. S., Surplus War Property Administration, 
"Report to the Director of War Mobilization as to 
Activities Under Executive Order No, 9425." October 31» 
1944, duplicated typescript In the Office of the Chief 
of Military History, Ft. McNair, Washington, D. C., 8. 
Cited hereafter as "SWPA Report."
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pass clear title; third, preferences, such as those to
veterans, small businessmen, and others should be spelled
out and be "administratively workable"; fourth, terms of
industrial disposal should not have to be submitted to
Congress; fifth, credit terms should be stated; sixth,
terms of foreign disposal should be clearly outlined;
seventh, a policy toward speculators should be Included;
and eighth, the legislation should be broad and not tie
the hands of the Administrator regarding regular channels
of trade, aid to small business, discouragement of
28monopoly, and the like.
Clayton felt that general principles, expressed in 
statutes might be helpful if they were not contradictory 
and could be administered, and if they would not impede 
the flow of commerce. In general Clayton tended to 
deprecate the role of legislation and to emphasize the 
need for "wise administration." He told the Committee:
"I am Inclined to think that in such matters it is wisest 
to trust the Administrator, requiring him to subject his 
every act to the scrutiny of the public and the Congress.
Clayton refused to be pinned down in regard to any 
specific date that Murray could expect proposed 
legislation from the Surplus War Property Administration.
^^Military Subcommittee Hearings. May 5, 1944, 146.
29%bid.. 147-48.
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9nClayton still felt there was plenty of time. Summer, 
however, was approaching and Congress was looking to early 
adjournment because of the elections of 1944. It seemed 
to be the consensus that surplus property legislation 
was a must before adjournment. Therefore, soon after 
the May 5 hearing, Murray Informed Clayton that he was 
going to Introduce a bill early in June and he wanted 
suggested legislation from Clayton before he did,^^
With less than a month, Clayton moved fast. To 
help him, he formed a committee of representatives from 
concerned Executive Departments and agencies, with himself 
at its head. These included representatives from the 
War Department, the Smaller War Plants Corporation, the 
Department of Justice, the War Production Board, the 
Foreign Economic Administration, the Maritime Commission, 
the Treasury Department, the War Food Administration, and, 
naturally, attorneys from the Surplus War Property 
Administration, The full committee met frequently and a 
small drafting group met daily for nearly three weeks. On 
June 2, 1944 the proposed bill, which ultimately became 
the basis for H, R, 5125, was sent to Senator Murray,





of its provisions came from three sources. The first was 
the Clayton bill or H. R, 5125 which was reported out by 
the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive 
Departments, commonly called the Manasco committee. 
Another source was a drastically changed version of the 
Clayton bill as rewritten by Senator Edwin C. Johnson of 
Colorado, S. 2045. The third source was S. 2065 
sponsored by Senators Tom Stewart of Tennessee, James 
Murray of Montana, and Robert Taft of Ohio. The latter 
two measures were debated and combined by the Senate 
Committee on Military Affairs and reported to the floor 
as S. 2065.33
Throughout the hearings and debate on surplus 
property legislation, Clayton vigorously opposed any 
change or substitution In his bill. He felt that none 
of the others approached his In workability. He was 
especially critical of the Stewart-Murray-Taft bill 
which he said reflected the fact that those who drafted 
It had not had "to dirty their hands with the job and 
make It work,"3^ it was the classic confrontation
33u, S., War Assets Administration, 
"Administrative History of the War Assets Administration 
and Predecessor Agencies," (Unpublished Typescript In 
Federal Records Center, Springfield, Virginia, File 
62-A-982 #7). Cited hereafter as "WAA History."
9llMemorandum, W. L, Clayton to Stuart N. Scott, 
General Counsel, Surplus War Property Administration, 
August 5, 1944, ln"WAA History."
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of theory and practicality.
A logical order of discussion of the three bills 
which contributed substantially to the Surplus Property 
Act would be from that which gave the least to that which 
gave the most. Thus, the Johnson bill will be discussed 
first, the Clayton bill second, and the Stewart-Murray-Taft 
bill third. Senator Johnson was proud of his bill. It had 
features that he felt were different from any other, and 
he had worked hard on it. When he brought it before the 
War Contracts Subcommittee he said:
The bill which I have prepared and which I 
wish to discuss this morning is a bold bill, it is 
a straight-from-the-shoulder bill. It hits the 
problem at its very heart and does not deal with 
it in any easy manner, but it is a bold question 
that must be handled, and the only way you can 
handle it is with a bold, decisive, definite bill. 
Already you have many groups who are trying to 
get some personal advantage out of the solution 
that we make of surplus property. My bill gives 
no advantage to any group. It helps small 
business, it helps big business, it helps __
America in reaching a sound reconversion basis,
In Clayton's bill, which Johnson used to some 
extent, he did not like the complete delegation of 
authority to the Administrator; in Johnson's bill Congress 
retained control,Johnson did favor a single 
administrator instead of a board. He reasoned: "I have
worked on the theory that one man is more effective




than three, and three more effective than five, and five 
more effective than s e v e n , H e  would, however, have 
an advisory board which would work with the Administrator,^® 
In the Johnson bill, however, the administrative 
set-up was of secondary Importance, The heart of the 
Johnson measure was the withholding of surplus property 
from the market. When all other bills 
called for speedy disposal, Johnson would hold up the 
disposal of all durable property for a period of five
onyears. It was on this proposal that the arguments
on S, 2045 centered and the one which foredoomed It from
serious consideration, Johnson held that Immediate
disposal would glut the market and preclude a fast start
for Industrial production. The resulting unemployment
would prove to be more expensive than loss of revenue
from postponed sale of surplus,
In the resulting discussion a statement from
Attorney General Francis Biddle was read In which he favored 
4lfast disposal. Senator Taft could see some merit In 







tip"durable property" was too broad, Johnson's only 
wholehearted supporter was John P, Frey, President of the 
Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of 
Labor. He was fearful of unemployment and using the 
machine tool Industry as an example, estimated that there 
were enough tools In existence to glut the market for 
over five years.Johnson's Idea, however, was not 
favorably received. In the final Senate bill the 
withholding of surplus was not mentioned.
H. R. 5125, commonly called the Clayton bill, 
reflected the views on surplus property legislation that 
Clayton had given to the Military Affairs Committee on 
May 5.^5 Objectives of the Clayton bill included: to
facilitate transition from wartime to peacetime; to 
promote production, employ labor, and utilize natural 
resources; to avoid dislocation of the domestic economy 
and of International economic relations; to discourage 
monopoly and strengthen small business; to promote wide 
distribution to consumers at fair prices; and to get the 
highest prices for the government consistent with a
*2lbld.. 773.
*3lbld.. 782.





The legislation. If passed, would set up a Surplus 
Property Administration headed by a Surplus Property 
Administrator who would be appointed by the President, 
by and with the consent of the Senate. He would be
appointed for two years at an annual salary of $12,000, 
His duties would be to "have general supervision and 
direction over (1) the care and handling and disposition 
of surplus property and (2) the transfer of surplus 
property between government agencies,"
To aid In the decision making process there was to 
be a Surplus Property Advisory Board which would be 
composed of the heads of concerned government departments 
and agencies, or their designated representatives. It 
was, however, made clear that this Board was advisory and 
that final authority would rest In the Administrator,^?
Congressional supervision under the Clayton bill 
would be very limited. It was specifically stated that 
Congress could appraise the situation from time to 
time and amend the Act If It wished; an Invitation It 
had seldom needed In the past. Other than that, the 
Administrator was to send a report to Congress within
46U, S., Congress, House, Committee on 
Expenditures In the Executive Departments, Hearings on 
H.R, 5125. 78th Cong,, 2d Sess,, August 7* 1^44, Ï,
Cited hereafter as Hearings on H.R, 5125.
*?Ibld,. 2.
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three months of the passage of the act, and quarterly 
thereafter. Also all regulations issued by the 
Administrator were to be sent to Congress within thirty 
days of their effective date.^® Under the heading of 
"Planning” it was stated that the Administrator should 
formulate detailed plans for converting government-owned 
war plants to private production as soon as possible after
the War.
The owning agencies, which would primarily be the 
Army and the Navy, were to have the power to declare 
goods surplus. Also the owning agencies could sell scrap 
without declaring it surplus to the Administration. The 
Administrator was given the power to name the disposal 
agencies with the one exception that the Maritime 
Commission was to handle disposition of all merchant ships. 
To control the disposal agencies the Administrator could 
"prescribe policies, standards, methods, and procedures 
to govern the exercise by any disposal agency of its 
authority under the Act.”^^
A wide latitude was allowed in the section headed 
"Methods of Distribution." If the surplus had no 
commercial value the Administrator could even give surplus 





Administrator was given the right to set policy, prices, 
and terms of disposition.^^ "Policies Governing 
Dispositions” was largely a restatement of the 
"Objectives.” Additional purposes were to facilitate 
transfer from one government agency to another; to afford 
governmental, educational, charity, and cooperative 
Institutions an opportunity to fulfill their legitimate 
needs; and to afford veterans a chance to establish 
themselves In agricultural and business enterprises.^^
On ”Dlsposltlon of Plants" the Clayton bill was 
rather vague. Disposition policy was largely left up to 
the Administrator, Antimonopoly provisions had been 
previously mentioned but specific guidelines were few.
The Attorney General could request Information on 
specific disposals, but the Administrator was not required 
to seek his advice. The only explicit program was for 
synthetic rubber and aluminum facilities. Plants 
costing over $5,000,000, In these two categories, would 
be withheld until Congress had approved procedures for 
their sale.53
The rest of the document took care of details such 
as depositing funds In the Treasury, delegation of 





end of hostilities,^^ The Clayton bill was an 
administrator's law with few restrictions. It was 
eminently "workable" if it was accompanied with "wise 
administration," but this was often hard to find.
Veteran legislators preferred to provide safeguards if the 
administration proved other than "wise,"
In the beginning the only real opposition to the 
Clayton bill was legislative. Even though he had 
requested the measure, James Murray was against it from 
the beginning. He said: "His [Clayton's] bill doesn't
spell out the program at all, and would really constitute 
a sort of blank-check proposal for him to handle the 
problem of disposal of surplus property,"55 Another 
source of Murray's discontent was revealed when he said 
that he was working with the Smaller War Plants Corporation 
on legislation which "will be really effective and which 
will protect the small businessman, "5^
In response to a War Contracts Subcommittee 
request, heads of departments and agencies evaluated the 
three bills before the committee,57 The result was
5^Ibid,. 6-8,
55u, S,, Congress, Senate, Committee on Military 
Affairs, Hearings on Mobilization and Demobilization 
Problems. 78th Cong,. 2d Sess..^une 9. 1944. 926.
Cited hereafter as Military Affairs Hearings,
S^lbid,. 327,
5?These Bills were: H.R, 5125, S, 2045, and S, 2065,
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nearly unanimous in favor of H. R, 5125— the Clayton bill. 
Ralph A. Bard, Acting Secretary of the Navy, declared that, 
"the Navy Department participated in the preparation of 
the Clayton draft and it reflects the viewpoint of this 
Department as to the requirements for property disposal 
legislation."58 D. W. Bell, Acting Secretary of the 
Treasury, wrote that the Treasury Department "reiterates 
its recommendation of the legislation proposed by Mr, 
Clayton,"59 Secretary of Agriculture, Claude R, Wickard, 
said; "I think H, R, 5125 is in essence a good bill 
and should become law,"^® Charles B, Henderson, Chairman 
of the Board of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 
responded: I , , , agree with him [Clayton] that the
bill which he has proposed is more desirable than any 
bill which has been introduced on this important 
subject,"^1 Admiral Emory Land of the Maritime 
Commission noted: "In general it appears that the
provisions of H, R, 5125 . . . would be preferable to 
those of either of the bills referred to in your letter, 
John J, McCloy, Acting Secretary of War also favored the
5®Military Subcommittee Hearings. 78th Cong,, 2d 









Clayton bill, "The War Department Is in favor of the 
enactment of a bill substantially in the form of that 
submitted to your committee by the Surplus War Property 
Administrator,"^3 McCloy said. Donald Nelson, of the 
War Production Board, agreed and stated that, "I prefer 
the bill submitted by Mr, Clayton,
There were only three opinions which were not 
wholeheartedly In favor of H, R, 5125. The Attorney 
General, typically, did not choose any of the bills but
gcpointed out the legal weaknesses of each, Secretary of 
Labor, Prances Perkins, also discoursed at considerable 
length on each, but made no c h oi c e. M ic h a el  Straus, 
Acting Secretary of the Interior, did not approve of 
H, R, 5125 because It did not specifically assign the 
disposition of non=lndustrlal real property to the 
Interior Department.^?
As reported out of committee S. 2065 was primarily 
the Stewart-Murray-Taft bill, with a few elements of the 
Johnson bill, S, 2045, and others Included. There was one 







gofor an eight man board Instead of a single administrator.
When public hearings closed on the two drafts both called
for a single administrator but in executive session of the
goMilitary Affairs Committee, the concept was changed.
Labor had been the only voice raised which strongly
70favored a board; its voice was evidently heard.
In every way S, 2065 was more detailed and more 
complicated than H, R, 5125, The listed "Objectives" were 
more numerous and under the three headings of: all classes
of surplus, consumers goods, and industrial plants and 
equipment. The objectives for all classes of surplus 
were: first, to use them most effectively for war
purposes; second, to aid in establishment of a peacetime 
economy, private enterprise, and to stimulate full 
employment; third, to strengthen and preserve free 
enterprise; fourth to foster family-type farming; fifth, 
to strengthen the cooperative movement; sixth, to aid 
veterans in business or farming; seventh, to discourage 
speculators; eighth, to aid governments and local
institutions as detailed in another section of the bill; 
ninth, to establish and develop foreign markets. Two 
further objectives were listed under disposition of
GGlbid,. August 14, 1944, 976,
^^Congressional Record. 78th Cong,. 2d Sess,.
August --------
70Ibid.. 78th Cong,, 2d Sess,, August 14, 1944, 972.
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consumers goods; first, to dispose at fair prices without 
dislocation of the market through dumping; second, to 
utilize normal channels of trade but not to discourage new 
enterprise. Three objectives were listed under disposition 
of plants and equipment: first, to promote maximum
production and employment with due regard to 
Industrially underdeveloped areas; second, to facilitate 
transition from wartime to peacetime economy with due 
regard to discouragement of monopolistic practices; third, 
to foster the development of new Independent enterprise.
The last objective, for all classes of surplus property, 
was to obtain the highest return for the government 
consistent with the other objectives.
Section two of S, 2065 dealt with the Surplus 
Property Board which was to be established under the 
Office of War Mobilization. In choosing the eight 
members, the President was admonished to give due 
consideration to the various geographic areas and 
economic Interests. It would be the privilege of the 
Board to elect one of Its members Chairman. If there was 
a tie vote of the eight members on any Issue, the 
Director of the Office of War Mobilization would have one 
vote. Each board member was to serve for two years and 
"the Board shall determine all matters of policy relating 
to the administration of this act." Sitting with the
T^Ibld.
89
Board as observers, were to be two Senators, and two 
Representatives, appointed by the leadership of each 
House.
In this bill, which was supposed to be so tightly 
drafted, the section on administration had one serious 
flaw. The Board was empowered to appoint an Administrative 
Director "who shall perform such functions as the Board 
may direct." This was clearly not sufficiently 
definite, and would allow the director to serve as 
anything from errand boy to dictator.
To save money the Board was Instructed to, as far 
as practical, perform Its duties "through the personnel 
and facilities of other governmental agencies," To 
round out the administrative machinery, S, 2065 provided 
for an Advisory Council which would be the heads of 
administrative agencies, or their representatives, with 
whom "the Board shall advise and consult.
The section on "Reports and Planning" was quite 
specific. In addition to the expected quarterly reports, 
the Board would be required to submit reports to Congress 
on twelve classes of industrial facilities. These were to 
be submitted one time only and were due six months after 
the passage of the Act, They were to Include a 
statement of status of disposal, a statement of proceeds 
received, and recommendations for any legislation "the
T^Ibld.
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Board may deem necessary or desirable." The twelve classes 
of property were: aluminum plants; magnesium plants;
synthetic rubber facilities; chemical plants; aviation 
gasoline refineries; iron and steel facilities; pipe
lines; patents, processes, techniques, and inventions; 
aircraft plants ; shipyards; transportation facilities;
and radio and electronic equipment. In the first eight 
categories the Board was prohibited from disposing of 
any facility until thirty days after the report was 
submitted. If, however, it was impossible for a full 
report to be gathered in six months an interim report 
could be offered which would permit d i s p o s a l . T h e  
reports and waiting period, nonetheless, were bound to 
delay disposition. As in H. R. 5125, the Senate bill 
allowed the owning agency to declare its own surplus.
It could also sell its own scrap, as in the House 
bill.?*
The fine hand of Maury Maverick could be seen in 
the Senate bill’s section on "Small Business." The 
Board was warned not to discriminate against small 
business. To provide aid it was to advertise the 
surplus widely, to sell in small lots, to arrange for 




Corporation In ascertaining the needs of small business, 
to sell to SWPC for resale, and to accept loans 
authorized by SWPC for the purchase of supplies.
The disposition of industrial facilities was 
well covered in other sections. The only new provision 
was that calling for submission of sales over $1,000,000 
to the Attorney General. These were to be checked for 
possible antitrust violations.7^
Where the House bill exuded trust of administrators, 
the Senate bill exhibited cynical suspicion. Where the 
House bill was a businessman's bill the Senate draft 
was a social planner's bill. The House bill looked to 
maximum government benefit; the Senate bill was designed 
to protect the interests of the people. Speaking to 
Will Clayton, Senator Joseph O'Hahoney of Wyoming 
analyzed the approaches with remarkable clarity:
I suggest, Mr, Clayton, that one of the 
primary considerations of policy involved in this 
bill, as I see it, apparently represents a 
divergence between the point of view you have 
taken in your testimony and the point of view that 
some members of the [Senate] committee have taken.
Your point of view seems to be that the prime 
objective Is to dispose of the property at the 
best possible price and in the most expeditious 
manner from the point of view of the Government 
as a proprietor, whereas the members of the 
committee feel that that objective, while it is 




circumstances, is not one which should be followed 
at any and all events In present-day conditions; 
that the policy of the committee should be to 
distribute this surplus property not to get the 
best return for the Government as a proprietor 
but to get the best results for the people of the 
United States by stimulating their business, 
by enabling them to secure this property and by 
enabling the Government to distribute the 
property In a manner best calculated to stimulate 
business activity throughout the country,''
Even though not as Impressive as that for H. R, 
5125, there was support for S, 2065. Although he was an 
administrator, the Old Curmudgeon, Harold Ickes, was even 
more a Progressive and a New Dealer. He favored the
Senate bill. He was aware of the magnitude of the 
Industrial surplus problem when he told the Senate 
committee: "The consequences of the Government's method
of handling that third part of our Nation acquired by the 
Louisiana Purchase may, in historical perspective, become 
Insignificant compared to the consequences of disposing 
of the present Industrial holdings,"^® Speaking of 
surplus property legislation, he said: "With respect to
. . .  S. 2065, I want to take this opportunity of saying, 
very sincerely, that It Is In my judgement the best of 
the general surplus-property bills now before the 
Congress."79
7?Mllltary Affairs, Hearings. August 17» 1944, 1082.
78] 
79,
ibld.. August 16, 1944, 1014.
'Ibid.. 1016.
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On the Important plant disposal problem, he said: "The
provision of S, 2065 dealing with the disposal of war
plants seems to me to be soundly conceived and very much
In the public Interest. I am particularly glad to note
80the specific Implementation of the antitrust laws."
Maury Maverick, Chairman of the Smaller War Plants
Corporation, endorsed the bill with typical Texas
enthusiasm, but had some suggestions for Improvement:
"As I said In the beginning, this Is a swell bill. It Is a
very fine bill. It Is one of the best bills that has ever
been written, but of course, no bill Is perfect until
you have washed It out two or three times, kicked It
Blaround and debated It." Maverick had one recommendation 
which certainly would have strengthened the small business 
provisions of the final Act, If It had been Included.
That was to empower the Smaller War Plants Corporation to
survey all of the surplus Industrial facilities, to 
single out those lending themselves to multiple tenancy, 
and then to create such projects. If the Congress was 
really Interested In plant disposal to small business 
this was one concrete proposal with real merit, but It was 





Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney General, in 
charge of the Antitrust Division gave his support to the 
antitrust section of S. 2065, but seemed to prefer H. R, 
5125 overall, when he said; "I believe that safeguards 
similar to those included in S, 2065 ought to be
incorporated in the Colmer [House] bill."®^
Each House debated its respective bill 
perfunctorily, but seemed inclined to follow leadership 
since the members were looking to adjournment. Attempts 
to amend, therefore, were beaten off. The House bill 
was managed by Carter Manasco of Alabama, Chairman of 
the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive 
Departments, and William Colmer of Mississippi, Chairman 
of the Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and 
Planning.
In his opening statement Colmer said that H. R. 
5125 had two major objectives: first, "protecting the
American taxpayer; and second, disposing of the surplus 
property with as little interference with our American
Oheconomy as possible." That statement certainly 
resembled the terminology of the Baruch-Hancock Report 
and Will Clayton's statement to the Military Affairs 
Committee. In fact when arguing for a single
^^Congressional Record. 78th Cong.. 2d Sess..
August 237~ w r 7m : --------
G^Ibid.. 78th Cong., 2d Sess,, August 15, 1944, 6955.
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administrator Colmer talked as if Clayton had already been 
appointed and confirmed to the post even before it was 
created,
Carter Manasco was convinced that Congress should
keep hands off surplus warplants disposal. If Congress
kept control, he said,” then if one is sold in your
district, your opponent who runs against you in the next
election is going to accuse you of getting a cut out of
it," But if the plant is not sold and "stands idle,
your opponent is going to say that some big industrialist
paid you to see that the plant is not used," So
Manasco concluded that, "the best thing for us to do is
give the Administrator the authority to sell all these 
86war plants,"
Will M, Whittington of Mississippi also clearly 
considered Will Clayton to be the future Administrator 
under H, R, 5125 when he argued for the single 
administrator by citing Clayton's record and implying 
that it could be continued with passage of the Act,®^
An amendment was offered by Jerry Voorhis of Califor­
nia to strengthen the antimonopoly section of H, R, 5125.
He had earlier introduced his amendment as a bill but it
85Ibid,. 6956,
GGlbid,. 6963.
^^Ibid,. 78th Cong,, 2d Sess,, August 16, 194%, 6984,
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had not received much support so he tried to get It 
Included In H, R, 5125. His rather sensible suggestion 
was that the government should not sell any of the surplus 
industrial facilities. It should only lease and thus 
retain a measure of control over the nation's productive 
capacity. It got no more support as an amendment than it
OOhad as a separate bill.
Congressmen George Bender of Ohio and Norris 
Poulson of California attempted to substitute the Senate's 
Board for the House's single administrator in H. R. 5125 
but were quickly beaten down and the issue came to a 
vote. On August 22, 1944 the House passed H. R, 5125 
and sent it to the Senate.®^
The Senate, however, had its own bill, S, 2065.
Senator Johnson of Colorado was floor manager for
the Committee on Military Affairs, although it was 
really no one's bill by the time it reached the floor.
As Johnson said: "We borrowed from more than a dozen
bills in formulating the language and the provisions 
of the committee amendments to Senate bill 2065." It 
came out of committee with the unanimous support of 
every member. Not, as Johnson said, because everyone 
thought it was a perfect bill but because it was the
B^ibid.. 78th Cong,, 2d Sess,, August 15, 1944, 6978,
B^lbid., 78th Cong,, 2d Sess., August 17, 1944, 7049.
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best compromise they could reach. The bill, according 
to the Senator from Colorado, did not espouse his Idea of 
withholding surplus, but then again It did not sanction a 
"fire sale," He was particularly proud of the bullt-ln 
protection afforded by the Senate measure: "In this bill
we have attempted to establish safeguards In the orderly 
disposal of surplus property, safeguards to protect the 
social, political, and economic life of the Nation,"
The only serious discussion In the Senate was over 
the proposal to limit the amount of money to be loaned 
to a small businessman In purchasing surplus property. 
Conservative Robert A, Taft thought that a substantial 
down payment should be required. Second generation 
Progressive, Robert M, LaPollette Jr., however, observed 
that such was not required from big business so, why 
differentiate? In the end, the liberal loan provision 
was left In the blll,^®
On August 25, 19^4 Senator Johnson made a motion 
that all after the enacting clause of H, R, 5125 be 
struck out and the text of the Senate bill, as amended, 
be substituted. It was done and without a roll call vote 
the bill was passed. Since each House had passed a 
different bill under the same number, a conference was 
necessary. As members of the Senate Conference Committee
S^lbld.. 78th Cong,, 2d Sess,, August 23, 1944, 
7325-26,
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the Presiding Officer named Elbert Thomas of Utah, Edwin 
Johnson of Colorado, Lister Hill of Alabama, Albert B. 
Chandler of Kentucky, Chan Gurney of South Dakota, Warren 
Austin of Maine, and Chapman Revercomb of West Virginia.
All of these men were members of the Military Affairs 
Committee, The House named Carter Manasco of Alabama, 
Charles L, Gifford of Massachusetts, George Bender of 
Ohio, John J, Cochran of Missouri, and Will Whittington 
of Mississippi.^^
The conference committee met from 10:00 A, M. 
to 5:30 P. M. every day for three weeks. Manasco 
said; "I do not believe there has been a conference 
committee that worked as heucd and diligently as we did.”
At the end no one, especially the House Managers, were 
really satisfied with the result, but everyone was tired. 
Manasco explained his attitude:
We thought the bill as it passed the House was 
a much better bill than the bill we agreed to, but 
in 3 weeks time, when you go up against men who 
have ideas different from your own, you finally 
get worn down. I have talked surplus property 
all day. My phone rings until midnight every 
night about surplus property*. I am tired of It 
and I want to get rid of it.^^
There was practically no debate in either House
S^Ibid.. 78th Cong., 2d Sess., August 25, 1944, 7330, 




on the passage of the conference report. Time worked 
on the side of those favoring the report, since September 
had arrived and elections were coming up on the first 
Tuesday in November. The House managers had more to sell 
than did the Senators and the Senate bill was the 
dominant factor In the final Surplus Property Act,
Except for places where both were Included It was hard to 
recognize any part of Clayton's draft In the final 
product. On September 18, 1944, the House passed the 
Surplus Property Act of 1944 almost two to one. The vote 
was 174 yeas, and ninety-one nays,^^
The only debate In the Senate was sparked by the 
Irrepressible Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska, He wanted 
proceeds from the sale of surplus property to be earmarked 
for the payment of the national debt. Elbert Thomas, 
Chairman of the Senate managers had anticipated such an 
argument and had armed himself with a letter from D. W, 
Bell, Acting Secretary of the Treasury, which gave 
Wherry a lesson In elementary economics. In time of 
deficit spending, earmarked repayment funds are useless, 
since the level of spending Is set by C o n g r e s s ,95 if the 
proceeds from the sale of surplus property went Into the
94lbld.
95ibid., 78th Cong,, 2d Sess,, September 19, 1944.
7941.
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special fund, instead of the general fund, more would 
have to be borrowed to keep up with appropriations, and 
the debt level would remain the same. When Wherry was 
convinced, the Senate passed the Surplus Property Act of 
1944 without a roll-call vote.9^
Since little of the Senate bill was cut out and 
most of the changes were to add House provisions, the 
Surplus Act was longer than either of Its parents. The 
"objectives" were twenty In number, among which were: to
facilitate and regulate the orderly flow of surplus 
property; to give maximum aid to the reestablishment of 
a peacetime economy of free Independent private enterprise 
and to stimulate full employment: to facilitate
transition from wartime to peacetime production; to 
discourage monopoly and strengthen and preserve small 
business; to strengthen family farming; to help veterans 
In business; to foster post-war employment; to discourage 
speculation; to develop foreign markets by orderly 
disposal In other countries; to avoid economic 
dislocations; to foster wide distribution of surplus at 
fair prices; to protect free markets and competitive 
prices from uncontrolled dumping; to utilize normal 
channels of trade without predjudlclng new enterprise; 
to foster development of new Independent enterprise; to 
prevent unusual and excessive profits; through disposition
9*Ibld.
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of surplus to foster a national transportation system; 
and to get for the government as great a return as possible.
As the Surplus Act came out of conference there 
was neither an eight man board, nor a single administrator. 
Legislators had split the difference and arrived at 
three, an odd number, so there would be no tie votes.
This Board was empowered to handle all policy matters 
pertaining to surplus property, except that they would 
be under the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, 
James P, Byrnes, The President was to name one of them 
chairman, but they would all serve for two years and 
receive $12,000 per annum,9?
The Surplus Property Act of 1944 provided for 
disposal at three levels. First there was the owning 
agency which was usually the Army or the Navy, The 
owning agency was given the responsibility of declaring 
Its own surplus. That Is, It could decide what It did 
not need and declare that property to the Surplus 
Property Board, the second level. It was then the 
Board’s duty to set policy concerning that surplus 
property. The Board was to make rules for disposition 
which would carry out the objectives and directives of 
the Surplus Property Act, The Board would also name the 
third level of administration which was the disposal
7841,
9?lbld,. 78th Cong,, 2d Sess,, September 18, 1944,
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agency. This agency, be It the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation, or any other named by SPB, actually disposed 
of the property In accordance with the rules laid down 
by the Board.
A few Important provisions of the Act went beyond 
the objectives. Government agencies were given the 
first priority for any surplus, to be followed by States, 
other political subdivisions, and charitable Institutions. 
Veterans were next on the list, especially those who 
wished to engage In business or In farming. Then came 
the small businessman protected by the provisions 
already described In the discussion on S. 2065.9^
In plant disposal, policies followed the Senate 
bill. All twelve classes of Industrial property on 
which the Board had to report to Congress were retained. 
Prospective sales of plants with a reported cost of 
over $5,000,000 had to have Congressional approval If 
they fell In the first eight classes. Any Industrial 
disposal with a reported cost of over $1,000,000 had to 
have the approval of the Attorney General.
President Roosevelt signed the bill Into law on 
October 3, 1944, but he did so with considerable 
reluctance. He said:




objectives of the bill, which are to aid 
reconversion from a war to peace economy and to 
facilitate the orderly disposal of surplus 
property, I have considerable doubt whether many 
provisions of the bill will not make extremely 
difficult the accomplishment of Its objectives.
There Is danger that the confused methods of 
disposition and the elaborate restrictions Imposed 
by the bill will In many Instances delay rather 
than expedite reconversion and re-employment.
Our surplus property should speedily be placed 
Into channels of disposition which should 
provide the most Jobs.and the greatest good for 
the greatest numbers.
In his pronouncement he was following the lead 
of the man he had appointed to the Surplus War Property 
Administration under Executive Order 9^25. Will Clayton 
had written to James P. Byrnes on September 14, 1944 
that he would not accept appointment under any 
legislation that might be passed by Congress because 
the Senate hearings had convinced him "that the surplus 
property disposal program Is no longer to be conducted 
In a businesslike manner." He particularly objected to 
the diffused responsibility of a Board to which It 
appeared at that time, the conferees would agree. One 
man rule, he said, was not really the Issue, but rather 
the final criterion was "administrative workability,
On October 4, the day after the President signed the
^^^New York Times. October 4, 1944, 83,
^^^Congresslonal Record. 78th Cong.. 2d Sess,. 
September 7B57:-----
104
Surplus Property Act, Clayton submitted his resignation 
to become effective when a majority of the Board had been 
appointed.102
Immediately after the passage of the Surplus 
Property Act, and in the months thereafter, there was 
comment on the legislation. Business Week published an 
analysis of the Act for its readers. The staff writer 
noted that though the Board had been given the dominant 
role in the disposition of industrial plants "the Job 
has many strings attached to it," These strings, the 
writer prophesied would act "as nothing but a short cut 
to trouble with Congress," He further prophesied that 
the Board would see a lot of Maury Maverick and that the 
"objectives" of the Act would get in the way of disposal. 
The writer had heard that "several officials were 
offering even money that the new Board would go to 
Congress immediately after the election recess to ask 
for changes in the l a w , "103
The New Republic called the Act "a confused 
compromise," Helen Puller, a staff writer, said that the 
legislation included an "elaborate system of preferences 
and safe guards written into the act by Congress," She
lO^Hew York Times. October 5, 1944, 24,
^03"Plant Disposal— 'With Strings." Business Week, 
(September 30, 1944), 17-18,
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was not optimistic for the Act's success.
In another article, later In October, Business Week 
analyzed the antitrust portion of the Surplus Property Act 
and concluded that It had given the Justice Department 
"exactly what It wanted— a mandate to go forth and see
that reconversion Is carried out In the fullest Interest
10*5of free corapetetlve enterprise. The National 
Association of Manufacturers, on the other hand, was not 
happy with the legislation. It went on record as 
favoring changes In the law "to Iron out unsatisfactory 
crinkles," and asked that "all mandatory preferences" 
be eliminated.
Some months after Its passage, when there had been 
time for evaluation. Fortune. usually as authentic a 
spokesman for the American businessman as NAM, was not 
hypercritical. Its writer said: "The Act has never
been as bad as some Interested parties pretend." And, 
he continued, "the growing objectives of the Act need 
not hamstring the Administrator, provided only that he 
Interpret them freely and sensibly."^^7 ^ New York Times
lO^Helen Puller, "Our Surplus Billions." The New 
Republic. CXIII (August 27, 1945), 252.
^^^"Antl Trust Acts Are Resharpened," Business 
Week. (October 21, 1944), 17.
^^^New York Times. January 30, 1945, 25.
^®^"War Surplus: Sell It While Its Hot, Fortune.
XXXIII (March, 1946), 190.
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editorial gave a partially favorable Judgment: "While
the legislation Is Inadequate In some respects," said 
the writer, "It does furnish the basis for prompter action 
than has thus far developed,"^®® In another Issue the 
New York Times quoted Mayor LaGuardla as saying that the 
Surplus Property Act was a "highly sentimental, well 
meaning" piece of legislation. After the Surplus 
Property Board had been given an opportunity to operate 
for some time after the passage of the Act, the New York 
Times Interviewed Guy Gillette, who said that the Act 
had "unworkable priorities" and that real progress In 
uniform disposal could not be made until the Act was
amended.109
The Surplus Property Act of 1944 was part of the 
law of the land for almost five years. Its three-year 
life span, after the announced end of hostilities, would 
have ended on December 31, 1949, but replacement 
legislation was passed during the previous summer. The 
Act was workable even though Its system of priorities and 
safeguards did prove a hindrance to the speedy disposition 
of surplus. The whole program worked out much as Will 
Clayton had prophesied. Legislation did not make that 
much difference, but good administration did. When there
lO^New York Times. March 26, 1945, 18.
109Ibid.. April 19, 1945, 31.
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was good administration the legislation was adequate, and 
when there was bad administration the Act could not save 
It, Actually, none of the administrators made any attempt 
to realize the social reform possibilities of the law. 
Without exception those sections received lip service at 
best, and were totally Ignored, at worst.
CHAPTER V 
THE SURPLUS PROPERTY BOARD
On October 4, 1944 James P. Byrnes, Director of the 
Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, accepted the 
resignation of William L. Clayton, as Surplus War 
Property Administrator. His resignation, however, did not 
take effect until a majority of the new Surplus Property 
Board, authorized by the Surplus Property Act, was 
appointed. No one was surprised at Clayton's resignation 
since he had worked so hard for legislation other than 
that passed by Congress. He had previously announced that 
he would not serve on a board.^
A month and a half passed before President 
Roosevelt appointed the first two members of the new 
Board. In the meantime Clayton continued to serve as head 
of the surplus property program, which proved that he was 
a dedicated public servant; subsequent chiefs would 
Invariably get out as quickly as possible. One left the 
morning after he submitted his letter of resignation. The 
surplus problem ate administrators faster than the Army of
^New York Times. October 5, 1944, 24,
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the Potomac did generals.
While he served, temporarily, under the newly passed 
surplus property legislation, Clayton naturally continued 
the policies he had originated under Executive Order 9425, 
since it would have been futile to modify them when a 
complete change was imminent. The agencies which had been 
designated to take care of the actual disposal also agreed 
to continue the same operational policies in the
pinterregnum. The Defense Plant Corporation even increased 
its efforts to get the sale of industrial facilities into 
high gear. Though the impending change in top authority 
left policy decisions in doubt, DPC continued to take 
stock of its holdings and, where the Surplus Property Act 
did not specifically tie its hands, opened negotiations 
for purchases by private operators.3 Final sales, 
however, would have to wait until the new Board was 
appointed; in fact DPC could not be sure that it would be 
named the industrial disposal agency, although there seemed 
to be no other practical choice.
Immediately after passing the Surplus Property Act, 
Congress had adjourned for the off-year elections of 1944.
It reconvened shortly after the middle of November at which 
time Roosevelt submitted the first two names for the Surplus
2Ibid.. November 5, 1944, III, 6.
3"Plant Bids Asked." Business Week, October 21,
1944, 24. '
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Property Board, Robert A. Hurley of Connecticut and Lt,
Col, Edward Heller of California.^ These appointments 
were completely political. Hurley being a Democratic 
National Committeeman, and Heller the husband of a National 
Commltteewoman.5 The appointments were not generally 
popular, Arthur Krock reported that both Will Clayton and 
Jesse Jones had suggested other names for the Board, but 
that New Dealers had objected and Roosevelt had gone along 
with the liberals,^ A writer for Fortune speculated that 
the Surplus Property Act would have been more effective 
from the beginning had more capable men been named to the 
Board; It also passed along the rumor that Roosevelt's 
first choices had turned him down,^ The New Republic had 
hoped that the Board would Include names like Maury Maverick 
and David Llllenthal, "men with an understanding of the 
fundamental economic and political problems that are
g
Involved," Senators promised that a thorough Investigation
N̂ew York Times. November 22, 1944, 12,
^U, S.. Congressional Record. 78th Cong.. 2d Sess,. 
December 16, Î 9 W r W Ï Ï 7 ^ --------
^New York Times. November 23, 1944, 30,
^"War Surplus: Sell It While Its Hot." Fortune.
XXXIII (March 1946), 190.
g
"Mr. Batt and Surplus Property." The New Republic. 
CXI (October 9, 1944), 448.
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of the appointees would be made.^
In December the Senate made good on that promise 
when In full and open debate it discussed the qualifications 
of the two men who would be asked to take charge of billions 
of dollars in surplus. Robert A, Hurley was a former 
Governor of Connecticut who had recently been defeated in 
his bid for reelection. The Senators hastened to assure 
that defeat did not necessarily demean the worth of a man, 
although Senator Chandler of Kentucky made it plain that 
he, personally, had never suffered such humiliation.^®
It was brought out that in addition to his background in 
politics Hurley was also an experienced engineer, having 
headed his own firm. The objection to Governor Hurley 
was that after his defeat he had accepted a job as vice-pres­
ident and general manager of the Narragansett Machinery 
Company which had received a $2,000,000 Federal Reserve 
guaranteed loan even though the company was rated a bad 
credit risk. To make the case even more interesting the 
other appointee to the Board, Lt. Col. Edward Heller, had 
been the finance officer for the Boston Ordnance District 
and had recommended the loan. The Senators wanted to 
make sure that there had been no dishonesty and no 
collusion; none could be found. The only other objection
^New York Times. November 23, 19%4, 23.
^®U. S.. Congressional Record. 78th Cong.. 2d Sess.. 
December 15, Î 9 W ; T 5 2 F r  --------
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to Hurley was that, since he was a National Committeeman, 
the appointment might have been political; but it was 
difficult for a chanber full of politicians to make much 
of an issue of that,^^
Edward Heller drew the suspicion regularly attendant 
to the appointment of a very rich man to public office. He 
was the heir of one of the early rich families of Los 
Angeles where he lived, and he owned extensive property in 
California, There was some objection to the political 
nature of his appointment especially when it was noted that 
his wife, the Democratic National Committeewoman from 
California, listed the same business address as Edwin 
Pauley, who was Treasurer of the Democratic National 
Committee, It seemed that the Senate Chamber had become 
somewhat "smoke-filled” but enough prominent Republicans had 
testified to Heller's character to weaken the political 
curse. However, his possible connection with the business 
empire of Henry J, Kaiser did draw considerable fire. In 
the listing of his business interests and positions Heller 
had included the Permanente Cement Company and the 
Permanente Steamship Company, Permanente was a corporate 
name closely associated with Henry J, Kaiser, Telephone 
inquiries were made to Heller and explanatory telegrams 




then explained that Permanente Cement Company was an 
Independent firm in which Heller and many others, including 
Kaiser, owned small shares. It was not connected with any 
of Kaiser*s better known enterprises. The Permanente 
Steamship Company had nothing to do with building ships, 
which occupation had made Kaiser famous. Rather, it was 
a subsidiary of the cement company; it owned two barges 
which hauled cement for the parent company. In his telegram 
Heller suggested that such considerations be discounted 
because he would use "greater than ordinary precaution in 
dealing with friends or former associates," This did not 
satisfy the rigid requirements of Senators like Warren 
Austin and Robert Taft, Austin did not like a man to lean 
over backward "which was almost as bad as leaning sidewise 
or forward,"13 Taft could not favor anyone who had "been 
connected with corporations which have been selling goods 
to the government, particularly through political 
channels,"!*
The vote was finally taken on December 16, 1944, 
and the result, largely along party lines, was in favor of 
both candidates: forty-one to twenty-eight for Hurley and
forty-three to twenty-six for Heller,




Robert Hurley was the first Board member to be sworn
in on December 22, 19%4. Since the law stated that the
Board only became operative when a majority of the three men
had assumed office, it was not until Edward Heller took
the oath, on January 2, 1945* that SPB was officially in
business.Clayton had finally resigned a fortnight earlier
in order to accept the post of Assistant Secretary of State.
In his last of several letters of resignation, Clayton had
recommended that Mason Brittan, Assistant Administrator
of SWPA, be named Administrator of SWPA until the Board
took o f f i c e . S i n c e  that took place on January 2, 1945*
Brittan, a surplus property hand since World War I, was
l8Administrator a scant two weeks.
The problems of the two men who assumed 
responsibility for disposal of surplus property in January 
of 1945, were enough to try the ingenuity of men with greater 
demonstrated capabilities than Hurley and Heller. As a 
start, in December SWPA had announced disposal figures for 
October and results were discouraging. During the month
^^"Minutes of the Surplus Property Board,"
January 23, 1945. Cited hereafter as "Minutes SPB," to be 
found in Ü. S., War Assets Administration, "Administrative 
History of War Assets Administration and Predecessor 
Agencies," (Unpublished Typescript in Federal Records 
Center, Springfield, Virginia, Pile 62-A-982 #7). Cited 
hereafter as "WAA History.”
l^William L. Clayton to James P. Byrnes, December 
20, 1944, in "WAA History."
lG"Minutes SPB," January 23, 1945, in "WAA History."
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the disposal agencies had acquired $207,302,000 worth of 
surplus and had disposed of property worth only 
$26,772,000.19 At that rate inventory would pile up fast. 
And this was in the middle of wartime. Bastogne had only 
been relieved on December 26 and the ground lost in the 
battle of the Bulge was not regained until January 21,
1945. Wartime selling was comparatively easy due to 
booming military production and the scarcity of most items. 
For instance, a recently held auction at one of the Navy 
Yards had netted the government a 35 per cent return on the 
original cost of machine tools that were twenty-five to 
forty years old; in peacetime they would have been junked.
The market would naturally tighten up when war 
ended and at that time surplus property would become a 
deluge. Obviously the problems of SPB would get worse 
before they got better. Charles Egan in the New York Times 
contemplated the future:
Imagine a job in which one was ordered to find 
markets for 22,000,000 flashlight batteries, a 
dozen live monkeys, 1,000 garbage cans, 10,000 
carrier pigeons and half as many dogs, and one will 
gain a slight conception of the range and variety 
of surplus property which the Surplus War Property 
Administration [Surplus Property Board] will be 
called upon to market for the next several years.
After V-E Day, particularly at the close of 
the war with Japan, the real task of the SWPA
^^New York Times. December 4, 1944, 28.
90"RPC Organizes for Biggest Selling Job on Surplus 
DPC War Plants," The Iron Age. CLVI (December 7, 1944),
114.
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[SPB] will open up. Then it will find on its hands 
the greatest collection of merchandise, machinery, 
real estate and other facilities of war that has 
ever been assembled for disposition. Stocks of 
raw materials of all kinds, goods in semimanufac­
tured state, canned and preserved foods of all 
kinds, electrical appliances, cargo ships, ships 
ways, aircraft numbered in the thousands from 
Trainers to B-29 Bombers, Tanks, trucks, marine 
engines and a seemingly endless array of other 
types of goods will wait disposal.
Some problems reminiscent of bygone days faced the 
new Board members. Nitrate plants, barkening back to 
World War I, were again a problem. This time the 
government had nine of them, instead of one, to dispose 
of. One of these facilities was again at Muscle Shoals 
but, in contrast to World War I, the disposition of this 
property was easy since the Tennessee Valley Authority 
had been its wartime operator and wished to retain the 
plant as part of its agricultural program. In disposal 
of the other eight. Congress would be a factor, since 
the Surplus Property Act required SPB to submit plans 
for disposal of nitrate plants for Congressional 
inspection. SPB was then required to wait thirty days 
for Congress to suggest changes. That requirement only 
proved to be a built-in delay in as much as Congress never 
suggested a change. How many of the eight could be 
utilized was a question. Wartime production more than 
doubled prewar consumption, and while it was agreed that 
the postwar market would be larger than prewar, by how
^^New York Times. December 3» 1944, lOE.
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much was anyone’s guess,
In a corollary field SPB would have to step In as 
referee In the never-ending struggle between the public 
and private power advocates. With the war not yet over 
they were squaring off over government-owned generating 
plants in the power-hungry South, Public systems such 
as Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes* Southwest Power 
Administration, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the 
Rural Electrification Administration, had already put in 
their bids for generating plants as soon as they became 
surplus. But private power companies were also putting 
their attorneys to work preparing claims for the same 
properties. It would be up to SPB to decide,^3
The specter of monopoly was a problem from which no 
surplus property agency could escape. After a wartime 
lapse, the Roosevelt Administration was considering a 
postwar trust-busting p r o g r a m , The disposition of 
surplus industrial facilities could be a vital cog in 
that program if some way could be devised to get rid of 
the huge plants without turning them over to their wartime 
operators, most of whom were monopolists or near
2^"Postwar Nitrates." Business Week, December 9» 1944, 21, -----------
^^"Circles on the Power Map." Ibid,. November 18. 
1944, 66, -----
2*"An Eye to Monopoly." Ibid,. September 30,
1944, 18,
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monopolists. Multiple tenancy could be the much sought 
answer. The United States government owned 427,000,000 
square feet, or about 10,500 acres, of factory space. 
Manufacturer's Report, while deploring any plan for 
continued federal control, suggested that local governments, 
or local groups of entrepreneurs, could assume management 
of a great deal of this surplus area for conversion to 
multlple-tenancy space for thousands of small 
manufacturers. The publication Included detailed plans and 
cited Instances where such a plan had worked In the 
past,25 SPB would have to consider something of this sort.
In the history of surplus property disposal SPB was 
the most criticized of the several disposal control groups, 
and this In spite of the fact that Its life was short, 
less then nine months. Those nine months, however, were 
eventful months; the SPB faced cataclysmic events and an 
ever changing situation. President Roosevelt died on 
April 12; the war In Europe ended on May 8; the first 
atomic bomb was dropped on August 9; on September 2 
President Truman declared the war to be over.
In the meantime the third member, and Chairman, of 
the Board had been nominated, approved, and assumed office. 
He was Guy M, Gillette of Iowa who had been defeated In his
25" ’Multiple Industrial Tenancy* Peacetime Use 
that may Conserve Wartime Haste," Manufacturer's Report, 
CXIII (December 1944), 40,
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bld for reelectlon to the Senate in November, As a 
consolation prize Roosevelt named him to the Surplus 
Property Board. Gillette's term In the old Senate had 
ended on January 3, 1945, the day that Roosevelt sent In 
his nomination for his new job.^? He was approved, with 
no argument on January 18, since he was a former member of
pQthe "club," and sworn In as Chairman of the Board on 
January 20, 1945.
It Is difficult to evaluate President Roosevelt's 
thinking with regard to the Surplus Property Board, In 
acting on the Baruch-Hancock Report and In appointing 
Will Clayton to be Surplus War Property Administrator he 
appeared to appreciate the importance and the urgency of 
the disposition of surplus property. It was In October 
that the Surplus Property Act was passed, yet It was the 
latter part of January before all of the Board members 
had been named. He had waited three months for Gillette, 
and Gillette was not worth the wait; the former Senator 
lasted little longer than that In office and performed less 
than well while he was there. All the appointments to the 
Board were political, none of the men had administrative
^^New York Times, January 21, 1945, 34,
2?u, S,, Congressional Record. 79th Cong,, 1st Sess,, 
January 3, 1945, 4,
28lbld,. January 18, 1945, 345.
^^"Mlnutes SPB," January 23, 1945, In "WAA History,"
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experience on the national level, and one, Heller, had no 
government experience whatsoever. Heller, Incidentally, 
proved to be the best of the lot. It Is really no wonder 
that the Surplus Property Board was the most criticized 
of the surplus property administrative agencies.
To be criticized one must have problems and not the 
least of the problems of the Surplus Property Board was Its 
organization, or rather the lack of It. Thirty-odd 
employees transferred from SWPA to SPB,^® Since the 
Board's function was only to set policy It did not need
the thousands of people that later agencies, those which 
combined policy and actual disposal, would require. Lack of 
personnel and lack of funds with which to hire, would 
however, plague the Board to the end of Its days,^^ With 
regard to Its own organization, the Board first agreed to 
meet three times a week, Monday, Wednesday, and Thursday,
It was further agreed that a quorum of two had to be present 
for official action and that special meetings could be held, 
but each of the other two members had to be notified by the 
Chairman If that meeting was to be official,
Three changes were made In those rules In the course 
of the Board's existence: the regular meetings were cut to
3°Ibld,
U, S, Congressional Record, 79th Cong,, 1st Sess,, 
March 30, 1945, 2995,
32"Mlnutes SPB," January 23, 1945, In "WAA History,"
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two per week,33 a member was allowed to give his proxy to 
insure a quorum, and the Chairman was required to call a 
special meeting upon the written request of any member.3^ 
This last change would seem to imply that there was some 
ill feeling between the Chairman and the other two members
of the Board.35
This disagreement further came to light over the 
ultimate responsibility of an Administrator. It will be 
remembered that the Clayton bill had called for an 
administrator,3^ and the Senate bill had called for a 
Board.37 The Surplus Property Act itself followed the 
Senate's lead in that it authorized a board but no 
administrator.33 In spite of that, in its first meeting 
the Surplus Property Board appointed an Administrator; 
he was Mason Brittan, the same man who had been surplus 
War Property Administrator for two weeks. There was no 
question, however, of the propriety of this action, for 
Brittan, albeit his title, actually served in the capacity 
of executive secretary of the Board. He prepared agenda
33ibid.. April 26, 19%5, in "WAA History."
S^Ibid,. June 7, 1945.
35New York Times. July 13, 1945, 14.
3^See chapter IV, 80,
37see chapter IV, 86,
3®See chapter IV, 100.
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for the meetings, hired and fired clerical help, and acted 
as communicator between the Board and the staff, and between 
the Board and disposal agencies.Brittan also seems to 
have acted as Instructor since he agreed to stay on to "help 
the Board until It was organized to f u n c t i o n , W h e n  he 
felt that this had been accomplished he sent In his resig­
nation to be effective March 15, 19^5.^^ Actually
Brittan*s time was extended to March 31 to give the
hoBoard time to find a replacement.
With the naming of Brittan*s replacement the 
controversy over personnel became pronounced. Col. Alfred 
E. Howse who became Administrator on April 1, 19^5 was a 
dynamic Wichita, Kansas businessman. He had served 
Roosevelt In an advisory capacity well before the United 
States had entered World War II. During the war he had 
served In the Procurement Branch of the Army Air Force and 
had become a close associate of Brehon B. Somervell, the 
autocratic chief of the Army Service Forces. Howse had agreed 
to come to the Surplus Property Board at the request of his 
old friend Edward Heller. He came at considerable personal 
sacrifice since his health was anything but
^^"Mlnutes SPB," January 23, 19%5; In "WAA History."
^^Letter of Resignation from Mason Brittan to Guy M. 
Gillette, February 8, 1945, In "WAA History."
*llbld.
*2"Mlnutes SPB," March 19, 1945, In "WAA History."
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strong.^3 His appointment was confirmed by a two to nothing 
vote of the Board with Gillette abstaining.This would 
be the voting lineup In all matters pertaining to Howse.
The Colonel was a positive man; his opinions were strong 
and outspoken. He had little use for Gillette or 
Gillette for him. Howse*s outlook was not political; he 
believed that surplus property should be disposed of as 
quickly as possible. Gillette, on the other hand, tended 
to look at problems from a political viewpoint.
Howse, although from a business background, had \come 
to respect the military way of doing things. He was 
accused of loading the staff of SPB with military personnel. 
It was feared In some quarters that, through Howse,
Somervell would Infiltrate SPB as he had Donald Nelson’s 
War Production B o a r d . H u r l e y  and Heller seemed to have 
a great deal of confidence In Howse and at the June 7 
meeting of the Board, by the usual two to nothing vote, 
adopted a statement of nine duties and functions of the 
Administrator. In this remarkable document they practically
li?handed the responsibilities of the Board to Howse. As
^^Intervlew with Alfred E. Howse, June 3» 1964. 
^^"Mlnutes SPB," March 19, 1945, In "WAA History."
^^Intervlew with Alfred E. Howse, June 3, 1964.
^^Helen Puller, "Our Surplus Billions," The New 
Republic. CXIII (August 27, 1945), 253.
*?"Mlnutes SPB," June 7, 1945, In "WAA History."
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Thomas Stewart of Tennessee remarked on the floor of the 
Senate; "They cannot even sign a letter, under the 
authority they have given to an administrator to do it 
for them."^®
In spite of his forthrightness in other areas, when 
talking for the press Howse mouthed the usual platitudes.
In a report written by Howse one finds: ", . . speed
production of civilian goods , . , stimulate employment 
. . . disposed of speedily , , . And further, " . . .  
prompt disposal , . . relieving current shortages . . , 
best price for the government , . , clear the way for 
expanded civilian production , , . All of these
phrases had been heard before and would be heard again 
and again, ad nauseam, as other administrators came and 
went,
Howse remained in the job of Administrator until 
after Gillette resigned as Chairman of the Board.
Gillette*s successor, however, did not prove pleasing to 
the Kansan even if he was from the neighboring state of 
Missouri, W, Stuart Symington was an appointee of the new 
man in the White House, Harry S. Truman, and as such he 
was not of the old circle of power with which Howse had
become so well acquainted, Howse and Symington simply did 
48U, S.. Congressional Record. 79th Cong,. 1st Sess,. 
August 1, 1945, BÏÏÎj :
^^New York Times. June 8, 1945, 23.
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not get along well together. Upon Symington’s appointment 
Howse, with the support of the two remaining Board 
Members considered himself well entrenched. But Symington 
was a dynamic man and Howse felt his support slipping,
Howse, therefore, pleading a worsening of his health, 
decided to resign. In the two weeks that Howse had stayed
on with Symington the air had become so charged that Howse
was more than glad to get away.^® In fact he sent his 
letter of resignation on August 9, and on August 10 
cleared his office and was gone.^^
Just as the Surplus Property Act of 194% had made
no provision for an Administrator, yet one appeared, anyway, 
the Act also made no provision for an advisory or 
policy board, yet one appeared--but only fleetingly. A 
Policy Board was fully constituted at the February 21 
meeting of SPB, It was to include a few more agency 
representatives than had served as advisers to SWPA.^^
The first meeting of the advisory group was called for 
March 15, at which time the members met with SPB and agreed 
to meet once a month thereafter,^3 The latter was the 
only action ever taken by the Surplus Property Advisory
^^Interview with Alfred E, Howse, June 3, 1964, 
^^"Minutes SPB,” August 13, 1945, in ”WAA History,” 
S^Ibid,. February 21, 1945.
53lbid,. March 15, 1945.
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Board. As each meeting time neared, the meeting was 
postponed until at last the Surplus Property Board itself
ceased to function before the policy group had met again,
It is clear that so far as administration was 
concerned the Board was in a state of confusion from 
beginning to end. This confusion was also evident in
policy-making efforts. From the beginning critics accused
the Board of inefficiency, but the Board muddled on, 
winning on some issues and losing on others, through 
the spring, summer, and fall of 1945. By early April 
Gillette was complaining that one of the difficulties 
facing the Board was the habit of the owning agencies to 
dispose of materiel without first declaring it surplus 
to the Board, The Senate misinterpreted Gillette's 
complaints against the owning agencies, as being complaints 
against the disposal agencies, particularly the Procurement 
Division of Treasury, and threatened to cut its 
appropriation, Gillette hastily sent a letter to 
Senator McKellar to clarify the situation, proclaiming 
that Procurement was "doing its job well,"55 Any 
criticism of the Procurement Division of the Treasury 
would become useless on April 19, anyway, for on that
5*lbid,. April 16, 1945: May 11, 1945; June 12,
1945; July i3, 1945; August 13, 1945,
55u« S., Congressional Record. 79th Cong,, 1st Sess,, 
April 5, 1945, 3BH7
127
date Fred M, Vinson, who had replaced James Byrnes In the 
Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, announced 
that henceforth the Commerce Department would handle 
consumer's goods disposal instead of the Treasury Depart­
ment «
By April 1, 1945, at least one problem had been 
settled which had bothered surplus property officials 
since the days of SWPA. That was the decision to give 
public power a chance at surplus southern electric 
facilities.57 in this case the Interior Department was 
given a Lake Charles, Louisiana, generating facility which 
had also been sought by a privately-owned electric utility. 
This was a feather in the cap of Interior Secretary Ickes, 
one of the most outspoken proponents of public power,5®
There were other developments in the surplus field, 
some of which were pleasing to the Board, Both the Army 
and Navy removed restrictions on machine tools which 
promised faster disposal in that category,59 Fiorello 
LaGuardia gave some comfort to SPB when, because of the 
huge amounts of surplus to handle, he admonished people 
not to be too critical of the disposal agency. He said
55n 6w York Times. April 19, 1945, 31.
57see page 117,
5®”Interior to Get First Surplus Equipment," 
Electrical World. CXXIII (March 31, 1945), 72,
59ncw York Times. April 26, 1945, 28,
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that huge surpluses were better than to have had shortages 
In supplies for the Armed Services. SPB Chairman Gillette 
acknowledged that some trouble might have resulted from 
the huge surpluses but blamed the trouble on "lack of 
funds, personnel, and the unwillingness of business men to 
expose themselves to the firing llne,"^®
On the other hand, public officials were not always 
complimentary. Attorney General Biddle asked for more 
speed in the disposal of Industrial facilities. In his 
Third Annual Report to Congress Biddle proclaimed that 
time was passing, that engineering studies should be made, 
that plants should be readied for disposal quickly, and 
that leases might be better than outright sales. His 
demands for haste were made so that when the war was 
finally over no plants would be Idle and no men 
unemployed.
Senator 0*Mahoney's subcommittee Investigated the
disposal of specific categories of warplants which
62naturally caused comment In those Industries.
Spokesmen for the aviation Industry were not Impressed by
GOlbld.. April 19, 1945, 31.
S. Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1st 
Sess., April 26,
goU. s. Congress, Senate, War Contracts Subcommittee 
of the Military Affairs Committee, Hearings. 79th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1945.
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the committee's statement of the situation, but they were 
glad to see the problem getting attention and were pleased 
that the Senators favored the retention of the aircraft 
plants by private industry.Aviation leaders were 
further pleased when the Army Air Forces indicated they 
would be interested in keeping the industry going after the 
war. They were gratified that some plants would be 
retained on a stand-by basis, that enough business would 
be forthcoming, in the transition period, to maintain 
skills and technical knowledge, and that in long range 
planning, industry needs would be the primary consideration 
even if that required leasing Instead of selling aircraft 
p l a n t s . T h e  petroleum industry, on the other hand, was 
given to understand by the O'Mahoney committee that no 
decisions would be made, nor would its opinions on 
disposal be sought, until after the war was over in
Europe. 5̂
Under the Surplus Property Board the question of 
the huge Geneva Steel Plant in Utah began to pose 
problems that would be so overwhelming in the future.
63«Peace Policy, Plant Disposal Linked by Senate 
Group Report," Aviation News. IV, (May l4, 1945), 10.
fill"Surplus Aircraft Plant Disposal Seen Shaping For 
Quick Action," Ibid.. IV, (July 23, 1945), 19.
65«o'Mahoney Committee Maps Agenda For Hearing On 
Nation's 19-Billion Surplus Facilities," National 
Petroleum News. XXXVII (March 7, 1945), lF%
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SPB opened negotiations with a number of prospective buyers 
but made no concrete plans for disposition. Vest coast 
Interests, however, were beginning to be apprehensive that 
Geneva might be disposed of to Its wartime designer and 
operator. United States Steel, Steel users west of the 
mountains were most interested In escaping the prewar 
domination of eastern capital. Their hopes were lifted 
when Attorney General Biddle Issued his report to Congress
In which he recommended that the western steel market
be made competitive. In several pages of harmonious 
discourse, California Congressmen readily agreed with 
Biddle and attempted to Impress SPB with their desire for a
west coast operator for Geneva.
Pertaining to other steel production facilities, 
steel Industry spokesmen were also In complete agreement 
In demanding that the government relinquish all control of 
steel-making facilities. An Industry poll told the story:
The executives were virtually unanimous In 
holding that government should not attempt to 
operate any plants and that all government plants 
not needed for future emergencies In a stand-by 
condition,should be sold or leased to Industry, or 
scrapped."'
The above survey, by the National Industrial 
Conference Board, Indicated, however, that the steel
U, s.. Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1st 
Sess., July 9, l 5 ^ l C 7 W ^ " : -------
^^"Leaslng Or Purchase of Government Plants 
Suggested By Survey," The Iron Age. CLV (May 24, 1945), 124.
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executives were not nearly so unanimous "on the manner and 
tempo of disposal," Views ranged from that of the 
operator who wanted the government to hold up disposal to 
give private owners a chance to get rid of their surplus 
facilities, to those who thought the government should 
scrap the plants or sell quickly at reasonable prices to 
stabilize the market. It was also feared that if the 
plants were not immediately disposed of "a concerted 
demand might eventually arise for government operation of
the plants retained," Leases, Instead of outright sales, 
were advocated by some because wartime costs, on which 
peacetime prices were to be figured, were too high to 
allow fixed capital investments. Several steel executives 
complained of the difficulty of "doing business with the 
government" and one declared that "restrictions are so
fi Rnumerous that it would be easier to build a new building,"
A Senate questionnaire of individual steel 
companies came up with similar results but with the added 
information that the steel industry expected the postwar 
demand to be greater than prewar but that it would be 
down about 20,000,000 ingot tons from the wartime peak,^^
In regard to ultimate methods of disposition the poll 
found that the Inland Steel Company thought that "plants
GGlbid.
^^"Many Industry Opinions for Disposal of 
Government Steel Plants," The Iron Age, CLV (April 26,
1945), 95.
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should be disposed of by sale only to get the government 
out of business," A spokesman for Copperweld Steel said 
that "plants should not be sold but leased for 20 years 
on a tonnage basis to prevent sales at sacrifice prices." 
The National Supply Company's response was that "sales are 
preferable, but Individual conditions should govern the 
method of dispositions," The Atlantic Steel Castings 
Company wrote that "leases with options to buy would be 
preferable," And a representative of United Engineering 
& Poundery Co, was "opposed to the sale of steel plants 
to companies not now engaged In the steel business,
By September the Surplus Property Board had taken a 
stand on disposition of Industrial facilities which It 
hoped would not contribute to economic concentration.
The Board announced that no preference would be shown to 
wartime operators, that the high bid need not be honored 
If disposition to another company would better carry out 
the objectives of the Surplus Property Act, and that each 
purchaser must certify that he Is buying for his own use 
and not for resale or l e a s e , T h e  largest actual disposal 
was leased, not sold, but, whatever the method, a 
$21,000,000 plant, built to manufacture stainless steel 
cargo planes, was kept In production. With this lease It
7°Ibld.. 95-96,
7^"8PB Rules for Plant Disposal Permit Below- 
Maximum Price Awards," The Iron Age. CLVI (September 13, 
1945), 110,
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was disclosed that wartime Industrial construction was not 
always productive. The plant in question had been built 
for the Edward G, Budd Manufacturing Company to fabricate 
600 planes, but the contract was cancelled after twenty-six 
were delivered, Budd had then utilized a portion of 
the huge facility for making shells but that contract was 
cancelled at war's end. With the lease, peacetime
production was assured in the making of Budd's famous 
streamlined t r a i n s , O n  a lesser scale, but having the 
advantage of a cash sale, was the disposal of a Navy 
shipyard in Chicago to the Pullman-Standard Company for 
$927,472, This was about half the actual wartime cost 
of the plant but each party felt that it had received 
fair treatment. The Navy was satisfied because it could 
retain considerable equipment which had been figured 
in the original cost, and Pullman-Standard was satisfied 
because It got a well-located property which would fit 
nicely into its postwar plans,
Also among the few accomplishments of SPB was the 
first actual step in aircraft plant disposal. The SPB 
induced the Army to declare thirty-two aircraft plants 
surplus to the Board, That was necessary before 
negotiations for sale or lease could begin. Since few of
^^”Under One Roof,” Business Week. July 14, 1945, 68,
?3”Half Off For Cash,” Ibid,. September 15, 1945, 53.
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the facilities declared surplus were major plants, aircraft 
executives doubted whether their disposal would Indicate 
future trends but they were pleased that disposition
7ijmachinery had been set in motion.'
Not everyone was pleased with surplus property 
developments, however. In fact, the complaints came in 
ever increasing numbers during the entire life of the 
Board. Some of the criticisms involved the highest echelon 
of government. Congressman John J. Cochran, of the 
President's home State, by-passed the Surplus Property 
Board in registering his grievance. He wrote directly to 
Truman protesting the slowness with which industrial 
facilities were being declared surplus to the Board. He 
referred specifically to a wire cable plant in his 
district which Cochran said could be sold Immediately If 
the Board could Just get It declared s u r p l u s . T h i s  was 
a busy time for the new President; the atomic bomb had 
been dropped, but surrender papers had not yet been 
signed. Truman, nevertheless, took time to answer:
Replying to your letter of the twenty-second, 
until the surplus property law is amended and 
placed in shape so we can actually work it from an 
administrative standpoint, there isn’t much use 
having surplus property turned over to that 
organization.
^^"Leased Wartime Factories Assume Vital Peacetime 
Role,” Aviation News. IV (September 3* 1945), 32.
T^John J. Cochran to Harry S. Truman, August 22, 
1945, OP 345, Truman Papers, Truman Library.
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I will ask for the necessary authority so we 
can really handle surplus property expeditiously 
* • . . It just is not possible now to operate under 
the present law.
I hope you will bear this in mind when Congress 
meets and try to get the matter straightened out.
We can't even make a contract to sell a plant and 
most of the large operators are threatening to 
build new plants unless we can find some way to 
do businesSfWith them. That certainly would put us 
in a hole.'
Other criticisms bore more directly on the Surplus 
Property Board itself. Early in the Board's existence a 
New York Times editorial had complained that no general 
policies had been formulated, that the administrative 
organization was confused, that funds were not adequate, 
and that lack of coordination was e v i d e n t . I n  the 
Senate Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska acknowledged that the dis­
posal situation was bad, but he blamed it on SPB's sub­
servient position to the Office of War Mobilization and on 
the negligence of owning agencies in declaring property 
surplus to the Board. More power for the Board was Wherry's 
answer to the problem.^®
As early as the end of March 1945, Congressional 
opinion had suggested that one agency, then the Surplus 
Property Board, should be given control over both aspects
^^Harry S. Truman to John J. Cochran, August 24,
1945, OP Pile 345, Truman Papers, Truman Library.
^?New York Times. March 26, 1945, 18.
S., Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1st 
Sess., March 30, 1945, 299b.
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of Surplus Property Disposal. That would depart from the 
recommendations of the Baruch-Hancock Report, which had 
been followed closely In this regard up to that point.
To Include both policy and actual disposal In one agency.
It was said, would Increase the efficiency with which both 
were performed.There was a drastic need to Increase 
because very little surplus property was being disposed 
of. Prom the beginning of disposal In February of 1944 
to the end of May 1945, $196,513,000 had been paid for 
property originally costing the government $357,063,000.
This was very good, better than 50 per cent return. But 
that was not the whole story. Victory In Europe had Just 
been achieved In that month, which meant that surplus 
property would be declared In much greater quantity, and 
already Inventory had reached a staggering $1,688,983,000.®°
In August Congress debated at great length over 
the effectiveness of the Board and the amount of authority 
It ought to have. Thomas Stewart of Tennessee, one of the 
Senate's ablest students of surplus disposal, protested: 
"They have not any control. They cannot sell a shoe­
string. They could not do It to save their Immortal 
souls." He added: "I want this Board to have some
authority and power." In the course of the debate Senator
79lbld.. 2985.
^°New York Times. June 29, 1945, 31.
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Downey, of California, defended the Board: ”I am of the
opinion . . . that the present Surplus Property Board
Is doing a highly efficient Job.” But Stewart had the
last word, when he said, "If they have ever done anything
but Issue regulations, I should like to know what It Is.
That Is all they have the authority to do."®^
At the end of August, after the fighting In the
Pacific had ended, the surplus property situation gave
every Indication of getting worse. In the first week
after the Japanese quit fighting, the Army alone declared
op$500,000,000 worth of materiel surplus to the Board.
The mountain was getting higher.
In an analytical piece the New Republic evaluated 
the Board and Its record. The editors considered all of 
the Board members to be honest men "who Intended to do 
their best." But Gillette was not a detail man, and he 
needed to be. Hurley, they said, tried to compensate In 
energy expended for lack of knowledge of the problems. 
Heller was the best qualified but he was. In the opinion 
of the writer, overcautious and no fighter. Moreover, 
the Board had difficulty In Interpreting the Surplus 
Property law. The article related how the Board decided 
to get expert opinion to help Interpret veterans*
OnU. s. Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1st 
Sess., August 1, 1945, 6233.
^^New York Times. August 23, 19^5, 14.
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preference so they Invited In for consultation four 
Senators and four Congressmen, all of whom had helped 
draft the act. Prom the group of eight, SPB got nine 
opinions since one Congressman changed his mind in the 
course of the discussionI
Prom his vantage point of hindsight, James A, Cook 
was the most specific in his criticisms of the Surplus 
Property Board:
Even in the most sympathetic appraisal of 
circumstances, it has been difficult to fully 
justify the Board's performance. Its members had 
for their guidance not only the Baruch-Hancock 
report, the C. E, D. study, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics account of World War I operations, 
but the policies of the Surplus Property Act 
itself. More importantly, they could now draw 
upon the experiences of SWPA. Yet, even in 
perceiving the large quantities of unliquidated 
properties in their custody, and the immensity 
of operations soon to be imposed upon disposal 
agencies, the Board members seemed simply unable 
to formulate the necessary administrative and 
operating procedures. By the end of March 1945, 
no policy statement had been announced, nor had 
further regulations been issued to disposal 
agencies. Of the 21 basic disposal regulations 
needed, 7 had been completed by June. The RPC and 
Treasury Procurement sales offices were unable to 
dispose of certain categories of equipment since 
they had not received authority or instructions 
under which the equipment was to be sold. It can 
thus be seen that neither the Board nor the disposal 
agencies were prepared for the large volume of 
surpluses following VE Day.
Chairman Gillette soon came to the conclusion that
^^Helen Puller, "Our Surplus Billions," The New 
Republic. CXIII (August 27, 1945), 253.
O h James Allen Cook, Marketing of Surplus War 
Property. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1947),
7ü=TX—
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It would be Impossible for him to remain on the Surplus 
Property Board, On May 25, 19^5, after only four months 
in office, Gillette submitted his resignation to be 
effective on July 15.®^
Before actually leaving office Gillette addressed a 
letter to his old Senate friend, Joseph C, 0*Mahoney, in 
which he outlined the troubles of the surplus property 
disposal system from his viewpoint. He saw two primary 
problems; that emanating from a disposal structure which 
had the SPB serving under the Office of War Mobilization 
and Reconversion; and second the problem of clouded
flfiareas of authority between SPB and the disposal agencies.
He complained that it was not clear whether OWMR should 
exercise authority "of such a general nature as to be 
negligible in its effect" or whether the authority 
should be strict and include the power of veto. He noted 
that James Byrnes and Fred Vinson had been "painstakingly 
considerate in their interpretation of the supervisory 
function . . . ." But in spite of that there had been a 
few Instances where OWMR had changed or even vetoed 
policies established by the Board. He feared that the 
relationship might become worse under future OWMR
®5"Minutes SPB," June 1, 1945, in "WAA History." 
fifiQuoted in Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st 
Sess,, June 30, 1945, 7154,
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Directors.
The problem with the owning agencies came about 
when those agencies sold property directly to the public 
without first declaring It surplus to the Board, In that
way the owning agencies circumvented the Board’s regulations
and the principles of the Surplus Property Act of 1944. 
Gillette was also convinced, as his letter to O'Mahoney 
Indicated, that the Property Act needed changing and 
clarification, especially In those sections dealing with 
surplus Industrial real property. Of greatest significance,
however, was Gillette's conclusion that a single
administrator for the surplus property organization was 
needed:
. . .  I was one of those who concluded that the 
provisions of the act should be administered by a 
Board, rather than by one Director or Administrator.
This conclusion was based on the very logical 
premise that the combined thought and Judgment of 
several Individuals would be more democratic In 
procedure and more sound In conclusion than the 
judgment of one man, I also felt that no one man 
was omniscient enough to reach Judgments In the 
wide field of activity envisioned by the act. In 
the light of my few months' experience as a member 
of the Board, however, I am forced to the 
conclusion, and I am convinced, that the act should 
be administered by one person as Its head . , , ,
To cure some of the Ills which had caused Gillette's 
complaints. Senator Tom Stewart of Tennessee, who had long 




Introduced a bill which would change the surplus property
goset-up.  ̂ Stewart's bill would make the Surplus Property 
Board an Independent organization with authority over 
actual disposal as well as over policy. It would be given 
sufficient staff to handle both functions, Stewart 
estimated that It would take 1000 employees,^® The New 
York Times reported that Stewart's bill had the blessing 
of the Administration and that "Symington had told the 
President he would not take the job unless his authority 
was made a b s o l u t e , O n e  thing that Stewart's bill did 
not do, that Gillette had recommended, was to provide for 
a single administrator, Stewart stated that he had 
originally been In favor of this course, but since a Board 
was already functioning and manned he did not want to 
reopen the question,
The President, however, felt otherwise. On July 
17* 1945» Truman sent a message to his former Congressional 
colleagues In which he requested that legislation be passed 
to provide for a single Surplus Property Administrator, 
Truman said that the accomplishments of the Board had been
ĜIbld.
^^Ibld.. 7569, The War Assets Administration which 
handled both' functions had a peak of 59,000 employees In 
November of 1946.
9^New York Times. July 13, I945, 14,
qo^ U, S.. Congressional Record. 79th Cone.. 1st 
Sess., July 13, 1945, 7569.
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considerable but that when the Surplus Act had been passed
James Byrnes had recommended a single Administrator and in
Truman's opinion "experience had proved him r i g h t , T h e
President did not follow the Stewart bill in regard to
divorcement from OWMR. In fact he specifically recommended
that the Administrator remain under Vinson's supervision.9^
In an editorial, the New York Times agreed that for
sake of coordinating reconversion the Administrator
should be left under OWMR, and the writer ventured that the
proposed change to an Administrator would be well received
by Congress.95 Nor did the President, in his message to
Congress, recommend the inclusion of all responsibility
for dealing with surplus property in one agency. Stewart
felt this was the most important part of his bill and
pleaded with Congress to include this change if it passed
96a law for a single administrator. Senator Stewart's bill, 
however, was referred to committee and died there.
On the same day that Stewart was arguing for his bill 
in the Senate, William E. Colmer of Mississippi, introduced 
a bill in the House embodying the President's suggestions.9?
93lbid.. July 17, 1945, 7587.
9^Ibid.. 7588.
95n6w York Times. July 19, 1945, 22.
9^U, S. Congressional Record, 79th Cong.. 1st Sess.. 
July 19, 1945, TTTC
9?New York Times. July 20, 1945, 7.
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Nothing was done with the bill, however, prior to 
Congress’s conditional adjournment on August 1, 1945. While 
Congress was In adjournment Chairman Carter Manasco of the 
House Committee on Expenditures In the Executive Departments 
called his group Into session. The highlight of this 
Hearing was the testimony of the new Chairman of the 
Surplus Property Board, Stuart Symington, In which he 
Introduced a letter signed by all three members of the 
Board favoring their own dismissal, and replacement by a 
single administrator.98
On September 6, 1945» President Truman In his annual 
message to Congress once again called for a single 
administrator.99 in response to his plea, the House, on 
September 10, 1945, passed H. R. 3907 which was a short, 
simple bill only embodying the one change. It gave to one 
man control of the surplus property policy-making agency.
The same bill passed the Senate and became law on September
12, 1945.19°
Manasco, Chairman of the House Committee on 
Expenditures In the Executive Department solemnly promised, 
however, that the other changes In the Surplus Property 
law would be considered by his committee In three or four
98y. S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures 
In the Executive Departments, Hearings on H. R. 3907. 79th 
Cong., 1st Sess., August 28, I945, 57
99jjew York Times. September 7* 1945, 17.
10°Ibld.. September 13, 1945, 4.
weeks.101
With the single Administrator law, the last change 
in a series took place. Gillette had retired as 
Chairman of to be replaced immediately by
S y m i n g t o n .  103 when Symington then became the lone Adminis­
trator he simply assumed a new title and increased respon­
sibility for Hurley and Heller naturally resigned with the
TollChange in the law.
To accompany this change in policy leadership there 
was, at the same time, a change in the disposal set-up.
The burden of the disposal of consumers* goods was changed 
from the Department of Commerce to the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation.105 ppc already had the job of
handling industrial facilities so it was looming larger as
a force in surplus disposal. With this recent change in
mind, Stuart Symington relayed his thoughts on the disposal
problem to his boss Harry Truman :
From hereout the surplus disposal problem will 
be a merchandizing job in the field, a job that 
will stand or fall on efficient administration in 
the field by the agencies of the Reconstruction
l^lu. S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong,, 1st 
Sess,, September io, i^^5, 845?.
l^^New York Times. June 1, 1945, 13.
^®^Harry 8, Truman to Guy Gillette, June 8, 1945,
OF 122Q, Truman Papers, Truman Library.
^O^New York Times. June 8, 1945, 20.
lOSibid.. October 20, 2.
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Finance Corporation.
These agencies face a gigantic task. Not only 
must they now merchandize those billions of dollars 
of goods they now have on hand as evidence of the 
money they loaned, but also now they must (1) 
absorb the field offices of the Department of 
Commerce and (2) take over the Veteran problem
The key to an efficient job Is direct control 
of the RPC regional field heads by people 
responsible for surplus sales, so that these agency 
heads could be constantly made aware of the fact 
that their most Important current job was this 
surplus disposal.
Of one thing we feel certain. If It Is 
handled as a side Issue, In a side corporation, 
there Is no chance whatever for success.
Nor Is there any chance of building up a new 
national organization In time to do the job. By 
the time It was built, any chance of selling the 
surplus without wrecking the peace-time economy 
would be gone.
RPC may have been able to slide some problems 
off Into owned or controlled subsidiaries, but 
they can never slide this one. It should be THE 
Issue for them until It Is gone, not any side Issue.
And therefore the head of RPC, regardless of 
title, should be a man with broad merchandizing 
experience.
As mentioned, the work of this policy agency 
will be over by the end of the year. We now have 
a good team and It would then be logical to send 
the key people here Into the RFC operating line 
# $ * #
If for any reason these Ideas do not coincide 
with your views, that would be understood and 
entirely satisfactory to me.
Nevertheless, after four months of Intense 
study and effort, we here are certain this plan 
Is not only the best way, but the only way a 
creditable surplus disposal job may be done; and 
are sure you would want us to present our
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conclusions.^®^
Symington, as a close associate of former Senator 
Truman, was considered dependable by the Senate and on 
September 26, 1945, he was confirmed in his appointment 
as Surplus Property Administrator with little discussion. 
This period, the latter part of the term of the Surplus 
Property Board and for the duration of the Surplus 
Property Administration, was the Symington era. Others 
had tried and had fallen by the wayside. The success of 
Symington’s efforts hung in the balance.
^Stuart Symington to Harry Truman, September 
17, 1945, OP 122G, Truman Papers, Truman Library.
®̂*̂ New York Times. September 26, 1945, 14.
CHAPTER VI 
THE SYMINGTON ERA
When W. Stuart Symington went from St. Louis to 
Washington to serve his fellow Missourian, Harry Truman, 
as Chairman of the Surplus Property Board, he had no 
governmental experience whatsoever. As the son-in-law 
of Representative James Wadsworth of New York, he was 
familiar with the Washington scene, but his experience 
had been entirely in the business field as an executive 
in electronics and metals companies in New York, Maryland, 
and finally in Missouri. As a leading businessman in St. 
Louis, he had long been a friend and strong supporter of 
the President.1 In public life Symington, his experience 
notwithstanding, had found his niche.
Stuart Symington brought ability, energy and 
dedication to his work as Chairman of the Surplus Property 
Board and as Surplus Property Administrator. Yet his 
performance was viewed with mixed feelings by those with 
whom he came into contact. Symington's most notable, and
^New York Times. June 8, 19*5; July 19, 19^5, 22.
147
148
enthusiastic, supporter was his friend, the President.^
His critics, however, both In business and government, 
were numerous.
Symington's most durable distinction In surplus 
property accomplishment deservedly rests with the 
disposition of surplus aluminum facilities. Until World 
War II primary production of aluminum In the United States 
was entirely In the hands of the Aluminum Company of 
America, better known as Alcoa.^ Prom 1893, three years 
after the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Alcoa 
had been almost continuously under Indictment for Its 
dominant role In light metals. The most recent suit, and 
the one which would bear heavily on the course of surplus 
disposal, had been filed by the government In 1937. In 
an Interim decision, handed down March 12, 1945, Judge 
Learned Hand found Alcoa guilty of monopoly In the 
production of aluminum Ingot but refused to order 
dissolution until the result of the disposal of government-
^Harry Truman to Stuart Symington, January 18,
1946, OP 122G, Truman Papers, Truman Library.
^Robert Lester Branyan, "Antimonopoly Activities 
During the Truman Administration," (Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Department of History, University of 
Oklahoma, 1961), 44.
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owned aluminum facilities had been evaluated.^ Section 
Twenty of the Surplus Property Act had specifically 
instructed those in charge of disposal to guard against 
monopoly.^
Symington has, to a great extent, been given sole 
credit for the creation of competition in the aluminum 
industry, but it must be recognized that his way was 
cleared by Hand's decision and the opinion of the out­
going Attorney General, Francis Biddle, This opinion held 
that in light of Hand's ruling none of the government-owned 
aluminum facilities could be sold to Alcoa who had been 
their wartime operator. Indeed, Symington's primary 
role was as a negotiator. As such he was the leading 
advocate of the get-tough policy in dealing with Alcoa.
His attitude was not the result of an idealogical 
repugnance for monopoly, but rather, he felt that he had 
been treated discourteously in a conference with Arthur 
V, Davis, Alcoa's crusty old Chairman of the Board,^ It
^Harold Stein, "Disposal of the Aluminum Plants,"
The American Economic Review, LII (Spring, 1962), 315-16.
In May ot l94% &tein was appointed as a special advisor 
to OWMR for surplus property problems. In that position 
he was a close observer of the aluminum situation,
^U. S., Statutes at Large, LVIII, Part 2, 479.
^Steln, "Disposal of Aluminum Plants," 332,
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was this mutual misunderstanding, Davis was perturbed 
too, which impelled Symington to take the crucial first 
step in aluminum trust busting: the cancellation of
Alcoa's leases on seven government-owned plants.?
Three agencies, the Justice Department, the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the Surplus 
Property Administration worked closely, one with the others, 
to break the strangle-hold of the aluminum trust. It is 
really unfair to give the credit to one person or one 
agency. Justice Department lawyers came up with the legal
pJustification for breaking the leases. RPC, through its 
subsidiary, the Defense Plant Corporation, built the plants 
and was the agency to hold the title and thus actually free 
the facilities at Jones Mills, Los Angeles, Massena,
0Spokane, Prontdale, Hurricane Creek, and Baton Rouge.^ 
Symington, as Surplus Property Administrator, contributed 
in four ways: first, as the policy agent; second, as
coordinator between government branches, departments, 
and agencies; third, as negotiator with industry; and 
fourth, as spokesman through which information was 
channeled to the public.
?"Light-Metals Plants Disposal Plans Presented," The 
Iron Age. CLVI (September 13, 19^5), 106.
p
Stein, "Disposal of the Aluminum Plants," 329-30.
9"Light-Metals Plants Disposal Plan Presented,"
The Iron Age. 106.
"Aluminum Enigma," Business Week (September 10, 
1945), 34, 36, 39.
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After cancellation of the leases, Symington most 
fervently hoped that Alcoa would continue to operate the 
plants, with an Interim agreement, until permanent operators 
could be found, but Alcoa leadership would not agree,
Alcoa announced Its Intention to clear the plants by 
October 31, 1945. The resulting unemployment, and other 
economic hardship, could be laid at the feet of the 
government.
That being the case, speed In finding permanent
operators was essential, Reynolds Metals was the most
logical organization to step Into the breach, Reynolds
had long been a substantial operator In the aluminum field
but had never had a full-scale. Integrated, start-to-flnlsh
manufacturing set-up. Without concessions from
Alcoa It was not sure that It wanted one. Hurricane Creek
In Arkansas was the logical plant to use as a pilot but
there, as elsewhere, Alcoa held patents which were essential
12to profitable manufacture.
To overcome this obstacle Symington favored the use 
of subsidy, whether It be In the form of low electric 
rates, low rent, product purchase, guarantee against loss, 
or assumption of liability for patent Infringement, But 
congressional opinion, on which any permanent settlement 
of the aluminum question rested, shied away from the
^^•'Llght-Metals Plants Disposal Plan Presented,"
The Iron Age. 106,
^^Steln, "The Disposal of Aluminum Plants," 347.
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mildest suggestion of s u b s i d y , T h e  only alternative 
open to the harassed Surplus Property Administrator lay 
in getting patent releases from Alcoa. Here was 
Symington's finest hour. Swallowing his pride, he bent 
every effort to reach a reasonable solution with the 
aluminum giant, Arthur Davis responded in kind and on 
January 10, 1946, Symington joyfully announced to the 
President that Alcoa had agreed to let Reynolds use the 
patents for Hurricane C r e e k , I n  the spring of 1946 a 
lease, which eventually turned into outright sale, was
signed with Reynolds and the aluminum monopoly was on the
way to being b r o k e n . A s  an epilogue Harold Stein 
reported that at the time of the Korean War the situation 
had stabilized with Alcoa controlling 50 per cent of 
production, Reynolds 30 per cent, and Kaiser 20 per cent.
The above figures are impressive, and given an
otherwise dismal picture, it is only natural that
government officials and apologists for the Truman 
Administration would point with pride to the aluminum 
settlement. But when viewed with somewhat greater 
objectivity the accomplishment does not warrant unqualified
ISlbid.. 331.
1 |iStuart Symington to Harry Truman, January 10,
1946, OP 541, Truman Papers, Truman Library.
l^Branyan, "Antimonopoly in the Truman 
Administration," 50.
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praise. It Is true that a monopoly was broken, but it is
also true that an oligopoly resulted. Oligopoly is
considered by many to be Just as restrictive as monopoly
without the efficiency, the one redeeming feature of
m o n o p o l y . I f ,  as others say, bigness itself is inimical
to the public interest, Alcoa was bigger in 1950 than it
was in 1945 in spite of the competition of the former 
17year.^ '
Even though Alcoa fought every inch of the way and 
appeared to have been dragged, kicking and screaming, into 
a competetive market, the disturbing thought keeps recurring 
that this was Just about what it wanted from the start.
When negotiations for the disposal of aluminum plants 
opened, Alcoa, under combined opinions of the courts and the 
Attorney General, was slated for dissolution. But when the 
negotiations were over, Alcoa had not been broken up and 
still held a dominant position in a fast growing industry.
It could ask for little more.
One of the most hotly contested issues was over the 
use of the Alcoa patents, but during negotiations
spokesmen for the company had indicated that the patents
18were not actually very valuable. And the Justice
^^Stein, "The Disposal of Aluminum Plants," 353.
^^Moody's Industrial Manual (New York: Moody's
Investors Service, Ï&61), 2^30.
T ftStein, "The Disposal of Aluminum Plants," 347.
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Department was not happy with the arrangements, which 
permitted Alcoa to receive the right to use Reynolds 
technological advances while the reverse was not true. The 
Justice Department, however, relented In the face of 
Symington's pressure for settlement.
When negotiations opened, the Justice Department had
ruled that Alcoa could purchase no government-owned plants,
whatsoever, but when negotiations had closed Alcoa had
been given the right to purchase the Massena, New York
plant. In return Alcoa agreed to close one of her antique,
out-dated plants In the same neighborhood, which certainly
20worked to Alcoa's advantage.
The aluminum deal was among the first of any 
significance In plant disposal. It was heralded as 
beginning a new era In antimonopoly procedure. Surplus 
Industrial facilities would be used to combat bigness In 
all Industries. The Surplus Property Act of 1944 
specifically required that this course of action be 
pursued.21 But It never developed. This was. It Is true, 
the beginning, but It was, also, almost the end. If there 
had been an Interim report on antimonopoly activity In 





encouraging than the final report would be,^^
It was In the midst of the aluminum controversy that
Stuart Symington's official title was changed from Chairman
of the Surplus Property Board to Surplus Property
Administrator. After Congress amended the Surplus Property
Act of 1944 Symington was sworn in on October 1, 1945.^^
On that same day he created the five divisions of
his Administration: capital and producer's goods; consumer
goods; operations, planning, compliance, management, and
administration; economic research; and public information
and policies. The actual disposal agencies, over which
Symington had absolute policy control, remained the same
for the time being. Primarily these were RPC who
continued to handle industrial goods, including plants,
and the Department of Commerce which retained the job of
selling consumers goods. He also announced that the
chief aims of the new agency would be to simplify veterans'
buying procedures, clear contract-terminated plants
quickly, sell faster but pay closer attention to government
and small business priorities, and speedily dispose of
2Uwarplants and machine tools.
Since SPA was only a policy making body it was a
^^See Chapter X.
^% e w  York Times, October 2, 1945, 32,
2*Ibid.
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continuing problem to keep this function clearly dellnlated 
from actual disposal operations. One agency for both 
functions would certainly make the structure less 
complicated, but Symington could not yet bring himself to 
favor such a course. Just as he had denied the wisdom of 
this move In writing to the President In September he 
reiterated his feeling to Representative P. Edward Hebert In 
November.There  was, however, feeling in Congress that 
something more had to be done and that a single agency 
might be the a n s w e r . E v e n  Symington was not dogmatic 
on the proposition. Writing to John W. Snyder, head of 
the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion,
Symington Indicated that, while at the moment he favored 
separation, he could be convinced of the propriety of
unification.27
Spokesmen for powerful pressure groups such as 
veterans and local governments, attested that all was not 
well with SPA. Mayor LaGuardla of New York City protested 
bitterly, saying that the Administrator and his aides were
25gtuart Symington to P. Edward Hebert, November 
27, 19^5. in U. S., War Assets Administration. 
"Administrative History of the War Assets Administration 
and Predecessor Agencies," (Unpublished Typescript in 
Pederal Records Center, Springfield, Virginia, Pile 
62-A-982 #7). Cited hereafter as "WAA History."
26U. S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee 
Investigating the National Defense Program, Hearings. 79th 
Cong., 1st Sesb., September 24, 1945* 15763.
27gtuart Symington to John Snyder, November 30,
1945, in "WAA History."
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"not competent or suited to administer the law by 
attitude, experience, and past performance," He charged 
that the cities could not get as good a deal from SPA as 
"second-hand dealers and junk dealers," While not as 
vehement as the Mayor, Governor Mon Wallgren of Washington, 
said that It was Impossible for the States to get as good 
treatment from SPA as that accorded to private dealers.
Maury Maverick, the volatile Chairman of the Smaller 
War Plants Corporation, which handled the priorities for 
veterans and small businessmen, complained of "Indlscribable 
confusion In disposals." He noted the difficulties In 
getting the priorities afforded by the Surplus Property 
Act of 1944,28 It was even sometimes difficult to 
determine just who was a "small businessman," SWPC 
defined him as an employer of less than 500 people but 
a Washington correspondent termed him, perhaps more 
realistically, as "the fellow who Isn't big enough to have 
a lobby."29
Many of the complaints about disposal simply stemmed 
from the tremendous Increase In the amount of property 
declared surplus In the months Immediately following the 
end of the war. By the end of October 1945, unsold 
Inventories amounted to nearly $7,000,000,000 and
28New York Times. October 12, 1945, 32.
29Richard Thruelson, "What You Can Buy Prom the 
Army," Saturday Evening Post, CCXVIII, December 1, 1945,
130.
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disposals during that month had only been 1,5 per cent of 
the total. October sales were even more discouraging when 
figured as only 3.3 per cent of that month's acquisitions,^^
By December of 1945, Industrial facilities were 
beginning to come on the market In great numbers. When 
military orders were ended, contracts cancelled, and plants 
cleared of government Inventory, the Armed Services then 
declared them surplus to the Surplus Property Administration, 
The Administrator judged whether any further steps, such 
as referral to Congress or the Attorney General, were 
necessary. If not the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
was then authorized to offer them for sale. Estimates 
of total facilities ran as high as 2100, 1000 of which were 
fully Integrated plants, certified to SPA by the end of 
1945,31 Aircraft plants loomed large In the total figures 
and they were proving difficult to s e l l ,32 over 100 
aircraft plants had already been listed for sale before 
the end of October and only six rather small ones, 
totalling altogether a little over $6,000,000, had been 
sold,33 Of the larger plants only three had been disposed
3®James Allen Cook, Marketing of Surplus War Property 
(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 19^7), H .
J Edwin Ware Hulllnger, "For Sale— 1300 Plants," 
Nations Business. XXXIII, (December 1945), 50.
32lbld.. 100.
33"Leases Preferred." Business Week, October 20,
1945, 19.
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of, all by lease, and none for aircraft production.
Personal pressure was still the best way to get 
action from a federal agency as evidenced by the results 
of a telegram Symington received from a group of Kansas City 
businessmen. In the wire these men warned that unless 
the Vendo Corporation's bid on a surplus plant was accepted 
quickly the company would move to another city.^^
Symington, naturally favored the cause of fellow Missourians 
and the case brought to mind one of Symington's chronic 
disputes with RPC officials. He wrote to George Buskie, 
Assistant Director of the Surplus Property Division of RFC:
As you know we have been much opposed to the 
long and costly delays instant to negotiations on 
plants which invariably result in people being kept 
out of work and especially in that . . . these 
citizens are interested in it and there seems to be 
justification for going through with the deal based 
on what was done with Aireon, please see if we 
cannot put this one through promptly.
As we have often discussed before, if we make 
deals with the big plants and haggle with respect 
to the little plants, not only are we going 
against the directive of the Surplus Property Act 
which says we should aid small business but we 
are actually favoring big business over small 
business.J
As the number of industrial facilities for sale 
3*Ibid.. 17.
35rpeiegram from large group of Kansas City people 
to Stuart Symington, undated, OP 122G, Truman Papers,
Truman Library.
S^Stuart Symington to George Buskie, November 29, 
1945, OP 1220, Truman Papers, Truman Library.
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Increased, the public began to realize that it had become 
a tremendous enterprise. One reporter termed It the 
"biggest lump sum disposal of national resources since 
the millions of acres of farmlands were turned over to 
private operators In the Nineteenth century." He added 
that the government-owned Industrial facilities represented 
"the largest block of state capitalistic holdings In 
existence outside Russia today."3?
This Included a vast array of facilities stretching 
from coast to coast and from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico. 
Every State had Its surplus Industrial facilities although 
they were few and far between In places like South Dakota 
and Nebraska, outside of Omsdia. The heaviest concentration 
was, naturally. In the Industrial East although California 
with Its concentration of aircraft plants had Its share.
As plants began to close down people began to realize how 
many belonged to the government and how big the job of 
getting them sold and reopened was to be.
If plant disposal In general was big business, 
disposal of the Geneva Steel plant would be the biggest of 
all. It was so big that as of October 20, 1945, SPA had 
not received a firm offer for It, although several 
operators had Indicated Interest. The potential of the 
plant rested on the probable west coast postwar market 
and this had not been properly evaluated. Geneva steel
S^Hulllnger, "Por-Sale 1300 Plants," 50.
I6l
would, however, have a competitive advantage due to a 
western freight rate basing point which would mean a 15 
to 20 per cent reduction in the price of western steel.
The sale of Geneva would eventually be one of the most 
controversial decisions in the history of surplus disposal.
Growing problems, particularly in consumer's goods, 
prompted a basic change in the surplus property disposal 
organization. On May 1, 1945, the Commerce Department had 
assumed responsibility for disposal of consumer's goods but 
the Job had soon palled on the former Vice-President, Henry 
Wallace, who had been demoted to Commerce Secretary.
Because his department handled surplus property he and his 
agency came under fire from the states, municipalities, 
veterans, and consumers in general.Wallace complained 
that "the business" was "not workable administratively" 
and chose to dump it into the lap of the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation.^® In defending his department 
Wallace averred that the whole trouble had stemmed from 
SPA, and that he had only been following its policies.
In any case it was becoming evident that the RPC was 
assuming more and more importance in surplus disposal since
"Geneva Aspirant," Business Week. October 20,
1945, 19.
^^New York Times. October 20, 1945, 2.
^®Thruelsen, "What You Can Buy From the Army," 129. 
^%ew York Times. October 20, 1945, 2.
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It already controlled the disposition of industrial 
facilities and producer's goods.
To take care of the increased responsibility RFC 
decided to make a significant change in its own organization. 
Heretofore, RPC had handled disposal through a surplus 
property Department, which meant that the field offices were 
required to operate in all RFC areas. With the added 
burden of consumer's goods this would be impossible, Sam 
H. Husbands, an RFC director, and head of the surplus 
property section, proposed a subsidiary corporation in
hnRFC for property disposal. Symington by this time favored 
anything that would speed operations and on October 31,
1945, inquired of Husbands; "When do we get rolling on War 
Assets Corporation
There was, however, some difficulty in getting WAG 
established. RFC's authority to create new corporations 
had expired on June 30, 1943. It was, therefore, necessary 
to find an RPC subsidiary which was already in existence 
but no longer useful. The defunct Petroleum Reserves 
Corporation fit the circumstances. Its name would simply 
be changed to the War Assets Corporation, new officers 
would be selected, and the new disposal agency would be
Uo"Notes on Outstanding Disposal Policies,"
October 30, 1945, in "WAA History."
•^Stuart Symington to Sam H. Husbands, October 31, 
1945, in "WAA History."
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In business,
The announced date for the birth of the War Assets 
Corporation was November 5, 1945. That was also to be the 
date that Symington, as Surplus Property Administrator, 
would designate It the new disposal agency to replace RPC 
I t s e l f . S u c h ,  however, was not the case since It required 
a great deal of planning and legal work to launch the new 
organization. It was not until November 9, that RPC's 
board of directors passed the resolution that created WAC.
At the same meeting the board named November 15, as WAC's 
first day In business.
But on that day WAC had nothing to do, since 
Symington had not designated It as the disposal agency.
The Surplus Property Administrator had been giving thought 
to organization and the establishment of field offices but 
had not yet reached the conclusion that It was wise to 
entrust the new organization with so vast a p o w e r . S o ,  
for the time being. In fact two months, the parent RPC
^^"WAA History."
^^New York Times. November 1, 1945, 34.
S., War Assets Administration, First Quarterly 
Report. 1946; The Integration of Surplus Dispos^ 
(Washington: Ü, S. Government i^rinting Office, 1946), 6.
^^Stuart Symington to Charles B. Henderson,
Chairman of the Board of RPC, November 6, 1945, In "WAA 
History."
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hOremained In charge of disposal. In spite of lack of 
duties WAC, on November 15, named its officers: Sam H,
Husbands, Chairman; George F. Buskie, Vice-Chairman; and 
Arthur J. Pushman, President,
RPC was not pleased with the delay so its Chairman 
wrote Symington: "Subject to your approval, Monday, Decem­
ber 3, is the date set for surplus disposal activities 
to be conducted in the name of War Assets Corporation."^0 
But Henderson raised questions which Symington considered 
to be too complex for easy solution so he decreed that 
designation of WAC would not occur before January 1, 1946.51
The truth of the matter was that Symington was 
discontented with RFC, and was not sure that shifting 
responsibility to a subordinate corporation would solve 
the problem. On November 1, 1945» he had complained to 
Henderson of the slowness of sales. Symington had also 
repeated his complaint of the ease with which RPC 
negotiated the big deals, and of the difficulties that 
always seemed to crop up when small plants were involved.
^®Cook, Marketing of Surplus War Property. 74.
*9"Minutes of the Board of Directors Meeting of the 
War Assets Corporation," November 15» 1945» in "WAA 
History."
5®Charles B, Henderson to Stuart Symington, November 
20, 1945, in "WAA History."
^^Stuart Symington to Charles B. Henderson» November 
29, 1945» in "WAA History."
165
He told Henderson, as he had written to Buskie, that this 
was "opposite to the wishes of the Administration and the 
Congress In enacting the Surplus Property Law,"^^
Evidently In a previous communication Henderson had Indicated 
concern for the reputation of RPC, for Symington 
chided Henderson on this point and concluded: "Surely what
is good for the country Is good for RPC."53
On his part Henderson admitted that sales had been 
slow, but pointed out that clearing government Inventory 
from contract-terminated plants had been the top priority 
since V-J Day, So that Symington could take part In 
disposal decisions, Henderson suggested that Symington be 
made a member of the board of directors of WAC,5^
Symington, however, cared nothing for that idea. Ever 
mindful of his status, he wrote: " , , , I would rather be 
allowed to talk directly with you and Mr, Husbands Instead 
of being relegated to a secondary position In a subsidiary
corporation,"55
Because of Symington’s uncertainty of the value of 
WAC, the January 1, 1946 date for designating It as the




Charles B, Henderson to Stuart Symington, November 
23, 1945, In "WAA History,"
55gtuart Symington to Charles B, Henderson, November 
27, 1945, In "WAA History,"
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disposal agency was passed by.5̂  But big changes, which 
promised more decisive action, were taking place In WAC 
organization. On December 26, 19^5, the energetic 
Lieutenant General Edmund B. Gregory, since 1940 the 
Quartermaster General of the Army, had been appointed to 
the board of directors of WAC, and on January 2, 1946,
Sam H. Husbands resigned as Chairman of that board.^7 On 
January 6, Gregory, at the request of President Truman, 
was appointed to the position vacated by Husbands.
In actually setting the date for WAC designation 
the reluctant Symington was by-passed. On January 4, 1946, 
John W. Snyder, head of OWMR and Symington’s boss under 
terras of the 1944 property act, met with Husbands, still 
on the board of RFC, and together they set January 15 as 
the date for WAC take-over. In spite of Symington’s 
continued opposition It was then clear that WAC would soon 
be the policy as well as the disposal arm of surplus 
property.59
On January l8, 1946, President Truman accepted
5^Stuart Symington to John D. Goodloe, General 
Counsel of RPC, December 18, 1945, In "WAA History."
^^Memorandum from Minot C. Mulligan, Secretary of 
the Board of WAC to Lloyd A. Nelson, WAC Treasurer,
January 10, 1946, In "WAA History."
5^New York Times. January 19» 1946, 20.
59Memorandum for the Piles of John D. Goodloe, 
January 4, 1946, In "WAA History."
167
Stuart Symington's resignation as Surplus Property 
Administrator, The President wrote:
You have fulfilled the highest expectations I 
had In mind when I appointed you as Administrator.
You have set up sound and comprehensive policies.
You have not only discharged your duties with 
efficiency and dispatch but you have maintained the 
highest integrity in formulating plans for the 
disposal of the enormous surplus which had 
accumulated through the years.
Since your work in its essentials is completed,
I accept your resignation as Surplus Property 
Administrator, effective at the close of business 
on January thirty-first next. I do this with less 
reluctance since I have today sent your nomination 
to the Senate of the United Statea_as Assistant 
Secretary of War for Air , , , ,
This was, indeed, a vote of confidence from an old 
friend and no doubt very pleasing to the property 
Administrator, Others were not so generous, A reporter 
for Fortune said: "U, S, surplus disposal must show
immediate improvement to escape general failure,
James Allen Cook, a noted economist who was working in 
Washington at the time, said of SPA: "Regrettably , , ,
it failed to contribute anything more than its 
predecessors to the solution of fundamental distributive 
problems of the disposal a g e n c i e s . H e  added that the 
huge amount of early surplus declarations had indicated
^^Harry Truman to Stuart Symington, January 18, 
1946, Pile 122G, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri,
^^"War Surplus: Sell It While It's Hot,"
Fortune. XXXIII (March, 1946), 194,
62Cook, Reconversion of the War Economy. 72,
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the need for a large and efficient organization: "But
the failure of Chairman Gillette and Administrator 
Symington to perceive and act upon that need not only 
prevented the distribution of 19%4 and 19^5 surpluses, it 
seriously handicapped the WAA throughout 19^6,"^^ He 
also accused Symington of too much criticism of RPC and 
too little help in its selling job. In interviews 
conducted during December of 19^5 and January of 1946 he 
continually found lack of understanding and lack of the 
feeling of cooperation in both SPA and RFC employees.
But perhaps criticism was inevitable. Bernard 
Baruch told Symington: "Whatever you do, it ain't
goin' to be no good; and if you did the opposite, it also 
ain’t goin' to be no good . . .  I said to your Board and 
I repeat to you, when in doubt, sell.*"^^
G^Ibid.. 75. 
^^Ibid.. 74.
*5"War Surplus: Sell It While It's Hot," 194.
CHAPTER VII 
SURPLUS PROPERTY IN 1946
Although Stuart Symington’s letter of resignation 
was accepted on January 18, 1946, the effective date was 
February 1. At the time of his resignation Symington, 
himself, admitted that all was not well in the surplus 
disposal field: "We are not moving the surplus today and
everyone knows we are not moving i t C o n g r e s s i o n a l  
observers agreed that the situation was bad. Most of 
them were inclined to blame surplus property administrators,
but a few admitted that the legislation under which the
2administrators had to operate was itself faulty.
One recurring suggestion which would make the 
legislation more operative was to combine policy and actual 
disposal of the goods. Since his first association with 
the problem Edmund B, Gregory, as of January 6, 1946 
Chairman of the Board of the War Assets Corporation, had
^"War Surplus: Sell It While It’s Hot," Fortune,
XXXIII, (March, 1946), 104,
^U. S,, Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures 
in the Executive Departments, Hearings. 79th Cong,, 2d 
Sess,, February 14, 1946, 31.
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felt that all surplus property functions should be brought 
under one roof. Gregory contemplated either the combination 
of the two services into one overall organization formed 
under the authority of the President's War Powers Act, or a 
less comprehensive arrangement which would see one man 
occupy both the post of Chairman of the War Assets 
Corporation and Surplus Property Administrator.3 An entry 
in Gregory's diary for January 7, 19^6, the day after he 
assumed the Chairmanship of WAC, related that he had 
begun conferences with RFC officials to discuss the merits 
of the two plans.^ In a series of conferences with 
Symington, which ended January 26, 19^6, the two men seemed 
to have reached agreement that a merger of functions was 
necessary.5 This was a switch in attitude, as the retiring 
Surplus Property Administrator, only a few days previously, 
had advised President Truman against such a course.^
After a final conference with Symington and other 
advisers, which was held on January 28, 1946, Gregory had 
definitely concluded that more than a merger of WAC and
^Diary of Edmund B. Gregory, December 21, 1945, in 
U. S., War Assets Administration, "Administrative History 
of War Assets Administration and Predecessor Agencies." 
(Unpublished Typescript in Federal Records Center, 
Springfield, Virginia, Box 62-A-982 #7). Cited hereafter 
as "WAA History."
^Ibid.. January 7, 1946.
^Ibid.. January 23, 25, 26, 1946.
^See Chapter VI.
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SPA was needed. His decision was to ask President Truman 
to create an entirely new organization which would Include 
all disposal functions and be responsible to the President 
and Congress. After several suggestions the name War 
Assets Administration received the most support. Opinion 
In favor of the proposed course of action was not unanimous 
at the conference. Some advisers pointed out that 
Insulation from criticism which goes with a subordinate 
position was oftentimes comforting. Others suggested 
that the awsome scrutiny of the General Accounting Office 
was often discomfiting to an Independent administration.?
Nonetheless, a staff meeting of the War Assets 
Corporation, on January 29, 1946, put Its stamp of approval 
on the plan and It was decided "to go ahead with the 
Executive Order setting up WAA."® At this point, even 
before the Executive Order was Issued, Gregory appointed a 
committee to begin work on an organizational arrangement and 
plan for complete separation of disposal personnel from 
RPC.^ Not everyone on the WAC staff agreed that Immediate 
separation was wise. Minot Mulligan, Secretary of WAC 
and an old RPC hand, argued that It was being done too 
quickly, as details had not been sufficiently worked out,
?Dlary of Edmund B. Gregory, January 28, 1946, In 
"WAA History."
®Ibld.. January 29, 1946.
9lbld.
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and "confusion and delay" would be the result. Gregory 
replied that there was already all of the "confusion and 
delay" that could be generated and little could be lost by 
the move. Mulligan eventually agreed with Gregory.
In the meantime Symington, as Is the case with many 
converts, became a most enthusiastic supporter of the plan 
for the new agency and urged It on the President and members 
of C o n g r e s s , A s  a result, on January 31, 1946, President 
Truman Issued Executive Order 9689 which produced the most 
profound change In surplus property disposal since the 
passage of the Surplus Property Act of 1944.1^ The 
Executive Order had two separate and distinct parts. The 
first part combined the Surplus Property Administration 
with the War Assets Corporation so they were completely 
"merged and consolidated" under the latter name. This 
portion of the Executive Order would become effective 
Immediately.The second part of Executive Order 9689 
created the War Assets Administration in the Office of 
Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the
^^Ibld.. January 30, 1946.
S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, 
"Statement by Edmund B. Gregory," Hearings. 79th Cong., 2d 
Sess., June 18, 1946, 527.
^^Harry S. Truman, "Executive Order 9689:
Consolidation of Surplus Property Functions, January 31, 
1946." Code of Federal Regulations. Title 3. The President. 
1943-48 Compilation (Washington: Government Printing
Office, l e s n i 'w ,
ISlbld.. Paragraph 1, 499.
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Presidentî this portion of the order would become 
effective on March 25, 1 9 4 6 , The President would then 
appoint a War Assets Administrator, "by and with the advice 
and consent of the S e n a t e . O n  that day, March 25, 1946, 
all functions of the recently empowered War Assets 
Corporation would be transferred to the War Assets 
Administration,^^ Word leaked out that Edmund B, Gregory, 
Chairman of the Board of WAC, would be appointed War Assets 
Administrator,
In the almost two months which ensued after the 
Issuance of the Executive Order, Gregory's position was 
somewhat anomalous but he acted as If he were already War 
Assets Administrator, He ran his office with no superior 
In mind but the President, though technically he was still 
under the supervision of RFC, For two whole months he 
expended his energy In creating the new organization 
Instead of operating with the framework of the 
Corporation,^®
Lieutenant General Edmund B, Gregory was finishing
^^Ibld.. Paragraph 4, 500, 
l^ibld,
^®Ibld,. Paragraph 5, 500,
ITttThe March of News: Surplus Property Disposal,"
United States News. XX, (February 8, 1946), 2,
^®Dlary of Edmund B, Gregory, January 31, 1946, In 
"WAA History,"
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one career when he accepted the surplus property job. He 
had just resigned from the Army after over forty years of 
Service, He graduated from West Point In time to see active 
duty In helping refugees of the 1906 San Francisco earth­
quake, Gregory began his career as an Infantry officer but 
served In so many supply commands that he was transferred 
to the Quartermaster Corps In 1916,^9 His last position 
In the Army was that of Quartermaster General where he 
supervised expenditures of over $25,000,000,000 from 1940 
until his retirement. During his long career, the Army 
sent him to Harvard Business School and he graduated 
second In a class of 300, At slxty-three he had acquired 
the reputation of "an administrator who gets results,
It appeared Initially that Gregory, as war surplus 
property chief, would continue to get results, James Allen 
Cook, ordinarily a vehement critic of any head of surplus 
property disposal, wrote glowingly: "The manner In
which the new organization was formed In the Spring [sic] 
of 1946 Is a credit to Administrator Edmund B, Gregory,"
He continued his paean of praise In saying: "The basic
structure of the War Assets Administration appeared to be 
suitable for the prodigious task to which It had been 
assigned," And Cook concluded: "The organization did
^9«Army*s Buyer Who Becomes Surplus Seller," United 
States News. XX. (January 11, 1946), 55.
ZOlbld,. 54,
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represent the most promising development in more than two
21years of disposal operations." The usually objective, 
anonymous compiler of the "Administrative History of the 
War Assets Administration" wrote: "Pew agency heads In
Government had started their administrations under more
ppauspicious and promising circumstances."
An obstacle which stood In the path of future good 
performance was the Surplus Property Act of 1944 Itself, 
under which the new War Assets Administrator must operate.
It had been amended once, but only to provide for a single 
administrator Instead of a board. The recent changes In 
disposal organization had been accomplished through 
executive power rather than legislative action. The Act 
was filled with contradictions and Inconsistencies, The 
framers of the 1944 legislation Included so many 
admonitions for the head of surplus property that It was 
almost Impossible for the Administrator to heed them all.
The law charged that he should favor and promote; the 
return to a peacetime economy, private enterprise, full 
employment, a competitive system, small business, family 
farming, veterans, veterans In business, foreign markets, 
wide distribution, fair prices, normal channels of trade, 
new enterprise, and a good return value for the government,
James Allen Cook, Marketing of Surplus War Property 
(Washington: Public Affairs Press,1947), 7^.
22"WAA History."
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On the other hand, he was to disfavor and hinder 
monopolistic practices, speculators, uncontrolled dumping, 
and unusual or excessive profits.
The Surplus Law also established priorities making 
the administrative machinery much more cumbersome. Before 
surpluses were offered to the general public, federal 
agencies, states and their subsidiaries, veterans, and 
small businessmen had supposedly picked them over. Then, 
there were special provisions in the legislation guiding 
the disposal of industrial facilities and agricultural 
property.23 There is no doubt that these restrictions 
made it much more difficult to sell surplus quickly, but 
it was not impossible to do a creditable job. That, at 
least, was the opinion of Howard Bruce, wartime director 
of Army Materiel, who was assigned to report to the 
President on surplus property problems in the spring of 
1946. His summary of the 1944 legislation follows:
Almost everyone who analyzes the problem of 
surplus disposal at first believes that the Act, 
because of these priorities, preferences and 
special provisions, will prevent reasonably prompt 
and orderly disposal. Thorough understanding of 
the problem, however, results in the conclusion that 
with adequate personnel and further perfecting of 
policies and procedures, the requirements of the 
Act can be complied with and the job can be done 
though not so expeditiously as it could be done 
without these restrictive provisions.
23gee chapter IV for a full discussion of the aims 
and provisions of the Surplus Property Act of 1944.
2^Howard Bruce, "Report to the President on Surplus 
Property Disposal," April 9, 1946, in "WAA History."
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To be successful any chief of operations must have 
capable subordinates. General Gregory naturally turned 
to the manpower pool he knew best— the military. But 
there were rules which precluded military men from working 
in civilian agencies without special authorization,
Gregory asked the President for help and Truman, on 
March 23, 19^6, two days before the War Assets Administra­
tion would come into being, obliged with Executive Order 
9707, which read in part:
, , , , the Secretary of War and the Secretary 
of the Navy are authorized to detail on a temporary 
basis such officers and enlisted persons of the 
military and naval establishments as the Chairman 
of the Board of the War Assets Corporation or the 
Administrator of the War Assets Administration may_ 
certify to be required for military duty therein.^
Therefore, Gregory's second in command was a former 
comrade in arms. Major General Glen E, Edgerton, Of the 
three deputy administrators, two were from the military, 
and of the four heads of divisions, or "offices,” half 
were from the Services, Gregory's two special assistants 
were Army officers and the remaining headquarter's staff 
was similarly heavy in rank. Since it was the custom to 
address each officer by military title,^ one can Imagine 
that an uninitiated civilian who had business with the
^Harry S, Truman, "Executive Order 9707: 
Amendment of the Executive Order of January 31, 1946 
entitled 'Consolidation of Surplus Property Functions,' 
March 23, 1946," Code of Federal Regulations. Title 3. 
The President. 1943-48 Compilation (Washington: 
Government Printing office, 19^7), 520-21,
2G"WAA History,"
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agency could well have thought that he had blundered Into 
the Pentagon Instead of WAA headquarters.
When the surplus property group Increased Its range 
from policy making to total responsibility It became 
necessary to augment civilian personnel. Thus when the 
War Assets Administration came Into being, on March 25, 
1946, It assumed 26,000 employees, a far cry from the 
fifty with which Will Clayton had manned the Surplus War 
Property Administration In 1944,2?
When he became War Assets Administrator, Gregory 
announced that his one aim was "to liquidate our war 
surpluses as fast as can possibly be done." He admitted 
that disposal to that time equalled less than one-seventh 
of the declared surplus but he had promised the President 
"a substantial part of liquidation would be accomplished 
within one year." He said that no private or group 
Interest could be allowed to stand In the way of over-all
pQdisposal.
These were brave words, for all observers agreed 
that Gregory had a big job, and few could agree on Just how 
big It was. Howard Bruce, In his report to the President, 
estimated that there would be a total of $32,000,000,000
2?Cook, Marketing of Surplus War Property. 123.
pQWar Assets Administration Press Release, WAA-6, 
March 26, 1946, Federal Records Center, Springfield, 
Virginia, Box 54-A-324 #19.
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worth of surplus by the end of 1946.^9 This was In 
substantial agreement with WAA*s own figure of 
$33,000,000,000 by June 30, 19^7.^® There were numerous 
estimates, however, which did not come close to the above 
totals. Among those was the appraisal of Samuel A.
Tower in the New York Times which only reached 
$20,000,000,000 for surplus in its entirety,
Tower also alluded to the scandal bugaboo. With 
26,000 employees and billions of dollars in possible loot, 
it was only natural that WAA officials would fear fraud and 
scandal. Tower had an ear in the rumor mill and warned,
"that there was scandal brewing in surplus property disposal 
that would make the explosions of the Harding Administration 
seem like a dead firecracker."^^ Arthur Krock, also a 
New York Times journalist, again used the Harding analogy in 
assessing the scandal potential of surplus property. The 
usually competent Krock must have been temporarily over­
whelmed by the uniforms and military decorum at surplus 
property headquarters. He must have thought that the Army was 
in charge of surplus property when he reported that because
^^New York Times. April 28, 1946, 28,
S., War Assets Administration, First Quarterly 
Report. 1946: The Integration of Surplus Disposal
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 194b), i,
3^New York Times. May 12, 1946, E7.
S^Ibid.
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of concern over potential fraud Truman had created War 
Assets "because he was convinced the Army would do an honest 
Job."33
Krock told of the President’s personal aversion to 
people who attempted to Influence him. It seems that a 
wealthy Missouri surplus property dealer retained a 
politician from Truman's home county In order to get 
special favors. In a telephone conversation, the 
politician made an appointment to see Truman but put In 
a pitch for his client before hanging up. He emphasized 
to the President how generous his client had been In the 
1944 Democratic campaign. Truman ordered the politician 
barred from the White House and Instructed the treasurer 
of the Party to return all of the dealer's campaign gifts. 
Crime, It Is sad to relate, triumphed In the end. It Is 
true that the dealer did not get his preferential treatment, 
but his campaign contributions had largely been gathered 
from friends and given In his name; consequently his own 
donation was returned to him many times over,3^
On March 31, 1946 the War Assets Administration had 
been In existence a mere five days, hardly time enough to 
plan and build a complete organization for disposition of 
surplus property. Yet that was the date of the First 
Quarter Report of WAA which detailed the existence of such
33wew York Times. May 23, 1946, 20.
3^Ibld.
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an organization. The explanation lay In the fact that 
Gregory had spent his entire two months as Chairman of 
WAC In creating the structure of WAA.
At the top of that structure was, naturally, the 
War Assets Administrator. In the next echelon were the 
five major divisions; administrative services, aircraft 
disposal, general disposal, real property disposal, and
acquisitions. The industrial section was in the real 
property division and it again was divided into five 
categories; chemical and allied metals, general 
manufacturing, iron and steel, utilities and property 
development, and an industrial advisory service.35
Outside of Washington D. C., thirty-three branch 
offices were established. These branches primarily dealt 
with consumer’s goods since offices for sale of real 
property were maintained only where activity warranted.
For example, Omaha, Oklahoma City, and Kansas City were 
regional offices but real property could only be purchased 
through the Kansas City branch. The designated field 
offices were empowered to sell any Industrial facility 
In Its area If the appraisal price was $1,000,000 or less. 
Bids were cleared through a Regional Price Review Board 
which had the authority to accept or reject them. For 
facilities appraised at more than $1,000,000, negotiations 
could begin In the field but closure was handled in
35wAA, First Quarterly Report. 1946, 42.
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Washington D. C, with a Central Price Review Board scrutin­
izing bids,3^ In certain categories such as aluminum, 
magnesium, and synthetic rubber, transactions which ran 
over $5,000,000 had to be cleared with the Department of 
Justice, and even Congress Itself.3?
Quite often plants were sold and some of the machinery 
could not be used by the buyer. These machines were turned 
over to englneer-salesmen, usually veterans, who received a 
12 1/2 per cent commission on all sales. Between January 1, 
and May 1, 1946 over $16,500,000 worth of such sales were 
made which was- about one-half of the original cost,3®
President Truman gave evidence that the nation 
was beginning to get back to a peacetime footing when. In 
the latter part of April, 1946, he terminated the Office 
of War Mobilization and Reconversion, which had originally 
been the supervisory agency for the Surplus Property Board 
and the Surplus Property Administration, The last head 
of OWMR, John W, Snyder, was elevated to Secretary of the 
Treasury when Fred M, Vinson was named to the Supreme 
Court, Truman did not make an appointment to Snyder's old 
post and the agency was dissolved.39
3^Ibld,
37lbld.
3^"The March of News: Surplus Property," United
States News. XX (May 3, 1946), 2,
39Hew York Times. June 6, 1946, 7.
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Wartime agencies were going out of business but 
there were still plenty of jobs available at WAA, The 
Second Quarterly Report, covering up to June 30, 1946, 
indicated that the new agency had 37*000 employees of which 
33,500 were in regional or sub-regional offices. This was 
an increase of 8,500 in three months time, and more than 
double the number of all disposal agency people in the 
days of the Surplus Property Administration. It was, 
moreover, anticipated that many more would have to be 
added before WAA could become an efficient disposal 
organization.^®
The report for the second quarter also disclosed a 
new plant disposal procedure which WAA said was "proving 
highly satisfactory." Prior to this time, if there were 
multiple bidders for one facility, negotiations might 
drag on for months while many companies submitted 
successive bids. The new procedure introduced "cut-off 
dates," after which no more bids would be accepted.
According to WAA officials this vastly improved speed of 
sale unless all bids were unsatisfactory.^^
Even if this report showed promise of better days 
ahead. Administrator Gregory would not be around to see
^®U. S., War Assets Administration, Second 
Quarterly Report. 1946; The Acceleration of Surplus 
Disposal (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1946), 24.
^^Ibid.. 37.
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them. On May 16, 1946, the General sounded retreat; he 
sent in his letter of resignation giving ill health as the
lipreason. The President did not accept the resignation 
until June 29 and it did not become effective until July 
21, 1946. This gave Gregory plenty of time to polish the 
acrimonious farewell statement which was not untypical of 
outgoing administrators. His troubles, he said, were 
caused by "mudslinging and pressure groups," "The special 
interests" had exerted "great pressure to open the flood­
gates of surplus for their own purposes, to the detriment
/toof priority holders and of regular markets,"  ̂ And to
top it off, Gregory was not pleased that his successor
44was a former subordinate in the Quartermaster Corps,
The new War Assets Administrator was Robert M, 
Littlejohn, former Quartermaster General of the Array for 
the European Theater of Operations in World War I I , His 
career had to a large extent duplicated that of Gregory,
At fifty-six years of age he too was a West Pointer, but 
in the class of 1912, He too had served in the infantry,
^^New York Times. June 30, 1946, 9.
^^New York Times. July 21, 1946, 4,
^^Robert M, Littlejohn, "Passing in Review," 
(Unpublished Memoirs, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Ft, McNair, Washington D, C,, 1965) , 2; Cited 
hereafter as "Littlejohn Memoirs," Each chapter is 
numbered separately so page numbers refer to Chapter L, 
which is the one on surplus property,
^^New York Times. June 30, 1946, 9.
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but like Gregory had transferred to the Quartermaster Corps 
fairly early in his tour of duty. He had not gone to 
Harvard, as Gregory had done, but he did attend the top 
Array command and staff schools. The new "General" of WAA 
took the oath of office on July 22, 1946. Littlejohn 
wanted it understood that he had not sought his new post 
but had taken it at the insistence of the President and 
because there was "a public demand to have the mess 
cleaned up."^^
Littlejohn's memoirs throw little light on early 
associations with Gregory but by the time the two men 
became connected with surplus property, battlelines had 
been drawn, Littlejohn accused his predecessor of asking 
the President to withdraw his name as Administrator "on 
the grounds that I would cooperate with no one."^?
Failing with Truman, Littlejohn charged that Gregory used 
his influence with Robert Patterson, who had replaced 
Henry Stirason as Secretary of War;
This had later an interesting sidelight as it 
developed that very fine cooperation was obtained by 
me from every Government agency except the War 
Department.
The Secretary of War apparently undertook to 
prove that WAA was inefficient and under my 
Administration would be uncooperative. He 





With the complaints and accusations, Littlejohn's 
inception as Administrator was not filled with promise, 
but in the end he lasted longer than any of his predecessors, 
and continuity in office was most desperately needed. Not 
only had continual change lessened the efficiency of the 
top post, but turnover was compounded in lower echelons.
When the agency head left, his deputies and assistants 
were inclined to leave too; when they departed, their 
assistants were inclined to leave, and so it went down 
through the ranks. Employee loss was also inordinately 
high in regional offices, and the overall turnover ran 
about 100 per cent per year, James A, Cook visited the 
Richmond, Virginia regional office once each month in 
June, July, and August of 1946; on each visit he found a 
new regional d i r e c t o r , H e  found none of the major 
selling divisions adequately staffed and not one of the 
division heads had been in office long enough to have a 
clear idea of his duties.
In assessing the reasons for excessive turnover.
Cook discounted compensation, which he termed "adequate,"
He suggested that inherent impermanence of the Job was no 
doubt at least partially to blame. Employees knew that 
with every sale their Job was that much closer to
^^Ibid.
^^Cook, Marketing of Surplus War Property. 124.
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termination and they were inclined to view WAA employment 
as temporary while they looked for something with a 
greater future. The lack of career opportunity also 
prompted people to quit when faced with the abundant 
criticisms and perplexing p r o b l e m s , Permanence began 
at the top and it was hoped that Littlejohn would 
provide the stability WAA would need for the huge job 
ahead,
Using his memoirs as evidence, it would appear 
that Littlejohn was little given to introspection or 
in-depth analysis, but he did provide numerous insights 
into problems of a surplus property administrator, 
Littlejohn did not like the law under which he was 
expected to operate because objectives of the act were 
mutually incompatible. With the typical rugged individual» 
ism of an old soldier he did not endorse its attempt "to 
cure all social and economic ills,"52
The new General was highly critical of the organ­
ization of the old General, particularly the many reports;
Frequent and voluminous reports flowed over my 
desk. These were being dispatched to the field 
and from the field to the home office in 
Washington, After looking at these for a few days,
I sent for the individual in charge of their 
production and distribution, I asked him to bring 





preceding thirty days. He brought them In on a 
truck. They stood six feet high. No one could 
read them all. I directed that hereafter there be 
one report a month and that It not exceed two Inches 
In thickness. The next morning I found on my desk 
a letter telling me that I did not know my 
business and that the reports would continue. The 
writer. Chief of the Planning Division, took to 
the woods, and the last I heard of him he was on 
the opposite side of the world.53
Littlejohn was greatly displeased with the Office 
of Real Property; he called It a "separate empire." It 
had Its own legal staff, met In closed hearings, and 
Littlejohn professed that he , got a good many of
Its decisions from the p r e s s . T h e  new Administrator 
opened the hearings to the extent that he held some of 
them In his own office, and reversed a number of the 
decisions of the formerly autonomous department.55
Gregory had filled the top posts In his 
administration with military men, but sales had not been 
what they should have been, so Littlejohn tried a different 
tactic. He asked Benjamin Fairless of United States 
Steel and R. E. Wood of Sears and Roebuck to send some 
crack sales executives to help him move the surplus.
Fairiess did not bother to send any, and Wood sent "two 
or three men for two or three days." Littlejohn was so 





went to see the President. "I told him about each one 
of these cases. He asked me, 'can you sell out and get 
out with what [personnel] you have?' I said, 'Mr. 
President, we can and will.'"^^
Few people are subjected to the temptations of an 
Army quartermaster officer so General Littlejohn had 
learned to live under those pressures:
There is another rule that any Government 
Official, whether he wears a uniform or civilian 
clothes, must abide by. That is, he must live in 
a goldfish bowl. He cannot expect any favors 
whether he be buying or selling merchandise for the 
Government. This even includes lunch. When he 
lunches with a prospective buyer or seller, he 
should pay for his own lunch and allow his 
companion to do the same. My rule when I was in 
War Assets was to accept nothing more than a cigar.
When I did accept a cigar, I left it in my desk
for a few days to see if it would„explode. If not,
I smelled it before I smoked it.^'
It was within the power of a surplus property 
Administrator to guard against the possibility of fraud and 
scandal, but it was impossible to operate with enough care 
to avoid criticism. The threat of action, either 
investigative or legislative, made Congressional criticism 
the most feared of all by WAA officials. Congressman 
Ralph E. Church of Illinois was particularly fervent in 
denouncing the "red tape" and "ridiculous procedures" of
the War Assets Administration. He called it a




concerning wasted effort in the organization, which 
definitely upheld Littlejohn's criticism of the 
proliferation of reports:
In order to give you a general picture of the 
extent to which red tape and paper work have served 
to prevent early disposal of surplus property, I 
call your attention to the Washington Staff 
Directive No. 1 issued March 27, 1946, by the War 
Assets Administration.
This directive established the types of releases 
to be utilized by the Washington office for the 
management and operation of the War Assets 
Administration. There are eight general types, as 
follows :
Administrative Directives, the Manual of 
Operations, Washington Staff Directives, General 
Administrative Procedures, Management Procedure 
Series, Operations Procedures Series, Staff Notices 
and Memoranda, The Management Procedures Series is 
in turn divided into the following six categories: 
Auditing Procedures, Accounting Procedures, Budget 
Procedures, Personnel Procedures, Organization and 
Procedure Planning Procedures, and Administrative 
Services Procedures, And the Operations Procedures 
Series is divided into the following nine different 
categories: General Operations Procedures,
Aircraft Disposal Procedures, Consumers Goods Disposal 
Procedures, Capital and Producers Goods Disposal 
Procedures, Real Property Disposal Procedures, 
Warehousing Procedures, Inspection Procedures,
Traffic Procedures, and Credit Procedures.
In other words, there are no less than 23 types 
of releases promulgated for the management of the 
War Assets Administration, as distinguished from the 
regulations, orders, special orders, and policy 
statements or other directives issued by the 
Administrator which apply to all Federal agencies 
engaged in the disposal of surplus property. The 
regulations that have been issued fill volumes.
There is a constant flood of new releases, amend­
ments and amendments. It would probably be no 
exaggeration to say that if an employee of the War 
Assets Administration were to keep himself advised 
on all the releases he would have to spend 7 hours 
each day reading them and perhaps the other hour of
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an 8-hour day discussing them.^®
The powerful Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia was 
highly critical and charged that domestic sales had 
" . . .  bogged down to such an extent that it is nothing 
less than a national scandal." The watchdog of the 
Treasury continued: "Although eight months have elapsed
since the last shot was fired in the War, effective 
machinery has not yet been established to permit the 
citizens to purchase surplus war materials . . . ,"59 
Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin was a 
vociferous critic of WAA; he called it "Wasting American 
Assets." He said: "A full exposure of this whole rotten
disposal situation should be made."^® His accusations 
centered around the handling of electronics equipment.
The Senator charged that equipment was stolen, that it 
was used as a political football, that it was denied to 
veterans, that it was wrapped in untold amounts of red 
tape, that it was being given to a crowd of special 
friends of WAA officials, that schools could not get it, 
and that the situation was becoming worse and not better.
5®U, S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 
April 30, 1946, ---------
59wew York Times. May 2, 1946, 15. 
60,U, S. Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 
June 24 (Legislative Day of wlarch ^), 1946, A3677.
6li'Ibid.
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In recalling his Congressional critics. General 
Littlejohn had mixed emotions. He was laudatory of 
Congressman Roger Slaughter and credited him with helping 
WAA get needed information. He remembered, however, the 
apprehension he felt when Ross Rizley of Oklahoma took 
over the Chairmanship of the House surplus property 
investigating committee In the Eightieth Congress, To 
forestall "rough sledding," he asked the President to 
call Congressional leaders to the executive office so that 
Littlejohn could explain the disposal situation to them. 
The General reported: "This the President did; however,
my objective fell flat. Subsequent events convinced me 
that the remarks of President Truman about the Eightieth 
Congress were substantially correct,"
Some Congressional criticisms were picayunish, 
such as the one which objected to the expenditure of
$27,961 to advertise a magnesium plant in Velasco, Texas, 
WAA, however, could Justify that handily, since through 
the advertisement it had received seven additional bids 
and the plant had sold for several million dollars more 
than originally thought possible,^3 Congress could 
hardly argue with results like that.
An object of criticism had been the continuing
^^"Littlejohn Memoirs," 14,
^^New York Times. October 14, 1946, 32.
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huge amounts of surplus, but Nation's Business reported one 
way to lessen the figures drastically. A reporter for 
that magazine claimed to have found the super salesman 
of WAAs a man who disposed of $40,000,000,000 worth at 
one stroke--one stroke of the pen, that Is, This man, 
according to the story, had taken the original 
$100,000,000,000 surplus property estimate and recalculated 
It, His revised estimate was $54,000,000,000 thus almost 
cutting WAA's job In half,^* In reality most realistic 
authorities considered even the latter figure to be too 
high.
At the end of the third quarter, September 30,
1946, WAA made another progress report to Congress, The 
over-all surplus property disposal situation was as follows:
A grand total of 34 billion dollars of surplus 
property will ultimately have been declared to the 
domestic disposal agencies; 21,5 billion dollars, 
or two-thirds of this amount, had been acquired up 
to September 30, 1946, Thus, 12,5 billion dollars 
remains to be declared surplus by the owning 
agencies.
Of the surplus acquired thus far by WAA and 
the disposal agencies, approximately 6,3 billion 
dollars has been cleared from the Inventory 
records. If the 3,9 billion dollars sale of 
scrap and salvage aircraft are added, nearly one- 
half of the acquisitions have been liquidated.
This leaves 11,3 billion dollars of inventory to 
be sold,
^^"War's Leftovers Are Moving Slowly." Nation's 
Business. XXXIV (June, 1946), 53,
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The current Inventory remaining for sale (11,3 
billion dollars) plus the property to be acquired 
(12.5 billion dollars) make up the total disposal 
task ahead— 23,8 billion dollars of surplus 
property to be liquidated.
Twenty-three billion dollars was still a lot of 
surplus, but WAA had help. There were never ending streams 
of suggestions as to how the surplus could be sold. In a 
radio broadcast. Bob Hope proposed a market for surplus 
which would also solve a nagging social problem;
Friends, do you want privacy? Do you hate
your neighbors? Are you bothered by salesmen, bill
collectors, book agents? Well, run down to your 
neighborhood armory and get an Elsenhower "Little 
Dandy" combination doorbell and flame thrower , , , . 
What a surprise to the unwanted guest. They'll be 
burned up I When someone presses the button, just 
wait twenty seconds , , . then go out and remove 
the clinker
Nineteen Hundred and Forty Six was the climax year 
of surplus property disposal. In those 365 days two new 
organizations, WAG and WAA, had been formed; three 
directors, Symington, Gregory, and Littlejohn, had headed 
the program and yet progress had been made. At last
all policy and disposal functions had been brought Into
one agency. Definite disposal policies, good or bad, had 
evolved. Changes would continue to be made but not the 
fundamental changes of 1946. Even though there would be one
^  U, S., War Assets Administration, Third Quarterly" s . q y 
Report. 1946: Surplus Property (Washington: Government
Mntin'g"' ÔŸfI'cFr 1§46') ; iS.---
Phil Kelly and Bake Young, "Shoes and Ships and 
Sealing Wax," Collier's. CXVI (October 20, 1945), 30.
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more change of Administrators, the organization was solid.
CHAPTER VIII 
INDUSTRIAL DISPOSITION IN 1946
Even though other aspects of surplus disposal were 
Important to the overall picture and troublesome to WAA, 
the dramatic and compelling story In 1946 was In 
Industrial facilities. They were being declared surplus 
In large numbers; they were being shut down; and the 
people were crying for them to be reopened on a permanent, 
peacetime basis. The pressures on WAA administrators 
were almost overwhelming.
By early 1946, the Army had more than done Its part 
In getting surplus plants on the market. In February, 
Under Secretary, Kenneth C, Royall, announced that of 
628 facilities under Army control, 504 had been declared 
surplus. He said that plans had not been completed for 
the other 124, but thirty-seven were potentially surplus 
as soon as production ended. Total construction cost of 
the plants which had been declared surplus amounted to 
nearly $4,000,000,000,^ The Navy, too, was making Its
^New York Times. February 19, 1946, 16,
196
197
facilities available for sale. Secretary James Porrestal 
stated, on April 12, 1946, that eighty-two Navy controlled 
plants had been declared surplus between V-J Day and 
April 1, 1946.2
At the end of the first quarter, March 31, 1946,
WAA reported to Congress that approximately 45 per cent of 
the government-owned warplants had been declared surplus 
and this would be slightly over 50 per cent of those 
likely to be declared. Industrial acquisitions for the 
first quarter of 1946 were listed at $1,300,000,000, which 
was somewhat less than the $1,700,000,000 reported in the 
fourth quarter of 1945. Since machinery for disposition 
was not operating smoothly, acquisitions were more impress­
ive than sales, but WAA could report that plants costing 
$262,000,000 had been sold for $142,000,000 in the first 
quarter. This was a 54 per cent return on investment, 
which was quite high, but it must be kept in mind that 
the most valuable plants were being purchased quickly and 
that such a percentage of return could not be maintained.
It was impossible to calculate percentage of return on 
leased plants, but $371,000,000 in plant construction was 
placed in the hands of private operators by this method.
This figure was higher than it was likely to be in the future 
as most of the expensive aluminum plants were leased in the
2Ibid,. April 13, 1946, 18.
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first quarter of 1946.3 in its report WAA officials 
pointed out that future results would possibly be less 
encouraging since plant capacity In some industries was 
far beyond peacetime needs. In those industries some 
facilities could be held in stand-by, some could be 
diverted to other uses, but some would have to be 
dismantled and scrapped.^
By the end of the second quarter, June 30, 1946, 
plant disposal presented a much more encouraging picture. 
Disposal increased at such a rate for industrial facilities 
that the amount sold in that quarter was 41 per cent more 
than for all previous disposal. In the month of June, 
for the first time, sales totalled more than acquisitions. 
This was partially, but not entirely, due to increased 
sales, for acquisitions were down to $830,000,000 for the 
quarter. The quarter's actual sales came to $501,000,000 
with leases adding $211,000,000 to that figure. There 
was, however, plenty left; a buyer still had a $3,400,000,000 
inventory to choose from.^
Even though disposals were at an all time high in
3u. S., War Assets Administration, First Quarterly 
Report. 1946: The Integration of Surplus blsposal
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946), 39-40.
*Ibld.. 42.
^U. S., War Assets Administration, Second Quarterly 
Report. 1946: The Acceleration of Surplus Disposal
(Washington; Government Printing Office, 1946), 33-34.
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the second quarter of 1946, WAA’s sales ability was not 
really tested since 84 per cent of dispositions were of 
large plants, $5,000,000 or over In original cost. These 
transactions were usually not difficult since the large 
corporations which could afford such purchases knew what 
they wanted and had built up cash reserves with which to 
buy. The only problem was to arrive at a price. Since 
continuation of prlvage enterprise and maintenance of 
constant employment carried higher priorities than top 
dollar return to the government, price was easily 
negotiated.^ There were, however, communities where a 
government-owned Installation was simply too large for the 
needs and resources of a single peacetime business. Such 
a community was San Diego, California, where the problem 
was solved by selling the immense Consolidated Vultee 
Aircraft Plant to four purchasers one of which was. 
Inexplicably, the San Diego Baseball Club.?
An accusation that disposal officers had abetted 
monopoly was almost as greatly feared as an accusation of 
corruption. The Surplus Property Act had admonished 
against aiding monopoly. Congressmen were always more than 
willing to castigate an untoward move In strengthening big 




the real property division broke down the Second Quarterly 
Report for members of the small business committees of both 
Houses of Congress, In the break-down, the 250 largest 
corporations were designated as big business. Thus when 
comparing disposal percentages to prewar share of production 
capacity and wartime share of government-owned plants, 
disposal came out fairly well, WAA's real property office 
found that big business controlled 65 per cent of prewar 
capacity, operated 79 per cent of the warplants, but had 
received, to June 30, 1946, only 62 per cent of Industrial 
disposals. In further analysis WAA calculated that big 
business received only 1,1 per cent of plants costing under 
$100,000; 9,2 per cent of those costing between $100,000 
and $500,000; 16,9 per cent of those costing between 
$500,000 and $1,000,000; 57.7 per cent of those costing 
between $1,000,000 and $5,000,000; and 6o,8 per cent of 
those costing over $5,000,000,® These percentages would not 
make a New Deal social planner Jump for Joy, but, on the 
other hand, they would not cause Thurman Arnold to come 
out of retirement.
The old saying that one can prove anything by
QReport from David A, McPherson, Assistant Deputy 
Administrator for Real Property In the War Assets 
Administration to William H, Coburn of the Staff of the 
Senate Small Business Committee and Dan W, Eastwood of the 
Staff of the House Select Committee on Small Business 
(Unpublished Report, August 14, 1946, Federal Records 
Center, Springfield, Virginia, Box 54-A-324 #19),
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statistics Is seldom better Illustrated than by a story 
In the New York Times which told of a "staff of experts" 
who also used disposal figures to June 30, 19^6 as basis 
for their findings. This group submitted Its version to 
the House Committee on Monopoly and came to the conclusion 
that big business was about to take almost all surplus 
Industrial facilities. According to this "secret report," 
the 250 largest corporations received 70,1 per cent of 
total plant disposal. The giants had taken all eighteen 
disposals over $5,000,000; and 28 per cent of those 
between $500,000 and $1,000,000, The reporter who had 
learned of this secret report Intimated that It would 
soon cause a national scandal and hinted darkly that people 
In high places were trying to keep It quiet,^
Three days later a New York Times editorial 
tempered the rather hysterical tone of the original story. 
The editorial writer accepted figures WAA had submitted 
to the small business committee rather than those of the 
"secret report," It labelled the fear that the 250 
largest corporations were about to run away with most. If 
not all, of the surplus production capacity as "childish 
nonsense,
War Assets Administration's Third Quarterly Report.
^New York Times. December 26, 1946, 40,
lOlbld.. December 29, 1946, BE,
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Issued as of September 30, 1946, showed acquisitions of 
Industrial facilities down dramatically from the 
$1,300,000,000 of the second quarter; only $324,000,000 
had been declared to WAA In July, August, and September. 
Sales were down too— only $230,000,000 for the three 
months period. Leases were up a little, to $294,000,000, 
but leases did not actually remove the property from 
government Inventory. Thus, total Inventory was about 
the same: somewhat over the $3,000,000,000 mark.^^
For the last three months of 1946 WAA did not 
divide Its Industrial totals Into sales and leases; It 
simply reported disposals at $344,000,000. These were 
miserable results so WAA evidently felt the less said, the 
better. The agency did say that sales came to 4? per 
cent of cost, which was quite respectable. Mercifully, 
acquisitions were also down to $178,000,000, Total 
Inventory was listed at $2,300,000,000 which Indicates
1 pa problem with WAA statistics; they did not always 
jibe. If the previous quarter's Inventory Is used and 
fourth quarter acquisitions added and dispositions 
subtracted, fourth quarter Inventory figures at
lly. S., War Assets Administration, Third Quarterly 
Report, 1946: Surplus Property (Washington! Government
PrlntlAg S m e ë ',~^gH6)'. U . —
 ̂U, 8,, War Assets Administration, Fourth Quarterly 
Report. 1946: The Target Program (Washington! CTovernment
Prlntlig (lfnce;^5TtyTr T liIïg:---
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$3,337,000,000, or a little over a billion more than 
WAA’s total. Another accounting procedure that had to be 
watched was that sometimes WAA Included leased property 
In held Inventory and sometimes In disposals; It made a 
great deal of difference.
In the Fourth Quarter Report. WAA reviewed the 
year of 1946. Officials were apologetic over prices 
received for Industrial property and Insisted that more 
could not be expected because wartime costs were high, 
many plant locations were bad, and some plants were 
poorly designed for peacetime use.^^ For the future, 
the Report warned that even 1946 results would be 
difficult to maintain because remaining plants would be 
In progressively worse locations and of progressively 
poorer design. For the large, hard to sell plants, 
multiple tenancy was offered as a possibility, but WAA 
foresaw that some Industrial facilities would have to 
"be disposed of for demolition and salvage, or 
abandoned
Sales of large plants, generally to their wartime 
operators, were a feature of Individual disposals In 
the first three months of 1946. The largest single sale 




New York to the Wright Aeronautical Corporation, Its 
wartime operator for $13,000,000. On percentage of 
reported cost, Goodyear Tire and Rubber paid the most when 
It gave $5,669,269 for Its $7,961,533 plant In Topeka, 
Kansas. On the same basis the Charles Pfizer Company made 
the best deal when It paid $900,000 for a Groton, 
Connecticut facility which cost $5,267,500. Selling 
prices for the big plants generally ran from one-third 
to one-half of reported cost.^5 The largest lease In the 
first quarter was for a $47,630,200 aluminum plant to the 
Kalser-Praser Corporation. The longest lease was for 
twenty years but the majority were for five years. Six 
aluminum plants were leased, all to Reynolds and Kaiser.
Of twenty-seven first quarter recipients of sales or 
leases, for plants costing over $5,000,000, only a 
handful were not recognizable as representatives of big 
business.
The big news of the second quarter of 1946 was the 
sale of the $200,585,000 Geneva Steel plant at Geneva,
Utah to Its designer and operator, the United States Steel 
Company for $47,500,000, Including Inventory, A wholly 
owned subsidiary of U. S. Steel, Carnegle-Illlnols Steel




paid a much higher percentage of cost when it purchased
three plants which cost $120,182,000 for $63»013,000.
In these sales WAA's point on location was well
illustrated, Geneva was in the hinterlands of Utah,
while the three Carnegie plants were in the heart of the
industrial East. The best bargain of the quarter went
to the Ideal Cement Company which purchased a $9,573,000
site for $1,500,000. There were more unfamiliar names
on the second quarter list but such well known giants as
Ford Motor Company, General Electric, and Remington Rand
l8shared in the spoils. Three more aluminum leases 
were recorded with two going to Reynolds, and one to 
Kaiser.19
There were no really dramatic sales in the third
quarter of 19^6. Largest was the one-half price sale of
an $10,900,000 chemical plant in Velasco, Texas to its
wartime operator Monsanto Chemical. A badly located
plant at Sterlington, Louisiana was sold for one-third
of its original cost. A highly publicized lease was of
the $170,000,000 former Chrysler plant in Chicago to the
?oTucker Corporation. The Tucker Torpedo was expected to 
give the big three auto-makers a run for their money.
l^WAA, Second Quarterly Report. 1946, 35. 
19lbid.. 36.
^°WAA, Third Quarterly Report. 1946, 13.
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The five largest sales In the fourth quarter were 
unspectacular sales to wartime operators: Chicago, a
$91,050,000 plant of Republic Steel to Republic for 
$35,000,000; Chicago, a $34,268,000 plant of Inland 
Steel to Inland for $13,250,000; Velasco, Texas, a 
$30,373,000 Dow Magnesium plant to Dow for $20,124,000; 
Velasco, Texas, a $17,006,000 Dow Chemical plant to Dow 
for $14,518,000; Long Beach, California, an $11,552,000 
Douglas Aircraft plant to Douglas for $3,667,000. Two 
more aluminum plants were leased, one to Kaiser and one 
to Reynolds,
Trade journals were naturally Interested In disposals 
In their fields of publication. In January, Chemical and 
Engineering News took a pessimistic view of the possibility 
of fast disposition of chemical plants when It pointed out 
that government facilities were too widely dispersed and 
not economical for peacetime production. The journal
ppfeared that alcohol plants would be the hardest to sell,
WAA sales results bear out the journal's gloomy prediction, 
since WAA reported only one of the chemical plants sold In 
all of 1946.23 An headline In Aviation News for February 25,
2^WAA, Fourth Quarterly Report. 1946, 15.
22 "Surplus Property Administration Reports on 
Chemical Plants," Chemical and Engineering News. XXIV 
(January 10, 1946), 48-$6.
23w a a , First, Second. Third, and Fourth Quarterly
Reports. 1946.----- ------- ---------------------------
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1946, told the story in the aviation business: "Industry
Proving Poor Market for War Surplus Aircraft 
Plants." According to the writer, sales had been slow 
and what sales had been made were largely to other than 
aircraft firms. That situation, however, was understandable 
since more than any other business, aircraft production 
had been expanded over its peacetime potential.
A similar story was told concerning aviation 
gasoline refineries. Petroleum Processing, in September 
reported that, "only a handful of the processing units in 
the 24 government-financed wartime aviation gasoline plants 
are in operation." A number of reasons were given but It 
was primarily due to the fact that private wartime expansion 
expenditure was more then double government expenditure.
Thus when there was a cut-back from wartime peak consumption, 
the oil companies used their "bought and paid for" 
facilities first. If demand continued to increase there 
could be a use for the government refineries, but not 
for a while.
WAA announced the sale of Geneva Steel in the 
second quarter of 1946 and it was the largest sale in 
those three months. In fact it was the largest sale of the
24"Industry Proving Poor Market For War Surplus Air­
craft Plants," Aviation News. V (February 25, 1946), 16.
25"What's Happened to the * AVGAS* Plants?"
Petroleum Processing. I (September, 1946), 12-13.
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year, and of WAA history. In the Quarterly Report, 
original cost was listed at $200,585,000.^^ Prospective 
bidders ran the estimated cost as high as $202,493,208 
which was based on independent engineers* studies. Sale 
and transfer of equipment brought that figure down to 
$191,210,307.^^ But wartime construction costs were 
high because of inflated material costs and speed in 
building, so postwar replacement was figured at 
$134,000,000, When the latter amount was depreciated 
normally, $103,275,000 emerged as actual mid-1946 value.
That Geneva was important to the postwar economy 
was never doubted. Consisting of the I6OO acre plant and 
nearby mining properties, it was located at Geneva, Utah,
It was the largest steel mill built during the war and by 
far the largest plant west of the Mississippi, The 
facility was of vital importance to West Coast steel users, 
since a western freight basing point would drastically 
lower steel prices. The plant was designed by United 
States Steel, built by United States Steel, and operated 
during the war by United States Steel, but, as was 
continually pointed out in Big Steel’s propaganda, all at
Z^WAA, Second Quarterly Report. 35.
2?Bld on Geneva Steel Plant by Paciflc-Amerlcan 
Steel and Iron Corporation, May 1, 1946, Federal Records 
Center, Springfield, Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376.
209
the specific request of the government,^
Bids for the huge steel complex were to be 
submitted to WAA headquarters dated May 1, 1946,^9 Seven 
bids were made and one withdrawn. Of the six remaining. 
United States Steel's bid was by far the most attractive.
WAA obviously favored it and it is easy to see why; it was a 
cash bid, there would be no change in management, it could 
be handled quickly, and there would be no additional 
government expense. For WAA it was the easy way out, but 
if the provisions of the Surplus Property Act were to be 
observed, it was not the proper way out,
U, S, Steel submitted the bid for its wholly owned 
subsidiary, the Columbia Steel Company of San Francisco, 
California, For the actual facilities the bid was 
$40,000,000; $5,000,000 would be paid when title was 
conveyed and $35,000,000 within two years. The company 
also agreed to buy the plant inventory at an assessed 
value of $7,500,000, The bid also obligated the company 
to spend $18,600,000 for additional facilities and U, S,
pQMemorandum to the Price Review Board from James 
T, Daley, Director of the Industrial Division in the 
Office of Real Property of the War Assets Administration,
May 23, 1946, Federal Records Center, Springfield,
Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376. Cited hereafter as 
"Daley Memorandum,"
^9b , p , Fairless, President, United States Steel to 
E, B, Gregory, May 1, 1946, Federal Records Center, 
Springfield, Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376,
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Steel proposed another $25,000,000 expansion although 
that was not obligatory.^®
James T. Daley, Director of the Industrial Division 
of WAA's Office of Real Property Disposal strongly 
recommended that the Price Review Board, which consisted 
of Gregory and his top advisors, accept the bid. Through 
the active use of a fertile Imagination he enumerated the 
ways that the bid fulfilled objectives of the Surplus 
Property Act: It would strengthen national defense; It
would stimulate employment, especially of veterans, 
because U. S. Steel would hire 5,000 men; It would 
facilitate transition to peacetime economy; It would 
strengthen new businesses and small business by 
providing an assured supply of steel; It would stimulate 
family farming by furnishing steel for agricultural 
Implements; and It would assure the government of the 
best price.
Then, according to Daley there were other 
advantages In accepting the offer because no additional 
government funds would be required; Big Steel's position 
In the Industry would assure continuing operation; the 
additional facilities would strengthen the whole operation;
3®Bld on the Geneva Steel Plant by the United 
States Steel Company, May 1, 1946, Federal Records Center, 
Springfield, Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376,
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and sufficient working capital would be a certainty,
With this strong recommendation in favor of United States 
Steel, the only possible obstruction could be adverse 
opinion by the Attorney General. All deals over 
$1,000,000 had to be submitted to him for clearance under 
the antitrust laws and the Surplus Property Act,
Another bid was from the Assets Reconstruction 
Corporation, Ltd, of Los Angeles. It was an "as is" bid 
of $38,750,000 for the plant and the company further 
agreed to spend $75,000,000 for additions and 
improvements.3^ Daley did not favor this bid because a 
statement of financial responsibility had not been furnished 
and details of how it was to be carried out were not given.
It is hard to figure the bid of the Colorado Fuel 
and Iron Company. It was as if a responsible company was 
attempting a bad joke. Apparently Colorado Fuel and Iron 
did not take the original bid seriously, since only a little 
over a month before bids were due the president of C, P,
& I, indicated disinterest in Geneva, He said: "We felt
that although under the Act it might be done, it had to go
^^"Daley Memorandum," Federal Records Center, 
Springfield, Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376,
S^Bid on the Geneva Steel Plant by the Assets 
Reconstruction Corporation, Ltd,, May 1, 1946, Federal 
Records Center, Springfield, Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376,
33"Daley Memorandum," Federal Records Center, 
Springfield, Virginia, Box 58-A-542, #376,
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through six or seven departments before you could get it 
approved. It is impossible to deal with six or seven 
parties."3^ It is probable that C, P. & I. put in its 
original bid with the hope that U, S. Steel would be
declared ineligible. In that case the Colorado company 
would be the only responsible party having submitted a 
bid and negotiations could go from there. In its May 1, 
1946 bid the company did reserve the right to make 
changes. As originally submitted C. P. & I, would lease 
Geneva for either fifteen or twenty-five years. Before 
the lease was consumated, however, the government was 
to spend $47,935,000 for improvements to the plant. The 
government was also to pay all operating expenses until 
those improvements were completed. Then C, P, & I, 
would put up $25,000,000 in working capital and pay 
$1,500,000 rent per year, with an option to buy if the 
plant proved profitable,
Daley was strong in his recommendation for refusal. 
He pointed out that $1,500,000 annual rent would not pay 
the interest on the $47,935,000 additional government 
expense. In his calculations, an annual rent of 
$6,10 1,000 would be necessary for the government to get a
^^Perry E, Holder quoted in Nation's Business, 
XXXIV (June, 1946), 99.
S^Bid on the Geneva Steel Plant by Colorado Puel 
and Iron, May 1, 1946, Federal Records Center, Spring­
field, Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376.
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fair return on its i n v e s t m e n t . It is hard to imagine 
why responsible executives would make a bid such as this. 
No doubt it created ill will in WAA.
Pacific-American Steel and Iron Corporation of 
Seattle submitted a bid and an alternate. In the bid 
it would pay 20 per cent of the $202,493,000 estimated 
cost of the plant which would amount to slightly more 
than U. S. Steel's bid. But instead of cash, payments 
would be spread out over twenty years. Also the company 
would require a $25,000,000 government loan for additional 
facilities. In the alternate bid the government would 
eventually recover all of its over $200,000,000 
investment, but over a period of many years and as an 
operating partner of Pacific-American Steel and Iron.3?
As usual, Daley complained of the lack of a statement of 
financial responsibility. Daley stated that he understood 
that the deal was to be financed by public stock issue.
As for the alternate, the Industrial Division head did 
not foresee government partnerships in a private business 
as a viable arrangement.3®
3^"Daley Memorandum," Federal Records Center, 
Springfield, Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376.
3?Bid on the Geneva Steel Plant by the Pacific- 
American Steel and Iron Corporation, May 1, 1946, Federal 
Records Center, Springfield, Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376.
3®"Daley Memorandum," Federal Records Center, 
Springfield, Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376.
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The Riley Steel Company of Los Angeles offered to 
pay $135,000,000 for Geneva in yearly payments of 
$12,367,102, The bidder, however, stated that he would 
have to borrow $28,844,000 for additions to the plant to 
make it a profitable venture.39 Daley did not like this 
bid at all. It did not indicate the source of the 
$28,844,000 loan and did not state the amount of working 
capital that would be provided. His judgement was: "The
bid lacks essential factors and is too intangible and 
does not present adequate evidence of financial 
responsibility or the background necessary for operation 
of the Geneva Steel Plant
The bid of Judson S. Warshaw of New York City was 
the only one from other than a corporation. Warshaw 
offered $132,000,000 for Geneva to be paid at 50 per cent 
down and the rest over a five year period. The only 
catch was that he did not have the money and would have 
to receive permission from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to sell stock in order to finance the venture. 
Warshaw also had an alternate proposition in which he 
would pay a total of $190,000,000 for Geneva on a rent-
S^Bid on the Geneva Steel Plant by the Riley Steel 
Company, May 1, 1946, Federal Records Center, Springfield, 
Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376.
^®"DaIey Memorandum," Federal Records Center, 
Springfield, Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376.
215
purchase agreement,There was no statement of 
financial responsibility with this bid nor could Daley 
find evidence of any sort of an organization, selling or 
otherwise, which would Indicate that Warshaw could 
handle the Geneva deal.
Since no others were acceptable, Daley advocated 
acceptance of the bid by United States Steel. He warned 
the Price Review Board that U, S, Steel had reserved the 
right to withdraw Its offer If It was not accepted by 
June 15, 1946, He also pointed out that U, S, Steel 
was operating the plant on a stand-by basis and that this 
contract would terminate on July 12, 1946. steel plants 
must be operated continuously or great expense Is Involved; 
that put pressure on the Price Review Board.
Obviously, some of the Geneva bidders were 
promoters who were attempting to get control of a 
valuable property with no capital Investment. Most, however, 
appeared to be honest, sincere entrepreneurs who were 
short of the necessary funds to swing a cash deal with the 
government. All of them, no doubt, were sure that the 
Attorney General would rule that U, S, Steel was 
Ineligible to buy the plant. It certainly appeared that
^^Bld on the Geneva Steel Plant by Judson S,
Warshaw, May 1, 1946, Federal Records Center, Springfield, 
Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376,
ho"Daley Memorandum," Federal Records Center, 
Springfield, Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376,
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he would, for In July of 19^5 his predecessor. Attorney 
General Francis Biddle, had issued just such an opinion.
At that time there had also been considerable Congress-
üqional opposition to disposal to United States Steel.
But, alas, Tom C. Clark was not Gncncis Biddle. In
a letter to War Assets Administrator Gregory in the last
week in May of 1946, Clark approved the sale to the
44United States Steel Comply:
Dear General Gregory:
I refer to the letter from your Administration, 
dated May 23, 1946, which requests my opinion 
pursuant to Section 20 of the Surplus Property Act 
of 1944, as to whether the proposed sale of the 
Geneva Steel Plant at Geneva, Utah, to a wholly- 
owned subsidiary of the United States Steel 
Corporation will violate the antitrust laws.
Subsequently I was advised that the Colorado 
Puel and Iron Corporation had filed with you a 
modification of its original bid. Thereafter, I 
informed you that I did not contemplate issuing an 
opinion on the bid of the United States Steel 
Corporation until such a time as I had been 
informed by you as to the disposition which you 
had made of the above mentioned modified bid. 
Inasmuch as you have indicated that you do not 
intend to consider any further proposals regarding 
the disposition of the Geneva Steel Plant until 
after my opinion with respect to the bid of the 
United States Steel Corporation has been rendered,
I submit herewith such opinion.
In the light of the foregoing considerations 
^^See chapter V.
^^Tom C. Clark to E. B. Gregory, undated but refers 
to May 23 request for opinion and the decision was 
denounced on May 30, 1946, Federal Records Center, 
Springfield, Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376.
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and all the other pertinent circumstances of the 
case, I do not view the sale, as such, of this 
property by the War Assets Administration to the 
United States Steel Corporation as a violation 
of the antitrust laws, ^
Tom Clark's decision was rather strange in that a 
great deal of the Justification for acceptance of U. S. 
Steel's bid was from James T. Daley's recommendations 
to WAA's Price Review Board. Since the request for the 
opinion was from WAA, it was unusual that the contentions 
of the requesting agency was used in formulating the 
decision. That would seem to be poor precedent for a 
quasi-Judiclal opinion. In further defense of his 
conclusion. Attorney General Clark noted that 
acquisition of Geneva would not raise U, S. Steel's 
percentage of the total capacity above its prewar figure. 
He did not, however, acknowledge that at the same time 
another U, S, Steel subsidiary, Camegie-Illinois Steel, 
was getting an additional $63,000,000 worth of ingot 
capacity. Clark did cite the fact that the 32.7 per cent 
of total production which U. S. Steel would have after 
Geneva, was less than the 50,1 per cent it had when it was 
formed in 1901, He argued that the 39 per cent of 
western capacity which the acquisition of Geneva would 
give U, S. Steel was itself below monopoly level. To 
support that position he quoted the Alcoa case in which
*5lbid.
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64 per cent was ruled doubtful of monopoly and 33 per 
cent declared to be definitely not monopoly. It would 
be difficult, however, to compare the two situations 
where the one was an established monopoly in the process 
of being broken and the other was a dominant power in 
the process of being strengthened. Clark even went back 
to the original United States Steel decision of 1920 in 
which the court rules that mere size". . . is not an 
offense against the Sherman Act.”^^ It would, no doubt, 
be possible to find opinion which would cast doubt upon 
the applicability of the "rule of reason" in a case 
involving the Surplus Property Act of 1944.
It must be granted that Colorado Fuel and Iron 
weakened its position with an apparently facetious bid, 
but its plea for further consideration certainly deserved 
attention in view of the monopoly situation. Since 
Attorney General Clark was supposed to consider both 
antitrust laws and surplus property legislation, his 
acquiescence in ruling on U. S. Steel's bid without 
waiting for Colorado Fuel and Iron's supplemental bid is 
hard to comprehend. A reasonable offer from the latter 
company would surely fulfill the conditions of the 
Surplus Property Act better than disposition to "Big 
Steel." WAA's adamant attitude in favor of U. S. Steel
*6ibid.
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is also difficult to understand; mere preference for an
uncomplicated contract does not emerge as sufficient
motivation. In spite of such consideration, WAA
announced on May 23, 1946 that the Geneva Steel Plant
had been awarded to the United States Steel Company.
Surprisingly there was little objection from the
people as a whole. The New York Times carried no
immediate word of protest. In President Truman's files
for the period there was one telegram of objection
which was coupled with a plea to take cognizance of
Colorado Fuel and Iron's amended bid. That, however,
was from the Colorado State Democratic Chairman so his
iiSdemurral was to be expected.
The Honorable John M. Coffee complained to the 
House of Representatives at some length, but he was from 
the West Coast which was to a large extent against 
United States Steel. Coffee charged that Attorney General 
Clark had ignored an adverse opinion by his own antitrust 
division. The Representative had heard that there was 
such a report and expressed the hope that it would be dug 
out and published. Coffee scathingly denounced U. S.
Steel publicity which made it appear that the company 
had undertaken design and operation of wartime Geneva
^^New York Times. May 24, 1946, 26,
48Telegram from Eugene Cervi to President Truman, 
June 5» 1946, OF Pile 345, Truman Papers, Truman Library.
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only at the Insistence of the government. The government 
in that Instance, he said, was the Steel Division of the 
War Production Board which was completely manned by 
United States Steel people on emergency leave. He 
concluded his tirade by suggesting that if the U, 8.
Steel award could not be retracted, then the Fontana 
Steel Works should be given free of charge to Henry J. 
Kaiser as a representative of West Coast steel operators. 
This, said Coffee, "is the least the Government can do 
to atone for this awful injury . , , ,"*9
Almost a year later the Antitrust Division report, 
which Coffee had heard about, came to light. The New 
York Times reported that the opinion had been delivered 
to Attorney General Clark on April 1, 1946. Clark had 
read it, suppressed it, and ignored it. That the opinion 
was adverse to United States Steel there could be no 
doubt: "The acquisition of the Geneva Steel plant by
either of these two gigantic steel producers (United States 
Steel and Bethlehem) is inconsistent with the very clearly 
stated objectives of the Surplus Property Act of 1944.
On June 12, 1946, E. P. Holder, President of 
Colorado Fuel and Iron submitted a modified bid to
^^U. S., Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 2d 
Bess., May 31, l'#6, A j676-Yf.
^^Report of the Antitrust Division of the Depart­
ment of Justice, quoted in the New York Times. March 28. 
1947, 41. --------------
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General Gregory. In the bid which was In the form of 
a letter, he noted that while the United States Steel 
Company’s offer had been publicly accepted, the deal had 
not yet been consummated. He therefore altered the 
C, P. & I. bid to Include everything that U, S. Steel 
had offered with the exception that $38,000,000 would 
be covered by a thirty year mortgage Instead of paid In 
c a s h , Backed by Rockefeller money, Colorado Fuel and 
Iron had a fine Dun and Bradstreet rating but there Is 
no record In WAA files that any consideration was given 
to the C, P. & I, amended bid. There is no answering 
letter, no acknowledgement.
The next evidence Is from the New York Times of 
August 8, 1946 which recounts the payment. In cash, of 
$77,490,375.44 by U. 8, Steel to WAA, That Instrument 
paid for the three Pennsylvania plants sold to Carnegle- 
Illlnols Steel and a $12,242,059.22 remittance on 
Geneva which covered a $7,242,059.22 Inventory and a 
$5,000,000 down payment.5%
U, S, Steel did not even take the two years grace 
offered on the payment of $35,000,000 by the original 
contract. On August 6, 1947, Associate General Counsel
5^E, P, Holder to E, B, Gregory, June 12, 1946, 
Federal Records Center, Springfield, Virginia, Box 58-A- 
542 #376,
5^New York Times. August 8, 1946, 28,
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for Real Property Disposal of WAA Informed the Regional 
Director in Salt Lake City that on August 4, 19^7* U. 8.
Steel had given WAA a check for the $35,000,000 remaining 
on the Geneva contract. 3̂
The year 19^6, which started out so well in plant 
disposal, did not really finish that way. Declarations 
from owning agencies had been good and a number of 
the big ones had been sold, but these were not the corner 
stones of the industrial structure. Everyone had always 
known that the big, well designed plants in good location 
would be purchased quickly. It would take a couple more years 
to find out about disposal possibilities for the little 
plant in Podunk Corners, It was, however, obvious by the 
end of 1946 that if any significant change was going to be 
made in the percentage of production controlled by the 
top 250 corporations, there would have to be a dramatic 
change in the attitude of War Assets Administration 
because so far they had done well to hold the line at 
prewar figures.
53john A. Loomis to Regional Director, Salt Lake 
City, August 6, 1947, Federal Records Center, Springfield, 
Virginia, Box 58-A-542 #376,
CHAPTER IX 
THE MIDDLE YEARS, 1947-48
The War Assets Administration was In operation 
for most of four years, 1946-49. As could be expected, 
the first and last years were turbulent: the first part
of the disposal period was disrupted by problems of 
organization and Inexperienced Administrators; the last 
was disquieted by legislative changes and last minute 
problems. The middle years, 1947-48 were comparatively 
quiet and productive. In January of 1947 inventories 
were at an all time high. A contemporary observer 
estimated that 70 per cent of the task remained.^ By 
early 1949, War Assets Administration was practically 
out of the consumer's goods business,^ and just under
^James Allen Cook, Marketing of Surplus War 
Property (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1947), 12.
^U. S., Congress, House, Surplus Property 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Expenditures In the 
Executive Departments, Hearings. 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 
May 13. 1948, 2340. These hearings were In both 1947 




$400,000,000 In industrial inventory remained,3
The anticipated amount of total disposal was, 
moreover, an encouraging statistic. The first estimates 
of this amount had run as high as $100,000,000,000, but 
by January of 194? it had been revised to $29,200,000,000,^ 
The industrial total had also been adjusted from 
$15,000,000,000 to around $10,000,000,000.^
To keep the proper perspective it must be kepj in 
mind that the above figures were based on acquisition 
cost. Just as were all WAA inventory. As an illustration, 
a truck which cost $3,000 was carried on War Asset's 
books at that price even though it was five years old, 
worn out, and worth $200 when declared surplus. In the 
same way the Geneva Steel Plant was carried at 
$202,000,000 in the War Assets Inventory, although the 
depreciated replacement cost brought its actual value 
down to $104,000,000,^ That system of accounting made 
the disposal agency's rate of return consistently bad, 
but it was physically Impossible to Inspect and evaluate 
each item, so acquisition cost was the only practical
^U. 8,, War Assets Administration, First Quarterly 
Report,^1949 (Washington; Government Printing Office,
^Surplus Hearings. February 28, 1947, 8,




Even if the disposal picture was better in 19^7- 
48, the problem of loose, confusing, and inefficient 
administration continued. Moreover, many people complained 
that the surplus was Just too large and the returns simply 
too small. It was difficult to understand, and lack of 
understanding bred criticism. Littlejohn blamed it on 
percentage of recovery rate when he said: "There has
been a great deal to criticize in war surplus disposal. 
There was bound to be. A bank receiver finding reasonable 
assets of about 25 cents on the dollar is not the most 
popular man in town with the depositors.
It was impossible to avoid all complaints. Efforts 
which made sense to WAA staffers often brought unexpected 
results. WAA had many unsold warplants in California so 
it seemed logical to send out a brochure headlined: "Go
West for Profitable Expansion." But some of them came to 
the attention of Chambers of Commerce in Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey. Secretaries of the Chambers immediately 
wrote to their Congressmen who in turn complained 
bitterly to WAA that Pennsylvania and New Jorsoy tax 
money was being spent to promote the interests of
OCalifornia. War Assets answered that if there were no 
^Surplus Hearings. February 28, 1947, 3.
OU. s.. Congressional Record. 80th Cong., 1st 
Sess., December 16, 1&47, Ï1435-36.
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local users for existing plants, outside operators would 
have to be found, but promised In the future not to extoll 
the virtues of one section of the country In 
advertisements distributed In another.^
The usual cry for speed In surplus sales was quieted 
somewhat In the spring of 1948. Worsening International 
relations. Including the Berlin Airlift and threat of war, 
prompted the House Armed Services Committee to plead for 
a slowing of surplus disposal.William Manchester 
suggested In The Arms of Krupp that fast disposal of war 
supplies was one reason for soft Allied treatment of 
convicted war criminal, Alfrled Krupp. With supplies 
gone the West needed Krupp*s steel In case of war with 
Russia.
Congressional complaints regarding WAA results 
were magnified by disclosures of mistakes In WAA 
statistics and questionable accounting procedures. The 
unreliability of some War Assets figures was documented 
by the House Subcommittee on Surplus Property. Nicholas 
H. Cobbs, Deputy Administrator for Fiscal Services, was 
questioned about the "sold" figure, cumulative through 
1945 on each of the four quarterly reports for 1946.
^New York Times. January 16, 1948, 30. 
lOlbld.. March 24, 1948, 22.
^^Wl111am Manchester, The Arms of Krupp:^ 1587-1968 
(Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 671.
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Obviously, it should have been the same for each report
but it varied from quax ter to quarter as much as
$40,000,000, When asked how that could be, Mr, Cobbs
gave the unsatisfactory answer: "Only through previous
errors of reporting that I can understand," As the
committee counsel said; "How can Congress rely on any of
12these things when they come in?"
Even more disturbing was the use of bad accounting 
procedures to make WAA look good. In the case 
investigated by the subcommittee, it was done on the 
regional level, with subsequent approval of Washington, 
The New York region had a December sales quota of 
$100,000,000, With the end of the month approaching 
they had only $44,000,000 in bona fide sales; but 
$57,000,000 in sales orders. These orders had not been 
checked. No one knew if the goods were available because 
the orders were not on the proper forms. But the 
$57,000,000 would put them over the top in sales so the 
regional director said to include them. As a result 
the New York region won the "D" award for the 
Administration's top selling Job, But the sales would 
have ordinarily been credited to January so the same 
thing had to be done at the end of that month. Then the 
auditor came. He reported the subterfuge to Washington, 
but a correction would have made the central office sales
12Sux*plus Hearings. March 28, 1947, 367-68,
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look bad, so New York was Instructed to continue Its 
unusual procedure. Eventually, due to bad orders not 
converted to bona fide sales, total results would be way 
off. The committee was quite disturbed by these 
revelations.
According to the personal recollection of one 
former WAA minor employee It was a wonder any money ever 
found Its way from the field to the general treasury. 
Employed by the Ft. Worth regional office he was assigned 
to a crew going to an El Paso military base to work a 
"site sale." Near the end of the two week period work 
slacked off so our protagonist decided to ask for the day 
off. He went to his boss's hotel room to ask permission 
and discovered a party In progress. The boss, 
understandably jovial, granted the request, then, as an 
afterthought, threw him a bundle of money asking that he 
take care of It. It was $30,000 In cash from the "site 
sale."
Being of prudent nature, the employee took It to 
the hotel safe, got a receipt, and departed. On his 
return he found the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
questioning his colleagues about a missing $30,000. The 
boss had taken a nap and awakened with absolutely no 
recollection of the $30,000 transaction. Apologies were
ISlbld.. May 13, 19*7, 1186-90.
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made to the annoyed FBI men,^^
Such antics certainly helped to bring on constant 
complaints concerning War Assets* cost of doing business.
It sometimes seemed that Congressmen suspected that after 
it was all over returns would not cover expenses. Costs 
varied from region to region but the Subcommittee 
unearthed some examples that appeared inordinately high.
As of the first of January, 19^7 costs in Jacksonville 
had reached 58,9 per cent of sales; Minneapolis operated 
at 54,8; Tulsa was down to 47.5 per cent; and Helena 
came in with an astonishing 98 per cent. In the course 
of the interrogation it was brought out that the reasons 
for Helena's poor showing was lack of inventory, but 
political pressure kept WAA from closing the office.
Actually, nationwide operating cost percentages 
decreased the longer WAA was in business. As of January 1, 
1947 expenses of $469,000,000 came to 19 per cent of 
s a l e s , b u t  with rapidly declining personnel and increased 
volume, the March 31, 1948 cost total of $800,000,000 was 
only 6.6 per cent.^?
l^Interview with Joe T. Timmons, Assistant 
Professor of History at Texas A & I University and former 
employee of the War Assets Administration, April 20, 1969.
^^Surplus Hearings. March 28, 1947, 369.
^^Cook, Marketing of Surplus War Property. 177.
^^Surplus Hearings. May 13, 1948, 2343.
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To help decrease costs. War Assets cut Its employee 
list drastically In 19^7 and 1948. In January of 1947 
there were 56,600 people on the payroll. The second 
quarter saw the number drop to 51,500 and by the end of 
the year the figure stood at 27,900. It was always safe 
to estimate that about 10 per cent of the total worked In 
Washington.^® By March 31, 1948 personnel had dropped to 
25,684 and Administrator Jess Larson projected a little less 
than 20,000 on June 30, 1948, and 12,250 by the end of the 
year.19
As War Assets Administrator, General Littlejohn 
placed strong emphasis on organization. His 
organization chart showed the Administrator at the top 
and an Associate Administrator working with him. There 
were two advisory groups attached to the Administrator's 
office. The first was the Advisory Council of Industry 
spokesmen, six of whom worked for WAA full time, and 
fifteen who were called In on a per diem basis. This 
group advised on any problem that was presented to them, 
but they did not Instigate Investigations; they had no 
freedom of action. The other advisory group was the 
General Review Board which consisted of the Administrator 
and whoever he chose to serve; Its function was to rule on
l®Ibld.. Exhibit 13.
19lbld.. May 13, 1948, 2343.
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offers submitted for real property.
In Washington, and directly under the Administrator 
were the offices of policy and planning. These were:
Office of Liaison with owning Agencies, Office of 
General Counsel, Office of Plans and Policies, Office of 
Fiscal Services, Office of Administrative Services, and 
Special Assistants. Then on the operational level but 
still In Washington were: Office of Information and
Advertising, Office of Acquisitions, Office of Real 
Property Disposal, Office of Field Operations, Office of 
General Disposal, Office of Aircraft and Electronics 
Disposal, and the Office of Disposal for United States 
Territories and Possessions. In the field and directly 
under the Office of Field Operations were the six Zone 
Offices and one Territorial Office, These, however, were 
also supervised by the other Washington Offices on the 
operational level. The Regional Offices, then, were 
directly supervised by the Zone Offices and the Office 
of Field Operations, but they too had to work directly with 
other Washington Offices such as Real Property Disposal, 
General Disposal, and others. Under Region were the
District Offices, Customer Service Centers, and Mobile
20Customer Service Centers.
Despite what appeared to be an efficient
organization on paper, Littlejohn's administration never
ZOlbld.. Exhibit 11.
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worked effectively. Moreover, he ran into trouble because 
of his egocentrism and attacks from Congressional critics. 
Ross Rlzley of Oklahoma, Chairman of the House Surplus 
Property Subcommittee, did not like General Littlejohn, 
his complicated organization, nor WAA's operations. In 
June, 1947 he charged War Assets with "confusion,
carelessness, and chaos," and demanded that Littlejohn,
21and his military helpers, be dismissed Immediately.
Littlejohn was egocentric to a degree seldom seen 
In a public man. He appeared to resent committees 
and they disliked him. His constant use of the personal 
pronoun "I" became terribly tiresome. In one passage of 
nine lines he used "I" eleven times.^2 Also he was 
easily confused and often testy when questioned. 
Littlejohn's successor, Jess Larson, on the other hand, 
testified beautifully. He used just the right shade of 
deference, was firm, and had his facts admirably In hand. 
Even when Larson was general counsel under Littlejohn, 
he handled congressional committees much better than his 
superior.
If It was organization that bothered critics, 
Littlejohn was always willing to change that. In fact 
constant change was the foremost complaint of those
^^New York Times. June 29, 1947, 8.
ZZgurplus Hearings. February 28, 1947, 20.
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working In War Assets. His Innovations were many but few
were s u c c e s s f u l . ^3
For the constant criticism of high personnel 
turnover Littlejohn had a new explanation, one which would 
hardly endear him to members of the Congressional 
Investigating committee, before whom he was testifying.
He said that men would not aome to War Assets and left 
after they got there because: ”. . . . the average civilian
does not like to come up and be Investigated by Congress.
Everyone will run . . . .”
Since most of the selling was done In the Regional 
Offices It was Important to have stability at that level 
but this, too, was hard to achieve. Gordon T. Burke, 
Regional Director at Omaha was one of the most articulate 
witnesses to appear before the Subcommittee. He had 
submitted his letter of resignation and was not afraid.
He told of the constant shifting of responsibility for 
real property from Region to Region, and from Region to
Zone and back to Region. He was, he said, completely
disgusted.
He complained of the many progress charts which had 
to be prepared In the Regional Office and sent to
^% e w  York Times. September 19, 19^7, 35.
ohSurplus Hearings. February 28, 1947, 8.
25%bld.. April 8, 1947, 394.
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Washington. He doubted that they were really used since
upon one occasion his office sent In a totally wrong
chart and no one In Washington even caught the error.
Burke resented the time he, as Regional Director, had to
spend with people coming to his office from the Zone
and from Washington. He protested bitterly of, "the
flood of dally visitors. We called them paratroopers.
They came In by the score. I have known as many as 23
to be In our office from the Washington office and from
the Zone In one day."^^
Banalities were numerous In Littlejohn's
correspondence with his Regional Directors. When Burke
wrote In to object to the new Zone system which he
considered unnecessary and confusing, he received
Instructions from the "coach" that his duty was to "play
the game":
The proper organization of War Assets 
Administration Is no different from that which 
should be applied to a large Industrial 
corporation. It Is similar In every respect to a 
football team.
As rapidly as It was possible for me to do so,
X assumed the role of coach and created six 
football teams, with the quarterback stationed at 
each Zone Headquarters.
I have played on a number of football teams.
I have followed a substantial number throughout 
my life. It Is the objective of every coach to 
minimize the stellar roles and to place the 
emphasis on teamwork. When the outstanding star 
Is over-trained, or Is not up to his usual form, 
the team Itself falls to win a game. Just review
Z^Ibld.. 406-07.
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the history of any college team„along these lines.
The facts become self-evident, '
After a letter like that, what could any self respecting
Regional Director do? Burke quit.^®
Another Littlejohn critic was former Tulsa Regional 
Director, R. D, Wilbor Jr. who objected to changes in 
regional office responsibility for real property and also 
to constant changes in planning and operations. He said 
it was impossible to keep abreast of real property 
responsibility shifts: "The real property deal has been
as tangled as personal property. We were originally 
under Kansas City, then they moved it to Dallas, then 
to Tulsa, and now they are moving it to Grand Prairie,
apparently."29
Wilbor also objected to the Zone set-up and 
constant changes by the plans and policy division:
Plans and Policies lay down the regulations 
under which you are to operate. That is well and 
good. You have to interpret the Surplus Property 
Act of 1944. But the trouble about that is, after 
the Zones came in they disregarded the Manual of 
Operations and everything else and said, "This 
is the way we are going to do it." Frankly it was 
very confusing and I did not go along with them.
I think Plans and Policies have a place in 
the scheme of things here in Washington in the 
over-all picture, and once those plans and policies 
are laid down, the regions should be in a position
27lbid.. Exhibit 132.
2^Ibid.. April 8, 1947, 386.
29lbid.. June 3» 1947, 1278.
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to follow them and function.
This surplus-property-disposal program. In my 
opinion would have been much further along, and 
so far as Oklahoma is concerned would have been 
nearly completed, had they stuck to one plan and 
given it a chance to work, instead of changing 
their minds every 30 days. They go off on one 
tangent one month, and the next month it is a dead 
issue and here is something else,3
Ross Rizley voiced his committee's major indictment 
of Littlejohn when he said it had received complaints 
from all over the country about "the show being run 
almost entirely by Army personnel," Rizley was critical 
of the officers* lack of business experience and resented 
that every suggestion or idea presented by a businessman 
"was overruled by some general or ex-gener*al or colonel, 
or someone who had occupied a military place." It was 
brought out in the testimony that ten of the twelve top 
posts in War Assets were held by military men,^^
Gordon Burke objected to the military's influence 
on the Regional level. He said: "The Injection of the
military into its [Region's] set-up is, in my opinion, 
unfortunate, and is looked upon with disfavor, not only 
by its employees, but by the general public . . • ,
For the last 9 months I feel we have had a military 
dictatorship in War Assets Administration." He charged 
that due to Army dominance, "the organization is ruled
SOlbid.. 1280.
31lbid,. March 7, 1947, 36,
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and governed by fear." One of the most common expressions 
he had heard among his superiors was: "That Is the way
we did It In the Army."^^
Stanley Bennlng Adams, former Regional Director In 
Chicago, thought Army officers were unfitted for War 
Assets since, "the most sheltered man In this country Is 
a Regular officer In the Army or Navy . . . .  They never 
had to worry about a price In their lives," Quite often 
witnesses suggested that department store people were 
needed. Instead of the Army, since they were such great 
merchandisers. Adams did not think much of that Idea:
"What does a man working for Marshall Field know about 
machine tools? He does not know anything about It. You 
cannot market machine tools like neckties.
General R. E, Wood, President of Sears Roebuck, was 
uniquely qualified to judge the Army offlcer-admlnlstrator:
I am a West Pointer myself and have served In 
the Army for 20 years. I have a very high regard 
for the Integrity and general ability of Army and 
Naval officers. However, I think a job of this 
kind Is decidedly outside their line and that the 
executive direction should be In the hands of some 
experienced businessman with a group of business 
assistants rather than Army and Navy Officers. In 
the first place Army and Navy men usually 
accumulate too great a staff which Is expensive and 
which slows up operations. In the second place 
they usually have not the knowledge of the mairkets
S^Ibld.. April 8, 1947, 409-10.
33lbld.. June 3, 1947, 1293.
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and do not consider the ratio of expense to the 
disposal value,j
In spite of the opposition to Littlejohn and his 
military system, It Is likely he could have stayed on aS 
War Assets Administrator because he had the support of the 
President. But by late summer he was considering giving 
up the Job, and in November he quit. His reason for 
leaving remains obscure. His letter was a simple 
resignation. He made no statements to the press and no 
mention of his reasons were stated In his "Memoirs." On 
November 21, 19^7 President Truman announced that 
Littlejohn was quitting on November 28, and praised the 
"wonderful Job" that Littlejohn "had been tough enough 
to do." He further announced that Associate Administrator 
Jess Larson would take his p l a c e .35
Jess Larson was a man of considerable talent. 
Schooled In rough and tumble Oklahoma politics, he thrived 
In the administrative maelstrom of Washington D. C. An 
Interview In 1966 provided good evidence of his wariness 
and ability to be pleasant without undue revelation.
During lunch at his "Club" he was most pleasant and 
discussed a mutual interest in Oklahoma politics at great 
length, but was singularly uncommunicative when War Assets 
was brought up. As he said, that was a staff operation
3*Ibld.. June 6, 19%7, 1296.
35now York Times. November 22, 19^7, 7.
239
and It was Impossible for anyone to be accurate after 
twenty years.
Mill Greek, where Larson was born in 1904, was in 
Indian Territory. After the Territory became the State 
of Oklahoma his family moved to Chickasha. He attended 
the University of Oklahoma for four years which included 
a year of law school, but he was unable to finish because 
his father became ill and he had to go home to manage the 
ranch and dairy business. After serving as Mayor of 
Chickasha for four years he was admitted to the Oklahoma 
bar in 1935. Larson then moved to Oklahoma City where 
he became Secretary of the Oklahoma Land Commission and 
served as an attorney in the liquidation of the E. W. 
Marland holdings.
Larson went into military service with the Oklahoma 
National Guard in 1940, was wounded in action in Italy, 
and reached the rank of colonel. He Joined the War Assets 
Administration in July of 1946 as Assistant General 
Counsel, became General Counsel in December of 1946, 
Associate Administrator on November 13, 1947, and Acting 
Administrator on November 28, 1947. President Truman 
appointed him War Assets Administrator on December 20
1947.37
S^Interview with Jess Larson, Former War Assets 
Administrator, Washington, D. C., December 20, 1966.
37u. S. Congressional Record. Both Cong.. 2d Sess., 
May 13, 1948, 5 W C
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The Senate did not get around to considering his 
appointment until the middle of May in 19^8. By that time 
he had made one die-hard enemy in the person of Senator 
Millard Tydlngs of Maryland, Tydings was incensed because 
Larson had not sold the Kalunlte Plant near Salt Lake 
City to the highest bidder. In two days of debate it 
was brought out that Larson had taken the wisest cov.rse, 
but Tydings remained bitter to the end,^® He did not 
have a chance to block the appointment, as Tydings himself 
admitted at the start df the debate. Vague charges of 
political skullduggery back in Oklahoma were mentioned 
and proved unfounded. Most Senators had nothing but 
praise for Larson. Senator George W. Malone of Nevada 
who had kept close watch on surplus property activities 
endorsed him unhesitatingly:
I wish to say for Mr. Jess Larson that I have 
the highest regard for him; and In comparison with 
his Immediate predecessor, I think there is such a 
contrast with respect to good administrative 
practices that there Is no comparison whatsoever.
I think Mr. Larson is head and shoulders above a 
great many Government officials who are engaged in 
Government operations at this time, so much so 
that I could not let this opportunity pass without 
saying that I have such a high regard for him, and 
that I have never known of any complaint regarding 
his administration, until now.also that I Intend 
to vote for his confirmation.*?




appointment was confirmed without even a roll call vote.^® 
In the meantime industrial disposal was progressing 
at a good rate. Among the techniques that were successful 
in pushing industrial sales was the issuance of the 
brochure called The Plant Finder. Issued at irregular 
intervals it listed all of the Industrial facilities 
available for sale or lease. A complete description of 
each plant was Included but price was not suggested.
Below Is the information page of the Plant Finder for 
June of 1947:
This completely revised inventory of surplus 
Government-owned plants gives basic Information on 
their size, location, general features and wartime 
use. Detailed Information, engineering data, 
surplus status and other facts are available 
through the Regional Office designated for each 
plant. Prospective buyers or lessees will be 
given full opportunity to inspect any property and 
look into all the facts.
With few exceptions, the facilities listed in 
this PLANT-PINDER are available for Industrial use.
It should be noted, moreover, that many plants 
designated as "general purpose" have had the 
original operating machinery and equipment removed, 
and can be quickly adapted to the particular 
production processes of the buyer.
The following guide to designations in this 
edition of the PLANT-PINDER may be helpful:
a. Plants marked "Surplus" are Immediately
available for purchase or lease.
b. Plants listed as "Leased" may be purchased,
subject to lease provisions.
c. Plants which appear in a separate listing
*°Ibid.. May I8, 1948, 5946.
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as "Sold" are carried as a matter of record and 
Information.
d. The names of the wartime lessees are used 
solely for identification of properties and this use 
has no connection with the privately owned 
facilities of these lessees.
Types, Methods and Terras of Disposals
Surplus industrial properties are variously 
offered: (a) for sale or lease; (b) in whole
or in part; and (c) with or without machinery 
and equipment.
These offerings are by public advertise­
ments which state a definite day and hour for the 
final receipt of all proposals. You are urged to 
watch these advertisements for offerings of interest 
to you.
All proposals must be submitted on the 
Standard Bid Form provided for each offered 
property. These Bid Forms give the terms and 
conditions of the disposal and a firm description 
of the facility offered.
Terms for purchase are available. These 
usually are based on a minimum of 20 percent cash 
down for land and buildings, the remainder 
payable in quarterly installments over a maximum 
of 10 years, with 4 percent interest on unpaid 
balances. When machinery and equipment are 
included the minimum cash down is 15 percent, 
with the balance in quarterly installments within 
five years.
The continuing volume of plant disposals in 
past months is evidence that these surplus 
facilities are adaptable to present-day 
production needs. They represent established 
values free from the uncertainties of new 
construction, and offer you a practical way to 
increase and speed production.
Inquiries are invited.
S., War Assets Administration, The Plant 
Finder: An Inventory of Government-Owned Industrial Plants
(Printed but not published brochure, 1947), no page number.
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In the Plant Finder one could take his pick of
several hundred facilities. There was an acetylene plant
for sale, one for making alcohol, or one for producing
carbon black. There was a feed recovery plant listed,
many general manufacturing facilities, and one to make
guayale rubber. If one did not want to manufacture
penicillin, perhaps a tidal power project would be more
useful. The largest offering was an aircraft plant In
Chicago with 6,430,000 square feet of floor space. The
smallest was a 1,400 square foot steel plate facility
In Coraopolls, Pennsylvania. If boyhood ambitions
remained, one could buy a twenty-nine mile railroad at
4pTahawas, New York, and drive his own train.
By the first part of 1947 States and educational 
institutions were beginning to acquire some of the hard 
to sell facilities, such as ordnance depots. The land, 
particularly for agricultural colleges, was the 
enticement, since buildings on that kind of Installation 
were usually cheap and poorly constructed. Business Week 
In February of 194? ran a list of sold plants which had 
cost over $5,000,000. From the list it appeared that the 
politicians of Iowa had better connections than those of 
Texas. Iowa State received a $31,000,000 shell loading 
plant, free of charge, while Texas A & M paid $2,000,000
42lbld.. 183-90.
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for one valued at only $20,000,000.^3
In the same month the magazine Steel reported that 
on the basis of cost, the disposal of steel plants was 
62 per cent complete. In actual numbers, sixty-two of 
146 were gone. The highest percentage price was the 
$47,923 that Plymouth Steel paid for a $49,141 plant,
The Iron Age reported that the largest steel plant that 
had been leased was a $25,000,000 facility to the United 
Engineering and Foundry Company, The largest plant that 
remained to be disposed of was a $28,053,292 location 
which had been operated by Republic Steel.^5
In Its First Quarterly Report for 1947 WAA was 
discouraged by the unwillingness of Industry to Invest In 
used facilities. The ratio of expenditure, new to used 
In 1946, was about ten to one, but the forecast for 1947 
was even worse. To make a decent record In 1946, War 
Assets had sold about half of the used manufacturing 
machinery In the United States, but with reduced spending 
In 1947, It would have to sell almost 100 per cent of all 
equipment purchased to maintain the same
^3"Many Surplus War Plants Already Sold or Leased," 
Business Week. February 1, 1947» 22,
^^"Surplus Steel Plant Disposal Progressing,"
Steel, CXX (February 10, 1947), 70,
^^"WAA Reports Steel Projects Disposal 63 Pet, 
Completed," The Iron Age. CLIX (February 13, 1947), 112-13,
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figures,Industrial acquisitions to the end of the first 
quarter, 1947, amounted to $5,200,000,000, of which 
$3,200,000,000 had been sold.^? The largest sale in the 
quarter was of a $4,026,000 plant in Milwaukee to 
Continental Can for $2,627,000,^®
Again, the unreliability of statistics was illus­
trated by an article in Manufacturer's Record which 
reported that $4,500,000,000 had been invested by the 
government in industrial facilities south of the Mason- 
Dixon line and that only $1,000,000,000 worth in that
ilQarea remained.  ̂ If those figures were correct, all 
disposals made by War Assets and predecessor agencies had 
been made in the South, which hardly seemed likely.
Since no material in World War II had been more 
critical than synthetic rubber. Congress reserved the 
right to review the disposition of those plants. In 
March of 1947 Congress halted all sales until legislative
S,, War Assets Administration, First Quarterly 
Report, 1947: Customer Service (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1947), 1%.----
47lbld.. 16,
*Glbid,. 17,
^^"Surplus Plants Costing $1,000,000,000 Undisposed 
Of In Southern States.” Manufacturer's Record. CXVI (July, 
1947), 37,
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action could be t a k e n , T h e  rubber industry, which was 
naturally interested in the plants, presented a plan for 
private ownership early in 1948, but Congress found it 
unsuitable.51 Thus on April 1, 1948, the Congress decreed 
that title to all synthetic rubber plants would be returned 
to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and thereafter 
all plants would be operated through contracts with the 
Federal government.5%
At the end of the first quarter of 1948 real 
property, most of which was industrial facilities, had 
assumed a greater importance in the overall disposal job.
It represented over half of the total surplus inventory. 
Properties ranged in size from a $1,000 lighthouse in 
Vermont to the $140,000,000 Basic Magnesium Plant in 
Henderson, Nevada. Plants remained to be sold in all 
forty-eight states and they were getting harder to sell 
because of size, type, and out-of-the-way location,53
Plants in which government-owned units were mixed 
with privately-owned units, known as "scrambled facilities"
5^U, S., War Assets Administration, First 
Quarterly Report. 1948 (Washington; Government Printing0??Tôë, 194WÏ, S: ^
5^New York Times. November 15* 1947, 21,
5^WAA. First Quarterly Report. 1948. 5,
53ibid,. 2.
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were becoming a problem. There was nothing to worry about 
if the company was willing to offer a reasonably fair 
price. There was also no problem if the facility was of 
no value to the company; WAA could write it off and forget 
it. But, if the company was trying to obtain the facility 
for little or nothing, it ran against the Surplus Property 
Act which required the disposal agency to "prevent, 
insofar as possible, unusual and excessive profits." If 
this was the case, quite often War Assets went to 
considerable expense to remove the machinery from the 
operator’s property.
Problems arose with leased property, since leases 
did not always cover every contingency. Such was the 
case with a Republic Steel blast furnace which sprung a 
leak. The furnace was shut down and repairs cost about 
$600,000, After extensive haggling it was decided that 
War Assets would pay for repairs and Republic would
CKrepay half of the expense in increased rental payments.
Increased industrial acquisitions and decreased 
consumer goods inventory, from the first quarter of 1948 
to the second, brought industrial facilities share of 
the total inventory up to 75 per cent. At the end of the 




warplants to dispose of.^^
Some plants were obviously not fitted for 
peacetime manufacture. If not, at least one of them might 
be used to manufacture peace. On May 20, 1948 another lease 
on the old Sperry Gyroscope plant at Lake Success, New York 
was given to the United Nations,5?
In February of 194? The Iron Age listed eighty- 
four steel plants still for sale,^® By September of 1948 
that number was down to twenty-nine and nineteen of those 
were under sales negotiation. The journal reported that 
War Assets had been ordered to dispose of Its holdings 
and get out of business by February 28, 1949.^9 In 
desperation WAA turned to auctioneers to sell plants 
hardest to dispose of. This method was tried on a plant 
in Garland, Texas which had been advertised time and 
time again. The plant cost $2,000,000 and the 
auctioneer got $611,000 for It, which under the circum­
stances, was an excellent price. Administrator Larson, 
therefore, picked out twelve more to test the method
S^ibld.
5?New York Times. May 20, 1948, 4,
^®"WAA Reports Steel Projects Disposal 63 Pet. 
Completed,” 112,
59”WAA Ordered to Dispose of All Remaining Surplus 
Holdings," The Iron Age. CLXII (September 2, 1948), 123.
249
further.
At the end of 1948, eleven WAA Regional Offices 
were still handling real property. Of those eleven, 
two, Alaska and Denver, were Just about sold out. Atlanta 
and Kansas City both had less than $100,000,000 in 
inventory; Philadelphia, San Francisco, Cincinnati, and 
Seattle had a little over $100,000,000. New York had 
approximately $175*000,000; Chicago had $200,000,000 
remaining. Grand Prairie [Dallas] brought up the rear 
with $300,000,000 still to go.^^ It would take a miracle 
to finish the Job by February 28, 1949.
The disposal of the Big Inch and the Little Big Inch 
pipelines was the single most important industrial trans­
action in 1947-48. The Big Inch ran 1,254 miles from Long­
view, Texas to a terminal near Philadelphia and was designed 
to carry crude oil to eastern refineries. Little Big Inch 
carried refined products 1,475 miles from Texas and 
Louisiana to New York City.^^ Under wartime pressures Big 
Inch was built in 377 days and was finished on August 14, 
1943. Little Big Inch was started later and finished on
GOwew York Times. October 4, 1948, 30.
S., War Assets Administration, Fourth Quarterly 
Report.^1948 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
^^"Two Pipelines For Sale?” Fortune. XXXI 
(January, 1945), 125.
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March 2, 1944,^3 Together they cost over $143,000,000,^^ 
German U-Boats and the demands of global war 
diminished the supply of tankers which usually supplied 
the petroleum markets of eastern United States. Railroad 
tank cars performed stopgap service but the Inches ended 
the crisis. Big Inch could deliver 300,000 barrels of 
crude dally and Little Big Inch 225,000 barrels,
When the crisis passed, studies were begun which 
would eventually lead to a sale,^^ The studies hinged 
around best postwar use. Profit would most easily come 
from the transmission of natural gas but national defense 
considerations Indicated continued consignment of 
petroleum,
When General Gregory was War Assets Administrator 
he submitted a plan to Congress which would restrict the 
lines to petroleum use. In June of 1946, WAA advertised 
for bids with that restriction. While these bids were
G3lbld,. 126,
*Cook, Markei
65wtwo Pipelines for Sale?” 126, 
66(
67t
G^C keting of Surplus War Property. 40,
^^Cook, Marketing of Surplus War Property. 40,
'U, S,, Congress, House, Surplus Property 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Expenditures In the 
Executive Departments, Report 2738. 79th Cong,, 2d Sess,, 
December 16, 1946, 3. Cited hereafter as House Report 
2738. --------
^®WAA, First Quarterly Report. 17.
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being studied General Littlejohn became Administrator. 
Even with the petroleum restriction WAA received sixteen 
blds.^^
While the bids were being studied many views were 
expressed about the proper use of the lines. Congressman 
John H, Polger, In a letter to President Truman, argued 
against sale to an oil company because of possible 
dominance of the eastern market. He felt that the Inches 
should be a public utility— a common c a r r i e r . Truman 
misunderstood Polger's position; he thought Polger was 
asking for government ownership. The President wrote 
back that he too considered the lines Important but:
”I think It would be better for them to be In private 
hands than be operated by the government . . .
Some tanker operators objected to the competition If the 
pipelines were used for oil. But coal and manufactured 
gas operators objected to their use for natural gas.?^
The Slaughter Committee, Investigating surplus 
property In the House of Representatives, advocated that
G^Robert M. Littlejohn, "Passing In Review," 
(Unpublished Memoirs, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Ft, McNair, Washington D. C., 1965), 60. Cited 
hereafter as "Littlejohn Memoirs,"
fOjohn H. Polger to Harry S. Truman, August 2, 
1946, OP Pile 345, Tiniman Papers, Truman Library.
^^Harry 8, Truman to John H. Polger, August 10, 
1946, OP Pile 345, Truman Papers, Truman Library,
"̂ "̂Two Pipelines for Sale?" 125.
252
the lines simply be sold to the highest bidder, regardless 
of use. That committee criticized Littlejohn for delays 
in the sale.73 Littlejohn, typically, snapped back. In 
a confidential report for Congressmen he argued that the 
delay was caused by restrictions for the use of petroleum 
established by his predecessor, and by Congress, eince it 
had not objected to Gregory's plan.7̂
Littlejohn decided to ignore Gregory's restrictions. 
With his usual flamboyant eloquence he declared; 
"Recommendations made to Congress by a predecessor 
theoretically became binding. Had I followed the 
recommendations so made, I doubt whether I would be an 
American citizen today."75 He also ignored his advisers: 
"all of my lawyers and legal consultants told me that I 
had to go along with the previous reports submitted to 
Congress. I threw the whole thing in the ashcan and 
became my own lawyer."7^ After it was all over 
Littlejohn felt that the selling of Big Inch and Little
73nouse Report 2738. 15.
7^Robert M. Littlejohn, "Statement to the Congress 
on the Findings of Congressional Committees Dealing With 
Surplus Property Activities," March 17» 19^7 (Unpublished 
Typescript, Federal Records Center, Springfield,
Virginia), Box 62-A-282 #9. Cited hereafter as 




Big Inch was, "the greatest accomplishment of the WAA,"??
When bids had been analyzed and those without 
adequate financial backing were thrown out, the highest 
was $66,000,000 for both Big Inch and Little Big Inch.
On November 19, 19^6 Littlejohn announced that he 
rejected all sixteen of the bids,?® He threw a 
bombshell when he announced the rejection: "When I
announced . , , that all bids had been rejected, the 
room exploded. Each newspaperman rushed to get to the 
telephone to call his paper,"?9
Littlejohn then resubmitted proposals to Congress 
when it reconvened on January 3, 1947, These proposals, 
following recommendations of the Army-Navy Petroleum 
Board, allowed the Inches to be used for oil, gas, or 
any combination of the two. The lines were to go to the 
highest responsible bidder. The only restriction was 
that in case of emergency the lines could be reclaimed 
by the government to be reconverted to petroleum within 
ninety days,°*
When Congress had not changed the proposal within 
its allowed thirty days it was announced that bids would
??Ibid.. 60,
?®WAA, First Quarterly Report, 1947, 17.
?9"Littlejohn Memoirs," 17,
Rn"Littlejohn Statement to Congress,"
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be opened on February 10, 1947, The Real Property 
Review Board considered the bids and February 11, 194?
It was announced that the bid of $143,127,000 by the 
Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation had been accepted. 
It was $77*000,000 more then the highest bid with 
petroleum restrictions and was within $2,000,000 of the 
original cost of both p i p e l i n e s . One of the rejected 
bids was that of J. W, Grotty of Dallas who had been 
rather bitter that his bid of $127,000,000 on the original 
call had not been considered because of lack of financing. 
This time he bid 60 cents for Big Inch, and 40 cents for 
Little Big Inch, cash with bld.®^
Everything considered. Big Inch and Little Big Inch 
were perhaps the most profitable government projects 
of World War II. The sale price had almost covered 
construction cost but that was only part of the story.
To get oil east after the reduction of the tanker fleet, 
the United States had agreed to pay the Increased cost on 
the use of railroad tank cars which was four times as 
expensive as ships. The completion of the Inches had 
cut those payments by millions. In wartime operation 
the government also cleared 22 cents a barrel on all 
petroleum transmission, thus bringing In more millions.
Gllbld.
®^"WAA Opens Pipeline Bids," The Iron Age. CLIX 
(February 13, 1947), 113,
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It was estimated that at least a 50 per cent dividend
was received on the Investment.®^
In 1947-48 a worsening International situation
characterized by the Cold War, the Truman Doctrine, and
the Marshall Plan, produced a whole new atmosphere under
which War Assets had to operate. With this growing
confrontation with the Communists, It seemed wise to retain
more government-owned Industrial facilities. Therefore, In
August of 1947 Congress passed Public Law 364 which
determined that 178 industrial plants, designated by the
Munitions Board, could only be disposed of with agreements
for government recall In case of national emergency. This,
naturally, would make already hard to sell plants even
more difficult to dispose of. Therefore, If after a
reasonable length of time the plant had not been sold or
leased. War Assets could ask for relaxation of restrictions.
If the Services were not willing to relax the restrictions,
they were required to take the plant back and relieve
84WAA of any responsibility for its disposition.
Following the passage of this legislation, the 
Armed Services, in November of 1947, announced that they 
would retain $5*000,000,000,in goods which they had formerly 
planned to declare surplus. With that withdrawal Littlejohn
®®"Two Pipelines For Sale?" 128.
®^WAA, Fourth Quarterly Report. 1947, 18.
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calculated that he would have only $8,900,000,000 worth of 
property to dispose of and that the job could be 
finished by June 30,1948.^5 what Littlejohn meant was 
that someone else could do the Job by June 30, 1948, for 
he had submitted his resignation and retired at the end 
of the month.
On March 5* 1948, President Truman sent a message 
to Congress in which he asked that the Surplus Property 
Act of 1944 be replaced with permanent peacetime 
legislation. The proposed law would not only deal with 
surplus property but with property management as well. He 
said that the disposal agencies had performed admirably and 
by June 30, 1948 surplus totals would be down to 
$6,000,000,000, consequently, he asked that the War Assets 
Administration be terminated by that date. He admitted 
there would be considerable real property left at that time 
since $2,600,000,000 worth remained to be sold and another 
$1,100,000,000 was on lease. But, he said, real property 
would be a long range problem and should be dealt with 
by permanent legislation. It was the President’s 
recommendation that procurement, surplus, and property 
management functions of the government be centralized 
in the Federal Works Agency, He also asked that the
85New York Times. November 1, 1947, 22,
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Ûgpriorities of the Surplus Property Act be ended soon.
It remained to be seen what action Congress would take.
A rather heated exchange between the President of 
the United States and Democratic Representative Lyndon B. 
Johnson of Texas was revealed on April 6, 1948. Johnson 
had written to the President on March 20, 1948 asking 
that War Assets hold up on the disposal of surplus 
warplants until the world situation could be properly 
appraised. Truman replied sharply on March 22, 1948, 
stating that the War Assets matter had been taken care of 
by the National Security clause of Public Law 364 and 
the whole question of international problems could be 
handled nicely if the Eightieth Congress would quit 
dragging its feet and pass the legislation he had asked 
for. He urged Johnson to put his "shoulder to the wheel" 
to see that it was done.
Johnson was not cowed. He answered, on April 22, 
1948, that "his shoulder had always been at the wheel" 
in the interests of preparedness. He flatly said that 
the President was wrong when he said that the country was 
amply protected by the National Security clause. He 
accused the President of not adequately preparing for 
defense. Johnson admonished: "World conditions require
that we mobilize men, and we must also mobilize plants
acU. S.. Congressional Record, Both Cong., 2d 
Sess., March 5, 1945, È268-66.
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and Industrial facilities to provide for them.”®^
On April 6, 1948, Lyndon Johnson was called to the 
White House for a conference. Evidently he convinced the 
President of his position for on April 8, 1948, Truman 
"froze" all industrial disposals for thirty days. This 
allowed the 230 industrial facilities remaining on War 
Assets' inventory to be examined for possible use in 
national defense. Even though he had prevailed Johnson 
was not contrite. The New York Times reported;
"Mr, Johnson hailed the action, though saying it was 
overdue,"®®
The "freeze" had the effect of lessening War Assets 
inventory. In May, Just before the freeze order expired 
the Munitions Board removed $7,000,000,000 In general 
surplus from possible disposal. This included 114 
additional industrial facilities which were placed under 
the National Security clause,®9
In the middle of May, 1948, with Jess Larson 
testifying, the House Surplus Property Subcommittee 
discussed the legislation which the President had requested 
to replace the Surplus Property Act of 194%, Since the 
1944 legislation would not expire until December 31, 1949»
®?New York Times, April 6, 1948, 4,
)]
89i
®®Ibid,. April 9» 1948, 1,
'Ibid,. May 8, 1948, 21,
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three years after the end of hostilities, there was no 
real hurry.
The President's requested legislation took the 
form of H. R. 6276, Larson heartily endorsed the bill.
His legal staff had worked with the Federal Works Agency 
In drafting the m e a s u r e , I t  seemed the only 
Congressional objection, which was mild, was that WAA was 
operating smoothly, so why rock the boat before all the 
surplus was disposed of. It was felt It would be less
expensive to continue with the present organization 
rather than replace It In the last days of disposal.
But It was pointed out that War Assets employees would 
simply transfer to the Federal Works Agency and complete 
the job. This appeared to quiet opposition,
Then the legislative process came apart, H, R,
6276 was In committee In both Houses when the 
Appropriations Committee of the House sent a bill to the 
floor as a rider on the Supplemental Offices Appropriations 
Act of 1949,93 The Appropriations Committee bill would 
simply terminate War Assets on February 28, 1949 and 




93u, 8, Congressional Record. 80th Cong,, 2d 
Sess,, June 9# 19^0, 76^3,
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Corporation* House members who were really Interested in 
surplus property were truly incensed. Many Congressmen 
were quite concerned with the Appropriations Committee's 
theft of legislative perogative but the legislation 
passed and became law on July 1, 19^8.^^ This Act not 
only set the date for War Assets' demise but decreed that 
thereafter no more surplus would be declared to WAA. In 
order that it might establish a firm inventory, all future 
surplus would be declared to other agencies.
In 1947-48 the War Assets Administration had been 
plagued by administrative problems, but it had disposed 
of over $3,500,000,000 worth of surpluses. The coming 
of the Cold War caused officials to rethink the current 
policies and by late 1947 legislation was passed to 
guarantee retention of the facilities which might be 
needed for defense. As the biennium drew to a close the 
President and the Congress were contemplating permanent 
legislation to remove surplus property from emergency 
status.
q|i ̂U, S, War Assets Administration, Second Quarterly 
Report. 1948 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION
The War Assets Administration lasted through 
exactly one-half of 1949. Those months were unusually 
quiet for the organization and Its Administrator Jess 
Larson. Everyone knew that the agency was soon to go 
out of business, the only question was when. Since, as 
the saying goes. It does no good to beat a dead horse, 
critics were generally kind to War Assets. There were 
no Congressional investigations, and the day had passed 
when a news story of a bemedalled veteran waiting In 
line In a futile effort to get a surplus Jeep could 
arouse a storm of public Indignation.
As 1949 opened, WAA was slated to end on February 
28. Since the disposal agency had not had any 
additional surplus declared to It since July 1, 1948,
Its Inventory had been cut drastically, but there was 
still much to do— more then could be done In two months 
time. On January 3, a New York Times reporter used 
War Assets year-end figures to summarize disposal results. 
Nearly $27,000,000,000 In surplus property had been
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declared to War Assets or predecessor agencies since the 
beginning of operations. Of that, there was about one- 
tenth still In Inventory, most of It hard-to-sell land 
and Industrial facilities. The WAA had collected a 
little over $4,000,000,000 which amounted to a little 
less than 15 per cent of total acquisition cost. Since 
a big portion of the total had been given away or 
scrapped, practically all returns had come from 
facilities which had originally cost some $14,300,000,000. 
That made the dollar return on saleable Items 28 per 
cent.̂
The New York Times story further related how 
foreign affairs In 1948 had affected the War Assets 
Administration. The Draft Law alone had caused the 
Armed Services to call back millions of dollars worth 
of uniforms and training equipment, which had helped WAA 
Inventory. But, on the other hand, national security 
clause restrictions had made Industrial facilities more 
difficult to sell. With a lessening Inventory War Assets 
employment was down to 10,000.^
Later In January of 1949 a committee of eight 
Industrial experts was chosen to review those plants 
which had been placed under national security restrictions
% e w  York Times. January 3, 1949, 59.
^Ibld.
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by the Munitions Board, It was thought that the 24l 
plants and 5,693 machine tools, then In the industrial 
reserves, could be somewhat reduced.3
Any change In the number of available Industrial 
plants would affect War Assets only If that plant had 
been declared surplus before July 1, 1948. Since that 
time all facilities had been declared to the Federal 
Works Agency or the Bureau of Federal Supply. This had 
been done so that it would be possible for WAA to 
establish a firm closing inventory.^
As February 28, 1949 came nearer It became 
obvious that something had to be done about War Assets 
since It still had $2,300,000,000 In Inventory and a 
shorter and shorter time to get rid of It. The bill 
which would put War Assets out of business at the end 
of February assigned the remaining surplus to the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and two other agencies. 
RPC's structure had been changed by the Reorganization 
Act and It was not equipped to accept surplus; the move 
would create chaos. A section of the supplemental 
appropriations bill would extend the WAA, but other sections
3lbld.. January 28, 1949, 31.
^U. S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Expenditures In the Executive Departments, 
Hearings on Federal Property Act of 1949. 8lst Cong., 1st 
Sess., March 24, 1949, 22-23. dlted hereafter as 
Subcommittee Hearings.
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were controversial, and the bill was not expected to 
be passed In time. Therefore, Congressman Chet Hollfleld 
of California brought a bill to the House Committee on 
Expenditures In the Executive Departments to carry War 
Assets to June 30, 1949,^
There was little discussion on the bill since It 
was obvious that It would be foolish not to report It 
favorably. Jess Larson, who was there to testify, said: 
"As a matter of fact, I am reluctant to take the time 
of the committee," But, since he was there, the 
committee decided to talk surplus property with him.
Larson gave the committee the disposal figures 
for the eight months— February projected— since Public 
Law 862 had ended the declaration of surplus to War 
Assets. In that time property totalling $2,256,000,000 
had been disposed of— about one-half by sale and one-half 
by donation. That which was sold brought In 
$200,000,000 of which $65,000,000 was spent In operation 
costs and $135,000,000 deposited In the Treasury,
Larson then projected the probable results of a 
four months extension, to June 30,1949, based on the 
figures he had given for the past eight months. He
^U, 8,, Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures 
In the Executive Departments, Hearings on Extension of 
Office of War Assets Administrator and War Assets 
Administration, blsi Cong,. 1st dess.. {February B. 1949,
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estimated that War Assets would dispose of property worth 
$689,000,000 in acquisition cost. Of this $376,000,000 
would be donated and $313,000,000 sold. Based on 
previous results. War Assets would receive $71,000,000 
for the property. It would cost WAA $15,000,000 to operate, 
so the government would net $56,000,000 from the four 
months extension. Larson then pointed out that if the 
same task was done by another agency, which was not 
familiar with the Job, and which did not have adequate 
personnel, the cost would be much higher and the net 
much lower.^
Larson also projected what would be left to do 
at the end of a four month extension. He said that 
there would be about $1,609,000,000 worth of property 
remaining, of which about $800,000,000 would be on long 
term lease. Another $294,000,000 would be in aircraft 
component parts which had already been turned over to 
another government agency for disposal. Since War Assets 
was already out of the consumers goods business the
7remainder would be entirely in real property.
The Administrator gave the committee a graphic 
illustration of the size of the Job War Assets had 




together and put all of the A & P stores and put the 
chain stores together and put all of the railroads 
together you still would not have the problem that War 
Assets had at Its height."®
War Assets had been very successful In reducing Its 
personnel with Its lessening responsibility. Larson said 
that on July 1, 1948 there had been 17,000 employees. 
Projected to the end of February the number would be 
5,000 and to June 30, 1949 It would be 2,100.9 And of 
all the people who had worked for War Assets at one time 
or another, only 2,000 had been Indicted for petty theft 
and fraud, and only 200 convicted. There had been no 
major scandals.
The Larson charisma was still evident In this 
hearing. Hollfleld had served on the Rlzley committee 
and had known Larson for some time, but he went out of 
his way to compliment the administrator when he said:
"I can say that he has stood up pretty well under our 
committee fire . . . .  I believe that he has done the 
most efficient Job on War Assets of any of the 






York was new, and to make matters worse, he was a former 
employee of War Assets. He started the hearing with 
a very belligerent attitude toward WAA and Larson. The 
Administrator, however, answered his questions courteously 
and well. Tauriello succumbed to the Larson charm and 
ended by saying, "Mr. Larson, when you consider the size 
of the organization that you were trying to administer 
you have done a good Job, you have done a very good 
Job."12
In conclusion Larson told the committee of his 
future plans and his evaluation of his position in War 
Assets: "I hope to get these 4 months to clear up this
Job because I do not plan to spend my life in the 
Government. I want to go back to Oklahoma and practice 
law. It has been a stimulating business but it has its 
headaches."13
When WAA*s First Quarterly Report for 19^9 came 
out, it gave a detailed account of the progress made 
in Industrial disposal. Industrial facilities with a 
reported cost of $373*700,000 remained in available 
inventory with another $664,100,000 on lease. During the 
quarter there had been sixteen disposals of facilities 




largest of these was the Sheffield Steel Plant In 
Jacksonville, Texas which was sold to its wartime 
operator. Prices were evidently low by this time, since 
War Assets did not give them, as it had in earlier
illreports.^
The National Industrial Reserve Act of 19̂ 8«, which 
created the national security clause, was still a 
hindrance to War Assets, although some sales and leases 
were consumated at reduced prices. These restrictions 
were that any plant under the clause had to be kept 
ready to convert back to war production within thirty 
days and that the government could take over operation.
As of March 31, 1949, 100 of the restricted facilities 
had been sold, thirty-eight had been leased and 
forty-one, with a total reported cost of $286,200,000 
remained in inventory. One advantage of the provisions 
of the National Industrial Reserve Act was that industrial 
plants did not have to remain in War Assets inventory.
If the agency certified any facility to be unsalable 
it could be transferred to the Federal Works Agency.
Thirty such transfers had been made.^5
In the first quarter of 1949 two sales were
S., War Assets Administration, First 
Quarterly Report, 1949 (Washington: Government PrintingiOffice," ÏP9T; '4-5:
l^Ibid.. 5.
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disapproved by the Attorney General and the plants were 
returned to War Assets Inventory. These were plants 
for the manufacture of oxygen. Since the industry was 
controlled by two companies, a difficult situation had 
developed. The Attorney General would not approve sales 
to the two major producers, and since they were the only 
prospects, the plants remained under WAA control,
With the reduction in work force, the table of 
organization was much simpler than it had been two years 
earlier, when War Assets had been at near peak employment. 
Still at the top was the Administrator, with an Associate 
Administrator in his office. Working directly with the 
Administration were the Office of the Compliance 
Division, the General Counsel, the General Board, and 
the Management Division. On the policy level in 
Washington were the Divisions of: Aircraft and
Electronics Disposal, General Real Estate Disposal, 
Industrial Real Estate Disposal, Property Management, 
Appraisal, and Fiscal Services, There were regional 
offices remaining in New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, 
Chicago, Atlanta, Grand Prairie (Dallas), Kansas City, 
Denver, San Francisco, and Seattle,




June 30, 1949, Congress found that it must turn its 
attention to permanent legislation. The details of the 
drive for the Federal Property and Administrative Services 
Act of 1949 is beyond the scope of this study. Since 
wartime surplus property was down to the neighborhood of 
$500,000,000 this was really only a small part of the 
problem facing Congress in 1949. The Hoover Commission 
had recommended the consolidation of many governmental 
services and agencies and the Property Act of 1949 
fulfilled many of its suggestions. The Act dealt with 
purchasing, property management, archives, and countless 
other areas which would place it beyond the scope of a 
surplus property study.
It will suffice to say, at this point, that all of 
the bills which were discussed in forming the 1949 
legislation, contemplated transferring War Assets to the 
new agency, whatever it might be. In most of the 
Committee discussions it was at first proposed that the 
responsible agency be the Federal Works Agency which 
had been long established. In fact it was the attorneys 
for FWA and War Assets who drew up the first Senate and
House bills which served as the basis for the Federal
18Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949. The
18U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Hearings on 
the Federal Property Act of 1949. 8lst Cong,, 1st 
Hess,, AprlTl? ; ------
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Idea of the General Services Administration was not 
brought up until April 12, 19%9 in House subcommittee 
hearings.19 The legislation, as it was finally enacted, 
was Public Law 182, Eighty-first Congress, First Session, 
passed on June 30, 1949 and which took effect on July 
1, 1949. It was this Act which ended the War Assets 
Administration,
The complete statistical history of War Assets 
and predecessor agencies was given in the last report 
to Congress which was the Second Quarterly Report. 1949. 
The final results seem surprisingly small when the 
grandiose estimates at the beginning of the operation 
are recalled. The final total acquisitions figure was 
$27,198,000,000 in reported cost. Of this, the 
government sold $15,052,000,000 worth and donated, 
scrapped, or otherwise disposed of $10,319,000,000.
Prom the portion that was sold, the government grossed 
$4,145,000,000. Expense of operation was $1,097,000,000 
so the government's net on sales was $3,048,000,000.
To this add return from leases and other receipts and 
the final net came to $3,700,000,000. The final 
percentages were 27.5 return on sales or a little over
^^Subcommittee Hearings. April 12, 1949, 150.
pAU. S., War Assets Administration, Second 
Quarterly Report. 1949 (Washington: GovernmentPrinting o ï H c i  lsSg), 2.
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15 per cent return on acquisitions.
Evidently there had been considerable additional 
return to War Assets Inventory from the Munition Board's 
review committee because total War Assets Inventory on 
June 30, 1949 was $1,828,000,000 Instead of the estimated 
$500,000,000, Of this $672,000,000 was on lease and 
$1,156,000,000 was on hand and available for sale.^l
Of the remaining War Assets Inventory 
$1,385,000,000 was In real property, $394,000,000 was In 
aircraft component parts, $23,000,000 In leased aircraft, 
and $26,000,000 In property assigned to other agencies 
for sale.
In real property, of which Industrial facilities 
were by far the largest share, total acquisitions had 
been $7,786,000,000, of which $6,401,000,000 worth had 
been disposed of, which left $1,385,000,000 to be
optransferred to the General Servicer Administration.
The big Increase In Industrial facilities from 
the first quarter to the second quarter was In large 
Industrial plants which had been released from the 
strategic reserve. The First Quarterly Report had listed 
forty-one plants costing over $1,000,000, The Second 




$5,000,000 each. The total cost of the seventy was 
$1,065,000,000 or about 70 per cent of the total real 
property left In Inventory, Seven of these larg& plants 
were shipyards, the largest of which was the Sun Shipbuild­
ing and Drydock facility in Chester, Pennsylvania; its 
total reported cost was $21,100,000. This was a bad 
situation since it had been built on privately owned 
land. The company would not sell the land nor offer a 
decent price for the plant.^3
Only sixteen aluminum, magnesium, and non-ferrous 
metal plants were still in inventory, and twelve of 
these were leased. One plant which the government 
could not sell or lease illustrated the hazards of 
wartime construction. This was an aluminum ingot 
plant in Burlington, New Jersey. It had been built 
because of a regional need for aluminum during the 
war. High electric rates, however, made It Impractical 
for peacetime production and the government could not 
give it away. The remaining three plants were under
piithe national security clause.
There were twelve steel plants still available 
for permanent disposal but eight of these were on lease.




plant in East Chicago, Indiana* It had been under the 
national security clause but this was being lifted and 
negotiations were under way to sell It to a manufacturer 
of earth-moving equipment.^5
There were three refineries, valued at approximately 
$7,000,000 each, still for sale. War Assets had 
despaired of ever selling them for operation at the 
sites, so they were being offered for sale to dismantle 
and move.26
Most of the ordnance plants had been taken back 
Into strategic reserve but there were three for sale.
Two were In the process of being sold to multiple 
purchasers, but an offer had not been received for one.
It, however, had been used for WAA storage and had not 
been on the market long.2?
On paper, the situation In general manufacturing 
facilities looked quite good, since the largest, by far, 
was listed as being under lease. But this was the 
$120,000,000 Chrysler plant In Chicago which was 
technically leased to the Tucker Corporation. It had 
gone bankrupt and the disposal agency was waiting for 





Another general purpose plant at Tonawanda, New York had 
been returned to War Assets because of bankruptcy. It 
would seem that War Assets could have expected this from 
Playboy Motors. There were fourteen general manufacturing 
plants and ten, including the Tucker plant, were
leased.28
When War Assets left the scene, it was probably 
the final appearance for that kind of temporary surplus 
disposal organization, despite the size of any future 
national emergency. With the establishment of the 
General Services Administration there would always be a 
permanent organization which would be expanded to handle 
any amount of surplus property.
To evaluate the operations of the War Assets 
Administration and predecessor agencies, it is necessary 
to review the authority under which each operated. 
Executive Order 9^25, which created the Surplus War 
Property Administration in February of 19%%, was a 
simple, straightforward document. It set up an agency 
"to have general supervision and direction of the handling 
and disposition of surplus war property." It was 
admittedly a stop-gap measure and it established some 
bad precedents. When it placed SWPA in the Office of 
War Mobilization, it blurred the lines of authority
28ibid.. 9.
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which later proved troublesome, especially since that 
organization was carried over in the Surplus Property Act 
of 1944. More serious was the precedent which relegated 
the surplus property agency to only a policy function.
This emasculation was only rectified by the War Assets 
Administration which was empowered to handle both policy 
and disposal.
The Surplus Property Act of 1944 was a complex, 
confused, well meaning compromise, passed hurriedly so that 
Congress could go home. The three-man Board did not work 
out. Divided judgment was ineffective in a situation 
which called for quick and forceful decisions. The 
Act's underlying assumption that surplus property should 
be used for the greatest common good was in the finest 
tradition of democratic legislation. Its specific objec­
tives, however, were self contradictory and difficult 
to administer. To foster small, independent business 
and impair the growth of big business was a laudable 
aim, but the law was not strong enough and allowed a 
series of administrators to largely ignore that whole 
section of the Act.
When the Surplus Property Act was amended in 1945 
to allow for a single administrator, the law was made 
more effective. The reform, however, should have gone 
further in order to end OWM direction and to establish 
a dual function.
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The only real reform in the Surplus Property Act 
was first accomplished by Executive Order, In the early 
part of 1946; the War Assets Corporation was formed to 
combine policy and disposal; the powers of WAG were then 
transferred to the War Assets Administration. It was 
only then that a real disposal organization could begin to 
function.
Without exception, the Chief executives of the 
disposal agencies were interesting men, but they were 
not uniformly efficient. The first of these. Will Clayton, 
was a capable man. There can be no doubt that his 
contribution to solving the surplus policy problem was 
substantial. Since he was the first, he had no precedents 
to follow. But he created a surplus property policy 
organization. Critics are apt to be blinded by Clayton's 
lack of a social conscience, his emphasis on business 
methods, and ignore the fact that his influence was 
felt in surplus property administration long after he 
had left the scene.
The Surplus Property Board was doubly foredoomed, 
first by the fact that it was a board, and second by the 
quality of men who served on it, Heller, the most capable 
of three, had not had the national experience necessary 
for the job, and Gillette and Hurley were political 
hacks. As often happens with people who are given power 
beyond their capabilities, they simply abandoned it.
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The Board became an ineffective body, even losing its 
own self-confidence.
As head of the surplus property organization, 
Stuart Symington did not live up to his potential. 
Perhaps this was because it was his first experience in 
the seat of national power. He did not provide the 
dynamic leadership of which he was capable. Dramatic 
changes were in the offing when he was Administrator 
but instead of springing to the lead, he was inclined 
to hang back.
As Administrators, neither of the generals, 
Gregory or Littlejohn, were effective. Gregory had 
been too long in the Regular Army; he did not understand 
a civilian organization. He did not trust civilians 
and had difficulty in getting them to work for him. 
Gregory was too thin-skinned to last long in office, 
but as first War Assets Administrator he established 
the complex organization with which each subsequent 
chief had to live. Littlejohn was, perhaps, the worst 
of the lot. He had difficulty getting along with his 
employees and with Congress. He was an egocentric 
who constantly changed his mind about policy and 
organization. By the time the "coach” left he had the 
"players" completely confused.
It is hard to say why Larson was such a good
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Administrator; there are a lot of possible answers. He 
was a lawyer; he was the only experienced man to be 
named to the job; or It might be that after being raised 
in the intricacies of Oklahoma politics any situation 
would seem simple. In any case he was a fine organization 
man and his public relations were excellent. He was the 
best of the Administrators.
In the eyes of the Administrators, industrial 
plant disposal was always of secondary importance. 
Consumers goods always took precedence because it 
involved more people, there was more Congressional 
pressure because of it, and it was more complicated. For 
industrial disposals the Surplus Property Act was very 
specific; small business was to be helped and nothing 
was to be done to contribute to the growth of giant 
enterprise. The disposal agencies, however, all seemed 
to take the attitude that Congress did not mean it, 
that the legislators really wanted the plants 
distributed as quickly and easily as possible. To have 
achieved the objectives of the Property Act would have 
taken time and constructive effort.
The end result of the surplus plant disposal 
program was to leave industrial concentration just about 
where it was before the beginning of hostilities. The 
250 largest corporations controlled 65 to 70 per cent 
of the nation's productive capacity before the War; they
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received 65 to 70 per cent of the War contracts; and 
they were allotted 65 to 70 per cent of the surplus 
Industrial facilities.
Of even more serious Import was the disposal 
programs effect on the growth of the military-industrial 
complex. This did not result from any conscious effort 
on the part of the military or industry. It simply 
happened that way. Prom the beginning of the War Assets 
Administration, military men were dominant. It is only 
natural that they should look out for the welfare of their 
Service, These industries which in the past had 
cooperated with the military would naturally be given 
preference when there were multiple applicants for any 
given plant. With the worsening of the international 
situation this attitude was given official sanction.
From late in 1947 to the middle of 1949, the Job a company 
could do for the military was an important criterion in 
industrial disposal. Prom Lyndon Johnson's concern 
for adequate plants in the strategic reserve, it was 
only a short step to nearly blind approval of all 
military requests.
Industrial alliance with the military came 
naturally. It had received consideration from military 
men in the assignment of facilities and there was profit 
in the military "cost plus" contracts. This is not to 
say that there was anything comparable to Hitler, Goering,
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and Krupp planning the rearmament of Germany, but the 
result could be equated; both led to a top-heavy military 
budget,
Actually, the planning for industrial plant disposal 
should begin with plant construction at the beginning of 
a national emergency. Any suggestions to improve the 
record of disposal of industrial facilities after World 
War II would have to start there. It would have taken 
little more effort to design, locate, and build the 
plants with an eye to eventual peacetime use.
The legislation for end of war surplus should be 
drafted with care. One legislative act would suffice, 
but plant disposal should be divided from other types of 
disposal, since there is little relationship in the 
handling of personal use items and industrial facilities.
The Act should empower a single administrator to 
handle all aspects of plant disposal. He should be 
instructed to sell, if possible, those plants with a 
reported cost of $1,000,000 or less. Those costing above 
that figure should be retained by the government to be 
leased to those concerns whose operations best tie in 
with the general welfare. Particular effort should be 
made to design plants with ultimate multiple occupancy 
in mind, so that, as far as possible, government-owned 
facilities could go to those firms with the most pressing 
capital problems. Efforts should be made, however, to help
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the larger adequately financed corporations find materials to 
build Industrial facilities quickly so production would not 
be curtailed. In this way all segments of the national 
economy would benefit from government surplus.
Other then a plan of this type, perhaps the only 
answer to the surplus problem Is that given by a witness In 
a legislative committee hearing who advocated withholding 
the surplus from sale. When asked what he would do with It, 
If it was not sold, he answered: "Why not keep It for the
next war?"29
% ,  8,, Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Mobilization 
and Demobilization Problems. 78th Cong,, 2d Sess., 
August 14, 1944, 963.
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